



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IS MANKIND ADVANCING?

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"THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IN THE WORLD"

IS MANKIND ADVANCING?

Martin, Prestonia Mann
By
(MRS. JOHN MARTIN)



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To

THE SUPER-SUPERMAN

WITH THE HOPE THAT HIS COMING

MAY NOT BE TOO LONG

DELAYED

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix
I. PROGRESS MEASURED BY GENIUS	i
II. PROGRESS MEASURED BY MORE THINGS, AND MORE FACTS	92
III. PROGRESS MEASURED BY MORALS	162
IV. PROGRESS MEASURED BY MYSTICISM	265
V. CONCLUSION. CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS	284

A DEPRECATION

At some point in the following work the critic is sure to declare that the writer overestimates the attainments of the Greeks, and he will insist upon recalling, *per contra*, their various well-known defects. Such criticism, however, implies a misapprehension of the purpose of this work. It is as though, when one speaks of "sunny Italy," some one should immediately remark, "But it sometimes rains in Italy"; or if you say, "Men are taller than women," should reply, "But I have seen some very tall women and some quite short men."

The credit side of Greek culture which is here described is a net result — after the debit side has been deducted. To that net result I point, rhetorically, for purposes of comparison. As an humble literary artist, not as a historian, I chose that epoch for the high lights of my picture. It was no part of my purpose, nor did I dream of attempting it, to set forth a complete account of Greek civilization in all its aspects. The net result was all I needed for the purposes for which the comparison was instituted.

INTRODUCTION

THE world to-day is convinced that it is making rapid progress. In western Europe and in America increased wealth production, democratic institutions, free education, free thought, the opening of opportunities in new countries, the acceleration of travel and communication, have combined to produce upon our generation an exhilarating sense of expansion, of liberation, of growing power. We are excited by the liveliness and bustle of the novel experiences and conveniences which each new day brings forth. Like children enjoying their first train ride, we are enchanted in watching the landscape of events and inventions rushing swiftly by and to feel ourselves proudly moving on into a wonderful beyond.

These assurances have been noticeably fortified by our popular conception and acceptance of the doctrine of evolution.¹ I say popular conception for there is a

¹Primitive men did not compare present and past, did not reflect whether they were moving forward or backward. After memory had developed and records had been devised, men began to make comparisons — at first in favor of the past. The Greeks, the Romans, the Hebrews extolled their forebears and believed themselves to be descended from heroic ancestors. Looking backward was to them looking upward — to demigods; with us it is looking downward — to apes. They gloried in their descent; we congratulate ourselves on our ascent. They were proud of their high birth; we are no less proud to have come up

popular interpretation of this theory which is not vouched for by science. Science has never declared that evolution spells progress, that natural selection develops invariably upward; it never dreams of asserting that the "fittest" is necessarily the best. Nevertheless the general public has interpolated its own version of the story and steadfastly persists in seeing evolution in the light of an epic — a holiday excursion from monkey to man. Not loath furthermore to accept favorable estimates of its achievements, it has determined to regard the incident as a corroboration of its claim to sit upon the pinnacle of history. It has thus contrived that science shall seem to have contributed the finishing touch to its complacency; it has picked up evolution, with a bow and a smile, like a prima donna receiving a bouquet. And therewith the question of progress appears to be considered as closed.

It is proposed in this book to submit the question to further examination. We shall ask, quite as though the matter had not yet been decided, "Is progress really taking place?" Is it certain, we shall inquire, that it is our train which is in motion, or is our impression of motion an illusion caused by the moving past us of the train on the next track? What is progress? we shall ask. Is all motion progress? Do we mean greater wealth, or are

from a low origin. They sought by great deeds to draw near to their ancestors; we endeavor to get away as far as possible from ours. They pleased themselves with tales of the heroes, saints, and demigods from whom they had sprung; we take no less satisfaction in our humble ancestry of baboons, molluscs, and protoplasm.

we thinking of moral or of mental advance when we speak of progress? Or have we in mind, perhaps, not the state of the individual at all, but of society as a whole?

This latter view, which is held somewhat widely among the cultured, declares that the "social organism" is advancing quite irrespective of the individuals composing it. It affirms that some sort of progress is necessarily taking place somewhere, somehow. Whatever may be said of individuals, "things" are improving, "the world" is growing better, "society" is advancing, laws and the general standard of behavior are steadily rising. While, as an individual, man, perhaps, may not be adding one cubit to his mental stature, yet the civilization which is the work of his hands is making progress.¹

Let us consider this view and dispose of it once for all. That society can improve, without progress being made by the individuals composing society, is difficult of acceptance. It is true that experience and practise will effect mechanical improvements of various kinds.

¹ Belief in progress seems to be common to all classes. At one social extreme there are not a few persons of religious confession with whom to doubt progress is a sacrilege because it is to doubt the wisdom of an overruling Providence; while at the other extreme those severest of all our critics — the socialists — also share apparently no less in the fixed belief in the existence of progress. In the midst of their bitterest denunciations of existing society, they still manage somehow, so it would appear, to retain intact their faith that good is to be the outcome of evil. As the orthodox believer looks forward to emerging from a life of sin and suffering into the bliss of salvation, so does the socialist's faith sustain him in the belief that somehow oppression, injustice, waste, and strife are to issue ere long in a heaven of brotherly love.

Pedestrians on crowded streets learn to minimize collisions. The members of a community acquire gradually the knack of getting along together with the least friction, and this by the same experiences by which the child learns that fire will burn. The second performance of an orchestra is apt to be smoother than the first, though the players are no better. Let us go further. Civilized communities (unless hindered by unusual occurrences) tend to become richer, the struggles between classes tend to secure a social equilibrium. The capitalistic system, for example, encourages the abolition of slavery and the free circulation of labor together with the sharpening of incentive and the provision of free education. But all these things at their best are but means to an end. There is no value in wealth except it be converted into human energy. If a rich woman dies of heart disease from lack of exercise, how can her carriage, which prevented her ever taking a walk, be regarded as wealth, or what wealth is there in the dose of poison which the suicide purchases, although he pays money for it? There is no wealth but life. There is no use in riches, freedom, opportunity, education, government, commerce, civilization, except to uplift mankind. There is no use in a "better" society except to produce better human beings. Progress in human society consists in the production of finer and finer strains of men and women, the final test of their superiority being their relative degree of pure intelligence.¹

¹It is to be noted that throughout this work the conception of progress which is adopted is one having no relation to those blind, unconscious

One gardener must prove his superiority over another by showing finer fruits and flowers. We do not accept any other proof. If he should declare that he had provided better fertilizers, better soil, better moisture, heat, and ventilation, yet his roses were no finer, we should deny his primary claims for we know that better conditions will produce better roses. Nature never fails; she always keeps her engagements. The fertilizer, soil, moisture, air, heat, which he used, if they did not produce better results, were not better, since their quality of being "better" depends upon results being better. All our social conditions are to be judged by the same test; they stand or fall exactly in proportion to the degree in which they can be shown to advance human progress, that is, as they bring forth finer and finer breeds of men and women. I hold this to be self-evident.

The word progress should, I believe, be exclusively reserved to express a rise in human capacity, the development of higher orders of human beings. Thus restricted, it remains, as it should, a strictly qualitative, never a quantitative, term. Improved conditions conduce to progress, and are necessary to progress, but may exist without producing progress. Progress is something more than improvement. Pro-gress means movement forward. Progress is a matter of growth. Comfort may and it may not conduce to progress. Passengers

operations of natural law which form the field of the biologist's observations, but concerns itself solely with the conscious, rational ends of a self-directing society.

sitting impatiently in a train that has broken down may have their hunger relieved and their condition improved by food being procured, but they do not thereby approach any nearer to their destination.

Looking back along the line of history, we can see that we (mankind) have been traveling a long, long road whose winding way, rising and falling century after century, we can trace back for a few thousand years until it enters a trackless desert and fades utterly from our view in the mists of antiquity. Immediately behind the spot where we now stand there seems to lie a downward slope, that is to say, we seem to have been ascending since the eighteenth, the seventeenth, yes, part of the sixteenth centuries. But the Elizabethan era and the period of the Renaissance in Italy do not lie below us. Life was very full and splendid then; man had climbed to a higher point of outlook than that upon which we now act out our little day. Behind those centuries the way becomes obscure; it seems to pass through deep and silent forests, over dim, somnolent plains, in shadowy twilights and through deserted wastes, until it falls away into a wide, cold swamp, noisome, dark, terrible, abounding in reptiles and the horrid monsters of sick dreams. Beyond this death-bound stillness of the Dark Ages, the road ascends again into the upper air. Birds are singing, the sunlight touches the grain fields; the bustle of human life appears, troops of soldiery in glittering armor, citizens in gorgeous raiment, all the pomp and pageantry of the triumphant Roman Empire. Behind Rome the road drops away again suddenly, a deep sharp drop into a

INTRODUCTION

xv

valley, beyond which it begins to rise once more and, becoming steeper and steeper, it lifts our gaze to the very mountain tops, where among the clouds against the deep blue sky, swept by fresh breezes, enthroned amid snow-white temples, gleaming in the golden sunshine, Greek civilization sits upon the pinnacle of human greatness.

IS MANKIND ADVANCING?

CHAPTER I

PROGRESS MEASURED BY GENIUS

"The advance of mankind has everywhere depended upon the production of men of genius."

HUXLEY, *Letter to Kingsley*, 1863.

HAVING determined upon a definition of progress, we may now ask ourselves by what method we may set about to measure its rise or fall from age to age. One method will no doubt readily occur to us — that of estimating the rank of an epoch by the number and caliber of its men of genius. To some persons this will not seem a satisfactory criterion, and we shall perhaps find ourselves being assured that an increasing comfort and material welfare enjoyed by the common people are no less, or perhaps more, an adequate measure of progress. To such we shall reply under the caption, *Progress Measured by More Things*, while the argument of others, that progress consists rather in the advancement of knowledge, we shall consider under the head of *Progress Measured by More Facts*. To the still dissatisfied who reject these tests and insist that the sole test of real progress is goodness, we shall address our answer under the title, *Progress Measured by Morality*. Finding ourselves now confronted by the still more subtle objections of those who hold that progress is contained in man's

spiritual advance, which is independent of both morals and material welfare, we shall reply in *Progress Measured by Mysticism*.

In addressing ourselves to the history of genius we find at once that its importance lies in the fact that in the achievements of great men we have an admirable measure of the peoples who produced them.

This point is essential to my argument and I must therefore beg a moment's attention to it. There are two theories of genius. One declares that the genius is a sporadic phenomenon, dropping suddenly like a bolt from the blue sky, a freak of nature, a detached, unaccountable appearance, an inexplicable marvel, a miracle. The other theory (conveniently called the "representative theory") asserts that the man of genius is an expression or representation of his age; in his personality (of extraordinary susceptibility) he takes up into himself the thoughts and feelings of his contemporaries, and through his superior powers of expression, or action, he says what they would say, or does the things which they but dream of. According to this theory (which the writer accepts) the great man is not an accident but is pushed up by the social forces beneath him. He is the fruit of the tree of life. The people have produced him; out of their loins he sprang, and their influence upon his growth has determined its scope and direction. He speaks for the dumb and acts for the quiescent who would speak his words and do his deeds if they could. They are the wine, he is the bubble which rises, shines, and breaks upon the top. The bulb of his sensibility

is immersed in their pools of thought and feeling and he records the temperature to which they raise him. The genius reaches high-water mark, but it was the whole ocean that lifted him there.¹

The men of Athens loved to discuss and argue; presently they produced Socrates and Demosthenes. Athens worshiped beauty, and soon it hailed Ictinus, the creator of the Parthenon, and Phidias. Athens revered knowledge, and before many years Aristotle arose. The Macedonians panted for war, and Alexander was brought forth. Rome chafed for conquest, and Cæsar appeared. England under Elizabeth was drunk with the love of life, and Shakespeare lived. Modern Germany hummed with music, from castle to cottage, and in time Beethoven and Schubert were begotten.

"If Beethoven," it has been remarked, "had been born in Chicago, he could not have composed his symphonies." But he could not have been born in Chicago. Chicago does not grow Beethovens. Chicago produces men of other talents. America has no Kant, no Wagner. This is because, if you visit an American playground of an afternoon, you will not find numbers of students lying under a tree absorbed in reading philosophy for the love of it; nor, upon entering the house of villages in the eve-

¹ "Great men are not born among fools," writes Carlyle. "There was Robert Burns. I used often to hear from old people in Scotland of the good sense and wise conversation around that little fireside where Burns listened as a child. When a great soul rises up, it is generally in a place where there has been much hidden worth and intelligence at work for a long time. The vein runs on, as it were, beneath the surface for a generation or so, then bursts into the light in some man of genius."

ning, will you find nine out of ten families making music. America's geniuses are coal barons and money kings, or, for the rest, inventors and electric engineers. Why has America no poet of nature to rank with the Englishmen Wordsworth, or Keats, or Shelley? It is because the American people do not love nature as the English people do. In America the leisure class lives in towns and cares nothing for clouds and stars, birds and trees; while that class which does live in the country toils terribly and takes no time for poetry. A leisure class loving the country and living there is the nursery of nature poets.¹

It is scarcely possible to find in the long catalogue of men of genius any instances which are not entirely representative. Jesus is the perfect culmination of the religious genius of the Hebrews. Cæsar was the embodiment of the masterfulness of the Roman will. Demosthenes was the mouthpiece of Hellenic eloquence. St. Bernard was a product of medieval mysticism. Schopenhauer was the outward sign of certain underlying Teutonic melancholy and world-weariness.

Calvin gave utterance to definite austere moods of reaction current in his day. All forms of genius either root themselves in congenial soil or perish. Had not Voltaire struck a responsive chord in the minds of his contemporaries he would never have heard been of. It

¹This is the reason also why great men come in groups. "The sixteenth century," says Lowell, "was a spendthrift of literary genius. An attack of immortality might have been looked for in a family then as scarlet fever would be now."

was England's interest in science which made Darwin's development possible. Victor Hugo voiced French romance. Edison is the fruit of America's practical inventiveness and enterprise. Need we multiply instances? Nearly all authorities are agreed, and the evidence is abundant to establish the validity of the "representative" theory of genius, which holds that the great man is the product of his age and in his characteristics manifests a fair measure of the qualities and powers of the people who have brought him forth.

This theory is by no means overthrown because of the fact that he does not always meet with the appreciation of the parental nation. Parental love sometimes turns to hate; Cronos was said to have devoured his own offspring. By a similar perversion Athens executed Socrates whom it had begotten, and Israel betrayed Jesus who was the fruit of its loins. Indeed, pregnant nations, like pregnant women, are not infrequently exceedingly excitable. They are subject to sudden and violent reactions, and may at any moment develop a nervous antipathy to the offspring they have just brought to birth. Sometimes it may be because the infant reproduces with offensive accuracy the faults and blemishes of its parents. It sometimes happens indeed that when a nation has succeeded in getting embodied in one individual its perfect national type, when it sees held up before it in one person as in a mirror its own traits, its secret ambitions, its excesses and its dreams, it recoils in horror from its own image and its repentance dates from that day. Thus the France of our time is chastened by the

recollection of Napoleon; thus the Revolution quailed before the spectacle of Marat; thus the people of the United States stand aghast before that exhibition of greed curiously combined with generosity and piety which is embodied in the person of its leading monopolist. Because a nation repudiates its offspring does not at all disprove the offspring's parentage, and whether the people's irritation be the result of wounded vanity at beholding its own vices thus writ so large that all the world may see them, or whether it be caused, in contrariwise, by the appearance in its offspring of an unattainable form of its own characteristic virtues, as in Jesus and Socrates — a development which carries in it a mortifying reproach — the result is the same: the parent resents the offspring.

It now becomes apparent why the acceptance of the "representative" theory of genius is important to my argument. In the person of this individual genius the race takes a step forward. When genius does not appear the standard of the race is stationary.

Great men are the types and representatives of the peoples who produce them, and, contrariwise, peoples can be measured by the number and grade of the great men they produce. Thus we are able to examine in a convenient manner various epochs as they stand revealed to us in the qualities and numbers of men of genius.

The task which, in the beginning of this work, I set for myself was to examine as impartially as I could the annals of genius in all ages, and, relying upon the best authorities procurable, institute a comparative estimate

as to their relative numbers and degrees of power. The work was exceedingly laborious, necessitating the poring over of hundreds of biographies and many months of stupefying concentration upon books of reference. Of course, it was, from the outset, vain to dream of devising any system of grading which would meet with everybody's approval, since in the absence of established canons of criticism even the rankings of conspicuous genius are subject to the widest variety of opinion. To dispute as to matters of taste is, as we all know, the most futile of occupations, but that the standing of giants like Aristotle, or Plato, or Raphael, or Homer should be subject to dispute did not seem to me for a long time to be sufficiently probable to constitute a serious objection to the proposed plan. It was not until my work was done, and thirteen charts had been laboriously prepared, that an exceedingly able critic, who had read the manuscript, succeeded in making apparent to me the difficulties of the task.

"It is not possible," said he, "to decide between men of genius, to determine whether Kant, for instance, is a greater genius than Herbert Spencer. You may prefer Homer to Victor Hugo, but I prefer Victor Hugo. You rank Rembrandt above Millet, but I should give Millet the higher place, and so on. There are no absolute standards. Genius of different kinds are, moreover, incommensurable. Again, the place of a great man is dependent to some degree upon the grade of competitors in his century. He may take first prize in a small show when he would be in-

conspicuous in a larger class. How can your charts make due allowance for this? Then, again, it is impossible for you or any one to preserve complete impartiality. With us all, tastes and personal preferences unconsciously influence our judgment. You, for instance, over-idealize the ancient Greeks; you over-emphasize their virtues and magnify their genius at the expense of that of our own time; you are so infatuated with the beauty of their civilization that you cannot judge it in cold blood; you can no longer discern their faults; their brilliancy has dazzled you."

I confess that I was much impressed by this criticism, the truth of which I could not deny, and it seemed that if I was to preserve my candor I must abandon utterly the attempt to measure the progress of civilizations through comparing the relative productivities of genius. I recalled the endless disputes into which I had been drawn by other unconvinced critics. I remembered a vigorous protest upon the part of one of these as to my high estimate of Moses, who, so my critic was persuaded, never existed at all. Buddha, in his view, was open to the same suspicion. Laplace and Spencer, he declared, were both greater than Aristotle. Hume, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Descartes all surpassed Kant. Hipparchus was a greater mathematician than Euclid. Hippocrates had been beaten by "a dozen" modern physicians. Tennyson was more artistic than Goethe, and Goethe had qualities lacking in both Homer and Dante. Rostand was not a great dramatist; Ibsen was. Velasquez was superior to Raphael; Grote, Thirlwall,

Mommsen, Meyer had done a kind of work which Thucydides couldn't have done; a writer like Bury was not excelled in any previous age. Wagner and Strauss had outstripped Beethoven. Degas and Whistler had never been surpassed as colorists. Modern poets did things which would have been out of Dante's range. There was nothing in all literature greater than the fiction of Tourguénief and Dostoyevsky. Shakespeare did not transcend Ibsen in his way. Faust was not a more admirable poem in its kind than Peer Gynt. Balzac, Thackeray, Zola were quite unparalleled in previous literature.

Here was indeed a pretty kettle of fish! To add to my perplexity, my free-thought friend claimed a quite appalling preeminence for free-thinkers; my practical friend would assign to inventors the palm over all other forms of genius; my military friend exalted the conquerors; my capitalistic friend declared Andrew Carnegie to be the greatest genius of all time; my trade-union friend valued highest the leaders of that movement; my socialistic friend would place Karl Marx among the anointed; my French friend besought a place for Victor Hugo among the gods; Boston would put Emerson on high; my patriotic neighbor threatened violence should Abraham Lincoln be seated below Pericles.

And now, finally, had come the Able Critic declaring that no settlement of these claims is possible. Judges at cattle and dog shows can weigh points and assign prizes, but for one person the whole area of human

genius is too big a field, no judges exist who are competent to award prizes in such a vast series of contests.

Confessing the truth of this contention, I led our discussion on to the consideration of the facts concerning moral progress, when I learned, to my amazement, that in this department the Able Critic had no hesitation whatever in expressing final judgments. In his opinion, not only are there no evidences at all that our civilization has made any moral advance over the ancient world, but he asserted confidently that the modern world has never even considered the advisability of once for all making any adequate, collective effort to improve its morals. From this incident I learned that every one reserves to himself the right to pass judgment on the question which he knows something about, and I therefore concluded that, while all our finite judgments, it is true, must be imperfect, we should not be debarred from making any judgments whatever, and the view of a candid and industrious person, though never so inadequate, is after all better than no opinion at all.

For surely there is no other question in the world which compares in importance with the question of human growth, and to establish a sound theory of progress is the chief need of mankind.

We shall be obliged to take a wide sweep in our survey of the annals of genius, and since the necessities of the case demand free and full citations from art critics, the author solicits the reader's patience for some pages. The form is not to be desired, but under the circumstances is unavoidable.

In addressing ourselves to a survey of men of genius, we shall find that the great men of all ages fall into three main categories; (1) Those who create beauty (the artists, literary and plastic); (2) those who pursue truth (speculative and natural philosophers and scientists); (3) the great leaders who contribute to human welfare.¹

Let us glance through the history of painting. We know little of Greek painting, but we know that the Greeks themselves (who were no mean critics) praised their painters in high terms. Polygnotus was called "the Homer of painting"; Aristotle declared that he was "an ethical painter." He was presented with the freedom of the city. The painter Zeuxis was compared to Phidias, the master-sculptor. Quintilian called the painter Parrhasius "the legislator of painting." The

¹These have been disposed in thirteen charts. (1) *Artists* (painters, sculptors, architects, composers, poets, dramatists, story-tellers — seven classes). *Scientists* (one class). *Philosophers* (one class). *Great Leaders* Men of action (conquerors, discoverers, travelers, kings); men of power and persuasion (orators, statesmen, patriots, benevolent rulers, lawgivers, jurists); educators (non-religious, teachers, reformers, critics, philanthropists, historians, patrons of learning, political economists); religious leaders (prophets, founders of sects, ethical teachers, preachers — twenty classes).

Each individual is entered in the century in which he was living at the age of thirty, that being the age at which his activity may be assumed to begin its prime. The red line at the head of the columns affords a general survey of the rise and fall of genius in succeeding centuries. Attention has been concentrated upon the placing of the first and the second names in each column — those following have not been especially graded. Actors and performers of various kinds are omitted, since their work is evanescent and does not admit of comparison.

Progress of Genius in History

masterpieces of Euphranor have been highly praised by Pliny and by Plutarch.

Lessing tells of the painter, Protagenes, who, finding that his marvelous depicting of a partridge in one of his paintings was becoming the admiration of all Greece and was distracting attention from the main figure, effaced it from the picture.

Pliny says that there was in Greece a picture so highly valued by the Greeks that the town which contained it was safe from attack. Demetrius would not assault the place where it was.

In the Dark Ages the painter's brush was still. Humanity was despondent; art languished. In the thirteenth century came an awakening; joy touched the horizon; in Italy art dawned. Men of genius began to appear. Cimabue (1240), Giotto (1266), were followed by Gaddi (1300); Bartolo (1362); Orcagna (1315), and others. The art of painting rose in splendor as the sun rises on a June morning. Fra Angelico (1387), Botticelli (1447), Perugino (1446), Lippi (1412), Ghirlandajo (1449), Leonardo da Vinci (1452), mounted to the region of great art. In the sixteenth century Raphael (1483)¹,

¹"Raphael's faculty and his artistic purpose were exactly balanced. He saw what to do and he did it, exercising from boyhood an unimpeded energy of pure productiveness. He was gifted with inexhaustible fertility and with unwearied industry. He had a nature which converted everything to beauty. Thought, passion, emotion became in his art living melody. We almost forget his strength in admiration of his grace. There is nothing overmuch in any portion of his work, no sense of effort, no straining. It is as though the spirit of Greece lived in him again.

"His intellectual capacity in all that concerned the art of painting was

M. Angelo (1475),¹ Titian (1477) Tintoretto (1512), A. Dürer (1471) carried the art to its summit. The seventeenth century could not quite sustain this altitude; there is a slight fall (the admirers of Velasquez and of Rembrandt perhaps doubt this), but in its chief lights, including Rubens, Domenichino, Murillo, Van Dyck, and many others, the art is still transcendent. The eighteenth century witnessed a decline to the level of Gainsborough and Reynolds, the nineteenth rose again to the measure of Millet, Corot, Turner, and a long roll of other talent. A chart of the leading painters of each age might present itself somewhat as follows:

Notice the rise and fall of the heavy line.

unbounded. Of no other artist do we feel that he was so instinctively and unerringly right in what he thought and did. The rapture of Greek art has never been so well recaptured as in his *Galatea*. His Madonnas are each more lovely than the other, like roses in June. The Apollo of the Greeks was not more radiant, more victorious by the marvel of his smile, more intolerant of things obscure and ugly. Raphael will not suffer his eyes to fall upon what is loathsome or horrific. Even sadness and sorrow, tragedy and death, take loveliness from him. His men and women are glorious in youth or dignified in hale old age. Touched by his innocent and earnest genius, mankind was once more endowed with the harmony that had belonged to Hellas." Symonds' "Renaissance in Italy," Vol. III.

¹ "Michael Angelo seems to have intended to prove by his form-poems that the human body has a language inexhaustible in symbolism, every limb, every feature, and every attitude being full of significance to those who comprehend." *Ibid.*

PAINTERS

GREEKS	13 AND 14 CENT.	15 CENT.	16 CENT.	17 CENT.	18 CENT.	19 CENT.
Polygnotus Agatharcus Micon		L. da Vinci Botticelli Fra Angelico	RAPHAEL M. ANGELO Titian Tintoretto Correggio	Rembrandt Velasquez Rubens		Millet Corot Meissonier
	Cimabue Giotto				Gainsborough Reynolds Romney Raeburn	

Concerning the supremacy of Greek sculpture there is practically no question. Sturgis ("The Appreciation of Sculpture") writes:

"The best sculpture of the Greeks (479-350 B.C.) has been held to be more nearly faultless than any other class of works of fine art. This art upon which all European arts of form have been based remains the accepted model of all perfection. We do not know all that the Greek artist had in mind, but that which we have of his workmanship remains superior in pure form to aught which we find elsewhere."

Walter Pater ("Greek Studies") writes:

"The works of the highest Greek sculpture are intellectualized to the utmost; the human figures seem actually to conceive thoughts. In them that Greek, profoundly reasonable spirit of design, traceable upward from the simplest object, the oil vessel or the urn, reaches its perfection. The aim of Greek sculpture was to command and express the deepest elements of man's nature and destiny in a manner clear, graceful, and simple. The

student of Greek sculpture must cultivate the capacity to appreciate expression of thought in outward form, to associate sense with soul, and trace what we call expression to its source; also a not less constant appreciation of workmanship in works, of design in things designed, of the rational control of matter everywhere.

"Greek art attained in its presentation of the human form not only to the profound expression of the highest indwelling spirit of human intelligence, but to the expression also of the great human passions, of the powerful movements, as well as of the calm and peaceful order of the soul, as finding in the affections of the body a language the elements of which the artist might analyze and then combine, order, and recompose. In a great Greek statue you have pure humanity — and it is pure — with a glowing yet restrained delight in itself, but without vanity. To have achieved just that was the Greek's truest claim to furtherance in the main line of human development."

Greek architecture occupies a scarcely less preeminent position than Greek sculpture. Lübke ("History of Art") writes:

"Greek architecture displays the lofty grace of an unfettered mind, the conscious feeling of human dignity and the cheerful sense of a noble worship."

Professor T. H. Lewis writes:

"The Greeks have not been surpassed in the exquisite beauty of form and proportion, in the extreme simplicity and perfect harmony which pervade every part of their structures. The qualities of simplicity and harmony are visible in the long unbroken lines which bound their forms, and the breadth, boldness, and fitness of every part. . . . For all the higher effects which architecture is capable of producing, a Greek temple of the Doric order is perhaps unrivaled."

Professor H. C. Butler ("The Story of Athens") writes:

"There are no words in any language to describe the indefinable charm of the faultless completeness of the Parthenon. There is a finality about its perfect proportions which cannot be explained, but which leaves no doubt in the critic's mind that this is of all buildings of man's hands the most flawless. Not only were the proportions the subject of the architect's devoted study, but subtle knowledge of optics, the delicate art of making things look as they should, by making them what they should not look, was applied in a hundred different ways to impart suppleness and vigor to the style. There is not a straight line in the whole structure. The long horizontal lines of the stylobate and the corona of the pediment are curved gently upward to prevent the appearance of sagging. The seemingly perpendicular lines stand inward. The swelling entasis of the columns is the most delicate curve known. Precision and delicacy of workmanship were lavished upon the structure. Although it was only ten years a-building, the profiles of the moldings, the arises of the column flutings, the most minute edges within and without were cut with almost microscopic precision. The drums of the columns were doweled together and then revolved one upon the other with fine sand between until the joints were scarcely perceptible."

Edward Carpenter ("Civilization: Its Cause and Cure") writes:

"This was the great glory of the Greeks, that they accepted and perfected nature; as the Parthenon sprang out of the limestone terraces of the Acropolis, carrying the natural lines of the rock by gradations scarcely perceptible into the human beauty of frieze and pediment, so in all their best work and life they stood in close relation to elemental things, admitting no gulf between themselves and them, but only perfecting their expressiveness and beauty. And some day we shall again understand this

which, in the very sunrise of true art, the Greeks so well understood."

Gothic architecture, invented by men of northern Europe in an otherwise barren and gloomy period of history, reached its perfection in the thirteenth century. It died out entirely by the middle of the sixteenth century, killed by the Renaissance. The Renaissance, however, did not achieve great things in architecture. Art could not return to the pure Greek models after its dalliance with Gothic ideals; nor could it continue to develop Gothic mysticism while impelled to a return to classic forms. Renaissance architecture fell between two schools.

Italian architecture falls short of the Greek. Symonds ("Renaissance in Italy") writes concerning its greatest master:

"Michael Angelo bequeathed in architecture masterpieces of energy and original invention in their kind unrivaled. He, however, took little pains to adapt the parts to the structural purpose of the building. It was enough for him to create a wholly novel framework for the sculpture it enshrines, attending to such rules of composition as determine light and shade, and seeking by the slightness of moldings and pilasters to enhance the terrible and massive forms that brood above the Medicean tombs. The dome of St. Peter's is his supreme achievement as an architect."

Modern architecture is imitative; at its best it is inoffensive. American architecture is a curious medley of all schools. A recent writer has said of it:

"Architecture in New York City, as a manifestation of human energy, is almost inspiring, but as the crudest and

nudest exhibition of the struggle for life, it is revolting. No man can now fix the limit of altitude. Manhattan has no sky-line at all. It is everybody for himself and the devil take the lowermost. The Babel builders seek each to monopolize light and air regardless of injury to their neighbors. It is a Saturnalia of individualism and, as an architectural aggregation, it is hideous . . . yet, it may be maintained, that is after all the true architectural expression of the American character, and that the polyglot confusion, the riotous irregularity, the ferocious individualism here manifested are American traits."

ARTS AND CRAFTS

All great art periods have been preceded as well as accompanied by unusual activity in the minor arts and crafts. While the sculptor, the painter, the poet, and the architect bring forth works in the grand style, the common people in alley and farmyard, hut and workshop, are fashioning with equal zeal innumerable small objects, useful and ornamental, in which they too express their ideas of how things should be. The degree of man's intelligence, uttered in terms of creative happiness, can be read in these works of his hand. What infinite pathos and charm lie, then, in these crumbling pots, these rusty buckles, these cracked urns, these tattered bits of woven stuff, these battered coins! They tell us of an age when men loved life for its own sake, when to be at work was to celebrate a perpetual festival. At such times the coin in the merchant's bag, the toy in the baby's fingers, the jewel in the maiden's girdle, the buckle on the warrior's shoulder, were fashioned with the same tender thought that was used to rear the noblest temples.

"The Greeks," says Professor Lowes Dickinson ("The Greek View of Life"), "were by nature artists. They created works of art more purely beautiful than those of any other age or people. Their mere household crockery, their common pots and pans, were molded in shapes so exquisitely graceful, and painted in designs so admirably drawn and composed, that any one of them has a higher artistic value than the whole contents of the British Royal Academy."

"The Greek workman," writes Professor Middleton, "was apparently incapable of making an ugly thing. Whatever the material he worked with, or whatever the object he wished to make, whether armor, personal ornament, or domestic vessels, the form was always especially adapted to its use, the ornament natural and graceful, so that the commonest water jar was a delight alike to him who made it and to him who used it."

"Into a world of material splendor," says Walter Pater ("Greek Studies") — "molded clay, beaten gold, polished stone — this informing soul entered, reclaiming the metal and stone and clay until they are as full of living breath as the real warm body itself. The background of Greek sculpture was a world of exquisite craftsmanship, touching the minutest details of daily life, in close correspondence with a peculiarly animated development of human existence."¹

¹Again he writes: "In reading Homer we seem to pass through the treasures of some royal collection. All life is beautified by the work of cunning hands. The thrones, coffers, couches are studded with bossy ornaments of precious metal, or inlaid with stained ivory, or blue cyanus, or amber, or pale gold; the surfaces of the stone conduits, the sea walls, the public washing troughs, the ramparts, are fair and smooth, all the fine qualities in color and texture of woven stuff are carefully noted — the finesse, closeness, softness, pliancy, gloss, the whiteness, or nectar-like tints in which the weaver delights to work. To weave the sea-purple threads is the appropriate function of queens and noble women. Use and beauty are still undivided; all that men's hands are set to make has still a fascination alike for workmen and spectators.

"Homer's minute, delighted, loving description of details of ornament,

"The Greeks," says Ruskin ("Athena in the Heavens") "never had bad dreams. Other arts depend for half of their power upon a certain feverish terror. But the Greeks could not have made anything ugly if they had tried."

The most exquisite bits of metal work perhaps in existence are the wonderful little shoulder-pieces, known as the "Siris bronzes" — the product of the fourth century B.C.

"No work of art in metal," writes Professor Middleton, "has probably ever surpassed these little figures for vigor, beauty, and expression, while the skill with which the artist has beaten these high reliefs out of a flat plate of metal appears almost miraculous."

"The metal work which Hordt describes is all hammer work," writes Walter Pater ("Greek Studies"), "which in a certain naïveté and vigor is the most expressive of all work of actual contact with dexterous fingers. One seems to trace it on every particle of the partially resisting material, the touch and play of the shaping instruments in highly trained hands, under the guidance of exquisitely disciplined senses — that *cachet* or seal of nearness to the workman's hand which is the special charm of good metal work."

The art of metal-working passed through periods of elaboration and showiness under Roman sway, becoming splendidly decorative in the sixth and eighth centuries under Byzantine influence and rose with the other arts

his following out of the ways in which brass, gold, silver go into chariots and armor and women's dresses, or cling to the walls, evidences an imagination stirred at the spectacle of real works of art. His mind is full of the lively impression of delightful things recently seen. Greek genius with new, informing, combining spirit played over the elements of art, touching them above all with a wonderful sense of the nature and destiny of man, the dignity of his soul and of his body."

at the Renaissance. Since then but little metal work of value has been produced.¹

Pottery was among the earliest crafts and men learned how to mold clay by hand even before they had invented the potter's wheel. Endless varieties of form occur in archaic pottery, changing with the mood and individuality of the potter; full of spirit and life, in their easy grace and the multiplicity of their flowing lines, in their fertility of invention and the utmost freedom of touch, these simple clay vessels give one — more perhaps than any other works of art — that keen esthetic pleasure which consists in a retrospective sympathy with the joy which the artist took in his own handiwork.

Greek pottery began at an extremely remote period. A large number of funeral urns of great beauty from about 350 B.C. have been found near Athens. Of the finest of these a kylix bears on its inside surface a drawing of Aphrodite seated on the back of a flying swan, concerning which Professor Middleton writes as follows:

"For delicacy of touch and refined beauty of drawing this painting is quite unrivaled. The exquisite loveliness of Aphrodite's head and the pure grace of her profile, touched in with simple, brush-formed lines, are quite indescribable, and show a combination of mechanical skill united to imaginative power and the realization of the most perfect and ideal beauty, such as no people but the Greeks have ever so completely possessed."

¹"In modern Europe," says Professor Middleton, "the arts of metal-working are not flourishing. The bronze lions of the Nelson monument in London are sad examples of the present low state of the founders' art. The high-priced gates at South Kensington, large and pretentious, are valuable only in showing what wrought iron ought not to be."

Homer compares the rhythm of a dance to the measured spin of a potter's wheel. Roman, Etruscan, Persian and Moslem, Spanish, Moorish, Portuguese, Italian, Mexican and Peruvian, Chinese, and Japanese wares contain an endless variety of design and ornamentation, combined with various sorts of clay and treatment, but nothing superior in beauty to the archaic and early Greek art.

"Sad though the confession is," writes Professor Middleton, "it must be admitted that to find a class of pottery designed with lines of beauty and produced in accordance with the simple quality of plastic clay, it is necessary to go, not to the centers of our boasted nineteenth-century civilization with its countless devices for turning out cheap work rapidly, but rather to the humble workshops of primitive races among whom the commercial spirit had not yet destroyed all inborn feeling for true art and beauty."¹

¹Medieval and Dutch pottery developed much grotesqueness, as did the English of the sixteenth century.

In the eighteenth century Josiah Wedgwood made an ambitious attempt to reproduce the beauty of Greek and Roman pottery. With great labor and expense he turned out from his workshop imitations, necessarily unsuccessful, of ancient engraved gems and camei, of jasper, basalt, and mottled marbles, of gem-like cut glass, such as the Portland vase, and dull copies, feeble in drawing and hard in texture, of beautiful painted Greek vases. Of natural methods of decoration suitable to pottery, or the life and freedom of the plastic clay rising into graceful forms under the touch of the potter's hand, aided by the rhythmic motion of the wheel, he knew, we are told, practically nothing.

The Japanese have shown great cleverness and ingenuity in mixing all sorts of clays, pastes, enamels, and pigments, but have aimed at producing curious rather than beautiful effects. Their main object has been to make pottery to imitate wood, ivory, bronze, lac, marble, basket-work, fruit, in fact resembling almost anything rather than what it

Man early lifted the craft of weaving into an art. The Egyptians were famed for the beauty of their woven stuffs. Herodotus tells of some marvelous fruits of the loom which were in the possession of the kings of his day. The Phœnicians were celebrated for their skill in weaving; purple linen came from the looms of Tyre and Sidon; beautiful cloths were woven at Babylon and Carthage. From the sculptured walls of Nineveh we may gain some notion of the richness in ornament and

really is. The utmost patience and labor are spent upon this object without consideration of true feeling.

Perhaps the most ambitious of modern potteries is the French ware known as Sèvres, upon which has been set a highly artificial value. The colors of Sèvres porcelain are harsh and out of harmony with the pictures they surround; the forms of the vessels are frequently very ungraceful and unsuited to a plastic material. The worst of all are the vases having scrolls and sham metal work to produce the effect of a porcelain vase set in ormolu mounts.

Dresden ware, less showy and gorgeous, has in some of its little statuettes and groups of figures a sort of feeble prettiness; but most of them have but little merit, while some are wilfully ugly and grotesque. About 1774 some designs of purer character, less crowded in clumsy ornament, came into fashion, but since then nothing of any real value has been produced in the Dresden china works.

Professor Middleton writes: "Modern so-called improvements in manufacture (such as printing patterns under the glaze to save the trouble of painting them) have done much to destroy all true art in English pottery. The use of the mold instead of the potter's wheel, and, most fatal of all, the fact that when pottery *is* turned on the wheel it is afterward turned on a lathe and rubbed down by a workman with glass-paper as though it were a block of wood, removes all marks of the throw of the potter's hand. The manufactory of Sèvres has now so completely lost all sense of the proper treatment of plastic clay that the larger vessels are cast whole by being poured into a mold, a method reasonable enough for metal but ludicrously inappropriate to plastic clay.

design of the textiles worn by the Assyrian kings. The poems of Homer abound in descriptions of magnificent raiment and tapestries. He tells us that Penelope wove for Ulysses a cloth of purple wool with a hunting scene in gold thread. Many of the Greek vases have representations of rich robes. Euripides describes in glowing words a magnificent peplos in the temple of Apollo. Splendid peploi were woven and embroidered by the women of Athens and Olympia and displayed at the Olympic games. That dedicated to Athene was solemnly carried in procession to the Parthenon at the time of the great festival. The treasuries of the Greek temples contained stores of rich woven stuffs.

Rome and Byzantium continued the art of weaving with lavish magnificence. The art museums of Europe contain specimens from various times and people. The South Kensington has three hundred pieces of remarkable stuffs found in Egyptian tombs, in which the magnificent reds and blues are as bright as if new. A large number of Sicilian fabrics of the twelfth century have been preserved showing Assyrian, Persian, and Saracenic influence.

"They are masterpieces," says Professor Middleton, "of the textile art, and have never since been rivaled either in beauty of design or in the skilful use of gold and colors."¹

¹ Examples remain to us of Persian damask, Genoese and Florentine velvets, oriental stuffs woven at Venice, gold stuffs from Cyprus and Lucca, and many others. Carpet weaving is an oriental art and the most superb rugs were made in the far East until about 1650, the culminating period of oriental art, since which time there has been a degra-

In an essay on his own collection of antique gems (now in the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art), Rev. C. W. King, of Trinity College, Cambridge, writes:

"The history of gem engraving extends over a space of nearly four thousand years from its first invention in Chaldaea down to its faint and feeble existence at the present day. The Greeks began by engraving pebbles picked upon the shore of the Ægean, using Phœnician models, but soon surpassing them in spirit and movement. With probably only a sharp flint or emery stone

dation in style and design. European taste is at present rapidly destroying the best in oriental art. Harsh and discordant coloring is taking the place of the glorious hues achieved by the early weavers.

The golden age of tapestry occurred from 1450 to 1500 when in Bruges and Arras especially magnificent historical pieces were woven from designs supplied by the Van Dyck school. "The Flemish tapestries of this age," says Professor Middleton, "are masterpieces of textile art, rich in color, strong in decorative effect, graceful in drawing and composition, and arranged with consummate skill to suit the exigencies of the loom." A curious fact is that although these tapestries are exceedingly rich and varied in effect the best of them are woven with usually not more than twenty different tints of wool, whereas in the laborious but artistically worthless modern productions of the Gobelin factory in France there are now used more than fourteen hundred different tints of wool. The Gobelin factories have turned out the most ambitious efforts of the modern loom. In the eighteenth century the popular painters of the day made for the *fabrique Gobelin* elaborate designs, including sacred, mythological, and historical subjects, landscapes and sea pieces, and even portraits, "all," says Professor Middleton, "in the worst possible taste, the portraits involving perhaps the most ridiculous misuse of the textile art that could possibly be invented."

"The only modern tapestry," this eminent critic goes on to say, "which has any of the merits of the best of the old is that made by William Morris at Merton Abbey. So scant is the artistic sense of our time, however, that but little appreciation has been shown of this beautiful work. The public has little true feeling for textiles as such."

and a wooden or copper mallet, the Greek engravers produced those miracles of art which defy all modern competitors."¹

Coin-engraving², which is akin to sculpture, is thus

¹The Woodhouse intaglio from the fifth century B.C. is called the finest Greek gem which has come down to us, while the two Cesnola gems are singularly beautiful. One of them, though simple and almost awkward in parts, is said to be conceived, nevertheless, "by a Greek mind imbued with the poetry of art," while the other is "a faultless gem, delicate as the color of the stone on which it is engraved." Three other Greek gems by Dexamenus of Chios, a chalcedony, an agate, and a carnelian, are examples of splendid workmanship.

Roman gem engravers continued, but did not advance, the art in spite of the fact that the Roman nobles patronized them liberally and Cæsar formed six cabinets for public exhibition. All the best specimens of this time were copies or adapted from Greek subjects, the purely Roman examples being much inferior while the early Christian gems sink into insignificance.

The Middle Ages used metal stamps for seals and hence gem-engraving declined. Modern engravers have confined themselves largely to imitating classic designs and have perpetrated many impositions upon collectors. Comparing their work with Greek gems, "their refinement," so says our critic — "turns out to be mere pretense, quite devoid of the true ancient spirit."

²Walter Pater ("Greek Studies"), writes thus: "Looking on one of the coins of Messene and noting the crisp chaste opening of Demeter's lips, the delicately touched ears of corn — this trifling object an epitome of art on a larger scale — we shall see how the mind of the old workman who struck that coin was unclouded by impure or gloomy shadows. The thought of Demeter is impressed with the purity and proportion, the purged and dainty intelligence, of the human countenance. In his firm hold on the harmonies of the human face this old designer is on the road to command over the secrets of all imaginative pathos and mystery — although the work itself shows no knowledge of Demeter's terrible story in its perfect fairness and blitheness."

Mr. Ward writes: "Perhaps the purity of the Greek type is better seen in the delicate modeling of the heads upon coins than even in the immortal statues. These coins are the wonder of the world for their

referred to by Mr. R. S. Poole, Keeper of Coins and Metals Department in the British Museum:

"The excellence of the designs of very many Greek coins struck during the period of the best art is indeed so great that, were it not for their smallness, they would form the finest series of art studies in the world.

"The school of central Greece shows instances comparable to the works of Phidias and has the qualities of dignified self-restraint and calm simplicity which characterize the *Æginetan* marbles. There are a series showing that lofty dignity and reposeful embodiment of character which mark the works of Phidias and his contemporaries. The subjects are remarkable for fidelity, breadth, and boldness. Every subject is ideal.

"There are the subtlest modulations of form and highest knowledge of anatomy. The power of expression and the knowledge of what underlies the surface of the face are carried even in the smallest works, as the *Cyzicene* *hectæ*, to a degree of excellence which baffles modern critical power."

The vital element in Greek art was its obedience to the nature of things as they are. The artist studied nature and portrayed subjects not as he might perhaps personally fancy them, but as nature has decreed that they shall impersonally be. The artist mind deferred always to her. He never tried to make some-

varied and universal beauty. A small town, hardly heard of otherwise, will indicate by its coinage that it could command artists in that specialty such as the richest modern empires do not employ. Hellenic coins afford a fascinating study, interesting in several remarkable features beyond any medallic art the world has ever seen. With the glorious collection of Hellenic coins at our British museum, which should be our model, we produce, in another government department in London, a coinage that becomes more unattractive every year. If the master of the mint would request his designers to study the treasures of the coin room of the British Museum, some improvement might result. They would see how much they are behind the times of ancient Greece."

thing look like something else. He never fashioned metal to imitate marble, nor did he require marble to look like wood. Textiles were not required to be oil paintings, nor the potter's clay subjected to treatment suited only to metal. He set the Parthenon comfortably upon a rocky hill; its columns accommodating themselves at a slight incline. He put the columns closer together at the ends that the burden might be happily distributed and the building present the appearance of enjoying its own strength.

The Greek artist was acutely sensible of the precise nature of his subject and of the material in which he worked. The sculptor seemed to have a special affinity for marble (if he had for one moment felt toward marble as though it were wood or clay, he had been lost). The same is true of metals, woods, textiles, clay, paints, etc. All artists, it would seem, have been great in proportion as they were appreciative and objective and have succeeded in their efforts to see things as they are.

LITERATURE

Turning now from the plastic arts to literature, we find that the preeminent masters of poetry, according to universal verdict, have been four: Homer (1000 B.C.), Dante (1265), Shakespeare (1564), and Goethe (1749). Goethe's place is perhaps not so generally conceded as those of his three predecessors, but critical evidence seems sufficient to secure to him a seat among them.

The great story-tellers, too, appeared, as was fitting, in the childhood of the race. Homer wrote the most charming of all story-books and supplied an entire fiction library to generations of young and old. The writers of the Old Testament were delightful *raconteurs*. Ruth is the most lovely of idyls; the stories of Adam and Eve, Joseph and his brethren, Moses and Pharaoh's daughter, Samson and Delilah, are unsurpassable as tales, while the story of the Exodus and the adventures of the children of Israel in the wilderness are told with unending charm and epic fire. As for animal stories, fables, etc., Æsop, writing seven centuries before Christ, has never been surpassed for point and brevity as well as for practical common sense. Boccaccio (1313) and Cervantes (1547) can hardly be said to have been outdone by any of the countless numbers of story-tellers who in our day are pouring out such a flood of fiction that one is sometimes almost led to believe that the world is entering upon its second childhood.

In their drama the Athenians had presented to them profound thought of their best thinkers on the most serious problems of human destiny. Fate, error, expiation, punishment, remorse, human rights, the claims of the gods, the deepest sorrows, the most solemn joys of men were here depicted. The drama embodied art, religion, politics, and united to these the ethics of daily life. If we can imagine the entire business district of New York, including the stock exchanges, closed, the government officials at Washington conveyed *en masse* to the metropolis, the entire nation from Maine to Cali-

fornia agog, every telegraph wire alert, awaiting the production of a new play dealing with the ethics of protection, the morals of imperialism, the crimes and glories of war, the regulation of the liquor traffic, the effects of municipal ownership, or the rise of Christian Science, we can form some idea of the interest with which all Athens abandoned other pursuits and repaired in a body to welcome a new drama by one of her masters.

Grote writes:

"So powerful a body of poetical influence, pregnant with ethical teaching, has probably never been brought to act upon the emotions of any other population; . . . the extraordinary beauty of these immortal compositions gave to tragedy a dignity never since reached."¹

¹ Mahaffy ("Rambles and Studies in Greece") says: "The Greek tragic poets were masters of expression, profound students of world problems and human nature, masters of language in dramatic force and lyric sweetness; they summed up in their day all that was great and beautiful in Greek poetry and became the fullest and ripest fruit of that wonderful tree of knowledge of good and evil which even now renders those who taste it to be as gods."

It is not impossible that the three supposedly greatest Greek dramatists may have been surpassed by contemporary poets whose works have been lost. Certain it is that the plays which we most admire were beaten, in the verdict of the Athenians, by other dramas. Sophocles' "Edipus Tyrannus" was defeated by a play of Philocles. Euripides was outdone by Euphorion (son of Æschylus), by Xenocles, and by Nichomachus. Neophron, Achæus, Ion, Agathon, and others poured out a continuous stream of original tragedy.

Chœrilus, who competed with Æschylus, wrote one hundred and fifty dramas (all now lost!) and gained the prize thirteen times. Gratinus triumphed over Aristophanes for his "Wine-Flask" and gained the

MUSIC

Music is the latest of the arts to come to maturity. We know that music occupied an important position in Greek culture and was, indeed, a necessary element in the higher education of the day. That the Greeks well understood the effects of music is apparent from the fact that Plato excluded from his ideal republic certain forms of music as having a debasing influence upon the young. The ancient Arcadians set so high a value on the ethical power of music that their youths were obliged by law to learn the art and practise it until they were thirty years old, in order that a soft and loving character might be given to their disposition that otherwise their rude climate and mountainous lands tended to make morose and fierce. "For this reason," says Winckelmann, "they were the most honest and best-mannered men in Greece." It is difficult for us to understand how the various Greek modes or scales with their extremely simple melodic progressions could have exercised a powerful effect upon men either for good or evil, but it seems that either there was at that time a development of musical composition of which we now know nothing, or else that the Greek was responsive to certain effects which our sated modern ears have lost the power to enjoy.

prize nine times. None of his plays are extant. Corinne defeated Pindar five times in poetic contests. The names of fourteen hundred tragedies have been preserved. Of Euripides' seventy-five plays we have only eighteen. Of Æschylus' seventy plays we have only seven. He took the prize thirteen times.

Professor Felton writes:

"The moral degeneracy of Greece in later periods was traced by philosophers and satirists to the corruption which had glided into the heart through the melting tones of a luxuriant and over-refined music."¹

Be this as it may, the polyphonic music of our programs is certainly the product of the last few centuries, and as such must be credited to the modern world; and although much of what seems to be a higher evolution of the art is but an increased mechanical complexity, due to the multiplication of instruments, the duplication of parts and the elaboration of technical means, still, allowing for all this, the essential spirit of modern music has displayed a new poignancy and intensity. It expresses the cry of pain, the wail of terror and despair, the elation of pride, the softness of romantic love, the thousand shades of personal feeling which are characteristic of a self-conscious age.²

SCIENCE

By the verdict of most of those entitled to judge, Aristotle displayed the greatest scientific intellect the world

¹ Lowes Dickinson writes: "Among the Greeks, melody, rhythm, gesture, and words were all consciously adapted to the production of a single emotional effect. The listener was in a position clearly to understand and appraise the value of the mood excited in him; instead of being exhausted and confused by a chaos of vague and conflicting emotion he had the sense of relief which accompanies the deliverance of a definite passion and was restored to his daily life, purged, as they said, and tranquilized by a process which he had understood and which had been directed to an end of which he approved."

² This subject is more fully discussed on page 227.

has known. Let us glance at the story of his development.

In the groves of Academe, where the white-robed Plato, surrounded by his disciples, paced up and down the shaded aisles, discoursing of the soul, of freedom, virtue, courage, friendship, immortality, or sat at the door of his house to discuss the march of his country's development, there one day appeared a new applicant, a lad of seventeen with massive head and luminous eye. He was of studious habit and soon became known among the other young men as the "Reader." The son of a country doctor at Stagira, his boyhood had been filled with outdoor incidents and the pursuits of an eager boy naturalist. We can imagine the assiduity with which he had explored the Macedonian forests not far from his home, what collections he had made of insects and reptiles, how he had watched the stars, noted the changing seasons, meditated upon the rocks and stones, pulled flowers, studied the growth of plants, observed the trees, listened to the birds, and stored his mind with countless memories of natural phenomena.

In Plato's school he turned from nature to books and to abstract thought. Part of his time no doubt was spent in the suburbs, where in the gardens of his friends he could pursue his studies of nature. In summer we can fancy him climbing Hymettus or wandering along the banks of the Ilyssus with his companions, always keenly alert, looking, listening, and always thinking. The spirit of Socrates still dwelt in Athens. The belief which that sage had held, that by discussion

and investigation men will at last be able to solve all the problems of existence, still obtained. The world was young then; men were thinking thoughts that had never been formulated before. Their fancies were fresh as the morning and their intercourse bright as that of newly-created spirits. Seasons rolled by; still Plato walked the shady aisles between the plane-trees with the young Aristotle at his side — the “eye” of the school. When he was absent, Plato complained that he spoke to a “deaf audience.” At thirty-seven Aristotle was still at school, but Plato died and Aristotle left Athens. He spent five years in retirement, engaged in coordinating the fruits of twenty years of study. It may be said that Aristotle wrote alone the first encyclopedia. The sciences treated appeared almost new, being created or reconstructed by him. He often had to invent the very words in which to describe his discoveries.

The science of logic was begun and completed by Aristotle at one stroke. No one understood its laws before him and no one has known any more since.

Here follow a collection of authoritative citations concerning the rank of Aristotle's genius.

G. H. Lewes says:

“No ancient and few modern works equal Aristotle's essay ‘On Generation.’ We find some of the obscurest problems of biology treated with astounding mastery. The work occasionally rises above the speculations of advanced embryologists of to-day. Harvey's work, for instance, while superior to Aristotle's in a few anatomical details, is philosophically so inferior to his that it is even now the more antiquated of the two. Aristotle distinctly announced the doctrine of epigenesis.¹

¹“Aristotle always went to direct sources of knowledge,” says Reich

"Aristotle's superiority is claimed not only in virtue of his achievements, but also of his native force—the force which creates epochs in human progress. This power which founds religions and philosophies and changes men's concepts is not to be measured by the standards applied to those discoveries which result from previous discoveries."

Karl Marx ("Capital") writes:

"Aristotle, the great thinker, was the first to analyze many forms of thought, of society, and of nature. Among them he also analyzed the form of value. The conditions of the society, including slavery, in which he lived, alone prevented him from seeing what was at the bottom of the equal relation in the value of commodities, but that he discovered in the expression of the value of commodities a relation of equality shows the brilliancy of his genius."

Professor Osborne ("From the Greeks to Darwin") wrote:

"It is startling to find Aristotle over two thousand years ago clearly stating, and then rejecting, the theory of the survival of the fittest as an explanation of the evolution of adaptive structures.¹

("Success Among Nations"). "He must have talked with fishermen and farmers, cattle breeders, fowlers, hunters. He had an unerring way of throwing knowledge together and at once seizing upon the guiding generality running through it. He gave system to science. . . . The form of strict scientific thought is still the same as he taught it over two thousand years ago."

His ethics abound in shrewd observations. "Anger," he notices, "is invariably directed against individuals; hatred may embrace a whole class. Anger may be remedied in time; hatred is incurable. Anger wishes to inflict injury; hatred is satisfied if only injury be inflicted."

¹ "The marvel begins," says Sir Alexander Grant, "when we come to contemplate the solid, compressed contents of his writings, their vast

"He was the first to conceive of a genetic series and his conception of a single chain of evolution from the polyps to man was never fully replaced until the beginning of this century."

Cuvier says:

"I cannot read his work without being ravished with astonishment. It is impossible to conceive how a single man was able to collect and compare the multitude of facts implied in the rules and aphorisms contained in this book."

Buffon, De Blainville, St. Hilaire, and others have used similar terms of eulogy. Professor Sundevall,

and various scope, and the amount of original thought in them. Any one man would have achieved lasting reputation by creating the science of logic as Aristotle did; but in addition to this he wrote on at least a dozen other of the greatest subjects, as discoverer and organizer, and in each of them he was for many centuries accepted as the authority."

"Aristotle's logic is an addition to human knowledge as complete in itself as the geometry of Euclid. It is a work which must excite our wonder if we consider the serried mass of observations and the complete way in which it constructs a science and provides its appropriate nomenclature. Though countless generations of commentators and schoolmen have busied themselves with it, and many modern philosophers have treated independently of logic, none of them have been able to add a single point of any importance to Aristotle's theory of deductive reasoning."

Both Kant and Hegel acknowledge that from Aristotle to their own day logic had made no further progress. Scarcely anything has had to be added or subtracted from what Aristotle wrote upon the syllogism.

Of the "Rhetoric," Sir Alexander Grant says: "Aristotle displayed his extraordinary power of exhausting any subject to which he gave his mind. Hardly anything of importance has since been added to what he wrote. Take the most powerful and subtle specimen of modern oratory — for instance, Shakespeare's Mark Antony's speech over the body of Cæsar — and you will find the *rationale* of every telling point set forth by anticipation in the 'Rhetoric' of Aristotle."

the zoologist, has reckoned that Aristotle has shown himself to be acquainted with nearly 500 species of animals, including 70 mammals, 150 birds, 20 reptiles, 116 fishes, 60 insects and arachnids, 24 crustaceans and annelids, and about 40 molluscs and radiates. When we recollect that these lists could not have been copied out of text-books, but had to be gathered from observation and diligent research, we get some idea of the Stagirite's industry.

Kant wrote:

"Logic since Aristotle, like geometry since Euclid, is a finished science."

Sir William Hamilton said:

"Aristotle's seal is upon all the sciences, his speculations have determined those of all subsequent thinkers."

Hegel wrote:

"Aristotle penetrated the whole universe of things and subjected them to intelligence."

Cicero said:

"Aristotle, in my opinion, stands almost alone in philosophy."

Eusebius wrote:

"Aristotle, Nature's private secretary, dipped his pen in intellect."

G. H. Lewes (not a friendly critic) says of him:

"History gazed on him with wonder. His intellect was piercing and comprehensive; his attainments surpassed those of every philosopher; his influence has been excelled only by the

founders of religions. . . . his vast and active intelligence for twenty centuries held the world in awe."

Professor Anthon writes:

"Aristotle's is an unfathomable intellect. There is nothing too great or too small for his observation, nothing which his understanding could not grasp."

Dante said:

"Wherever the wisdom of Aristotle spoke, the wisdom of others is to be disregarded."

Lessing wrote:

"I could soon get over Aristotle's 'prestige' if I could only get over his reasons."

Goethe:

"If I had my youthful faculties at command now, nature and Aristotle should be my sole study. It is beyond all conception what that man saw, remarked, observed."

"Aristotle," writes Professor Hyslop ("Ethics of the Greek Philosophers") is the hero of those who ask no favors of the universe except to know the truth."

Hegel:

"Aristotle was a genius beside whom no age has an equal to place."

Romanes:

"It appears to me that there can be no question that Aristotle stands forth not only as the greatest figure in antiquity, but as the greatest intellect that has ever appeared upon this earth."

Aristotle's preeminent position may best be explained by a bare list of his achievements.

Aristotle summarized the best thought of Greece up to his time. He wrote what was practically an encyclopedia of logical, ethical, political, physical, and metaphysical philosophy. He was the teacher and guide of Alexander the Great for seven years, playing a large part in the development of the mind of the great conqueror.

He rebuilt and resettled his native city, Stagira, after it had been sacked. He collected the citizens who had been scattered, invited newcomers, and made laws for the community.

He maintained for thirteen years the greatest school of the ancient world — a school for advanced philosophers.

He framed a nomenclature for science and philosophy, thereby facilitating the thinking of all future generations.

He created the science of logic.

He wrote anew the history of ethics, politics, rhetoric, and poetry.

He laid the foundations for the natural sciences, histology, anatomy, embryology, psychology, the philosophy of the senses, and natural history.

He gathered enormous bodies of facts, historical, political, psychological, and naturalistic.

He collected, classified, and exposed all the fallacious arguments and sophistries possible to man's reason so exhaustively that the human mind has hardly invented any fallacious arguments since which may not be brought under one of the heads he enumerates.

He collected the constitutions of two hundred and twenty-five Greek cities.

He invented many words and phrases and made suggestions which have advanced human intercourse and powers of thinking.

By urging the study of facts he grounded the scientific method through which has been accomplished most of what has been since achieved.

His analysis of the ludicrous has been the foundation of all subsequent philosophy of laughter.

He threw light upon man's nature, his strength and weakness, his passions, his follies, his relations and his capabilities. He performed an enormous service in teaching man to "know himself." He showed for the first time that human thought has a history.

He stated the law of the association of ideas.

He indicated the fundamental principles of education.

The reader may wonder why we have given so much time to Aristotle. It is because his is commonly accepted as the most powerful brain that ever came into the world. His is the standard of the scientific intellect. Has this type advanced since his time?

The genius of the modern world is preeminently scientific. Our knowledge of natural law and our wealth of modern invention seem to demonstrate the possession on our part of scientific and inventive talents superior to the ancients. It is certain that the bulk of our achievement is vastly increased. Our productivity has enlarged itself a hundredfold and we have accumulated

the data of natural law in lavish abundance. Of this there can be no question.

What effect has this had upon the progress of human genius? Have wealth and scientific knowledge demonstrated an augmented human faculty or not? Allowance has certainly to be made for the fact that the early philosophers enjoyed the advantage of perfectly fresh investigations. Their labors were expended upon virgin soil, and their harvest might naturally be expected to be richer than that of later generations obliged to till fields already worked. Against this claim, however, must be set the fact that the modern investigator has at his command incomparably more tools and conveniences of all sorts. (It is an interesting speculation, for instance, to ask ourselves what Aristotle would have thought and said and done if the modern microscope had been put into his hands.)

In his defense be it said that the modern investigator, furthermore, must specialize. Darwin spends years over his pigeons and the laws of heredity; Edison must know little beyond electricity; Huxley, Agassiz, Hertz must confine their labors within strict limits. The modern scientist is thus not able to give to his work that sweep and range which we admire in Aristotle, and which conveys an impression that all knowledge is the writer's province. It is true that Herbert Spencer assumed the rôle of the universal philosopher with some success, and there be those who believe that his grasp and range entitle him to rank with the ancient Stagirite. I confess myself here unable to come to a conclusion. I have

stated the sum of Aristotle's achievement, which seems to me to have indicated a mind of almost miraculous powers, but whether Darwin and Huxley and Spencer and Helmholtz and Marx and Galileo have equaled him, I shall leave it to the reader to form his own opinion.

INVENTIONS

It may be questioned whether the inventions of modern science, numerous and complicated as they are, indicate any marked accession of mental capacity, since they are so largely the result of long-continued accumulation of very small improvements. It may be doubted, for instance, whether the invention of the telescope evinced any larger faculty of ingenuity than did the discovery of his hydraulic screw by Archimedes. It is possibly no more wonderful that we can communicate by the telephone than that we can communicate by language. Language is perhaps the most amazing tool which man has ever invented, but the most splendid language ever perfected was, by almost universal consent, the ancient Greek. The people who devised it were not lacking in imaginative inventiveness. If, says Curtius,

"the Hellenes had left us nothing but their grammar, it alone would furnish valid testimony to the extraordinary gifts of this people. Their language was penetrated in every part with living spirit, and could accomplish an infinity of results by the simplest means. It resembles the body of an athlete whose every muscle and sinew is in full play, where there is no tumidity or inert matter, where all is power and life."

Grote adds his testimony that

"The Hellenic language is the noblest among the many varieties of human speech."

Professor Felton declares:

"The Greek language is the most flexible and transparent body in which human thought has ever been clothed."

If, again, we were to measure the value of inventions by their services to mankind, we must cede first regard to the men who first planted seeds and built houses, for it was they, perhaps, who saved the race from extinction. No subsequent inventor, perhaps, has performed a more valuable service than this. Mr. Frederic Harrison has remarked with admiration upon the inventive genius of this early benefactor. Mr. Gladstone declared that the wheel is the most marvelous of man's inventions since there is nothing in nature to suggest it.

Mingled with admiration for our inventive faculty, who can avoid a feeling of amazement at its inexplicable sluggishness in many cases? Such simple conveniences as a stirrup to a saddle and a spring for a wagon were overlooked for thousands of years, although it would seem that they lay within any one's reach. Mariners suffered shipwreck for hundreds of years after the compass would seem to have been within grasp. How shall we account for the fact that the humble but indispensable wheelbarrow waited for discovery until the time of Pascal? Is it possible, we exclaim, that Adam carried on gardening without it! In our own time is it not amazing that among the most inventive people in the world, where

the principle of gearing lay to hand and where immense fortunes awaited the inventor, it yet took twenty years after the appearance of the big-wheeled, man-killing bicycle before the "safety" was produced!

PHILOSOPHY

Plato occupies in the idealistic, speculative realm the same position of supremacy that Aristotle fills in that of practical science. These two giants of the ancient days divided between them the kingdom of human thought.¹

"Plato," Emerson says, "is at once the glory and the shame of mankind, since neither Saxon nor Roman has availed to add any idea to his categories."²

"His book contains the culture of nations, it is the cornerstone of schools; it is the fountainhead of literature. His works contain a discipline in logic, arithmetic, taste, symmetry, poetry, language, rhetoric, ontology, morals, practical wisdom. There was never such range of speculation. Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought. His book has been the Bible of the learned for twenty-two hundred years. Boethius, Rabelais, Erasmus, Bruno, Locke, Rousseau, Alfieri, Coleridge are readers of Plato and translate his good things into the vernacular. St. Augustine, Copernicus, Newton, Behmen, Swedenborg, Goethe are his debtors and must say after him. The Alexandrians were Platonists, the Elizabethans no less. Plato's 'Phædo' contains Calvinism; Christianity is in it.³ Mahometanism

¹ Coleridge has remarked that even to this day every man who may be said to think at all is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian.

² "Plato only," says Emerson, "is entitled to Omar's compliment to the Koran when he said, 'Burn the libraries; for all that they contain of value is in this one book!'"

draws all its philosophy from him. Mysticism finds in Plato all its texts."

"No philosopher," says a writer in Lippincott's dictionary, "of whatever age or nation, has contributed so much as Plato toward the moral and intellectual culture of the human race. This preeminence is due not solely to his transcendent intellect or to the marvelous depth and comprehensiveness of his philosophic views, but also in no small measure to his poetic power and to that unrivaled grace and beauty of style which led the ancients to say that if Jove should speak Greek he would speak like Plato."

Macaulay also speaks of Plato as "the finest of human intellects, exercising boundless dominion over the finest of human languages." In his essay on "Books" — to quote Emerson further, — we read:

"In Plato you explore modern Europe in its causes and seed. . . . The well-informed man finds himself anticipated — Plato is up with him too. Nothing has escaped him. Every new crop in the fertile harvest of reform, every fresh suggestion of modern humanity, is there. Why should not young men be educated on this book? It would suffice for the tuition of the race to test the understanding and to express the reason. Who can overestimate the images with which Plato has enriched the minds of men, and which pass like bullion in the currency of all nations?" . . . "His strength is like the momentum of a falling planet, and his discretion the return of its due and perfect curve." . . . "Compare Plato with other men. How many ages have gone by and he remains unapproached!"

Coming now to *men of action*, we may perhaps allow ourselves a chart of conquerors, discoverers, kings, etc., fashioned somewhat as follows:

MEN OF ACTION
CONQUERORS, DISCOVERERS, TRAVELERS, KINGS

B.C.	1ST TO 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
ALEXANDER CÆSAR Hannibal Scipio Philip	Charlemagne Marcus Aurelius William the Conqueror	Joan of Arc Columbus Vespucci	William of Orange Charles V	Cromwell Marlborough	Washington Frederick the Great Lafayette Nelson	NAPOLEON Wellington Grant Von Moltke Sherman

A chart of great leaders embracing men of power and persuasion might resemble the following:

MEN OF PERSUASION (not mainly fighters)
STATESMEN, ORATORS, PATRIOTS, BENEVOLENT RULERS, LAWGIVERS

B.C.	1 ST TO 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
PERICLES Demosthenes Solon Aristides	Marcus Aurelius Alfred the Great Hadrian Trajan	Macchiavelli Ferdinand Isabella	William of Orange Queen Elizabeth Wolsey Cranmer	Cromwell Gustavus Richelieu Mazarin	Washington Turgot Jefferson Burke	Lincoln Bismarck Gladstone Webster Disraeli

Summing up the results of this brief glance over the records of genius, we may say that there seem to have been in history about thirty-five men of absolutely first rank. These are Raphael, Michael Angelo, Phidias,

Ictinus, Homer, Shakespeare, Dante, Goethe, Æschylus, Beethoven, Aristotle, Newton, Euclid, Plato, Darwin, Kant, St. Paul, Pericles, Demosthenes, Moses, Cicero (?), Alexander (?), Cæsar, Napoleon, Jesus, Buddha, Confucius, Mahomet, Socrates, Columbus (?), Thucydides (?), Hipparchus (?), Hippocrates (?), Hannibal (?), Washington (?).

Omitting from this list Cicero, Thucydides, Hipparchus, Hippocrates, Hannibal, Columbus, Washington and Darwin, we have twenty-seven names.¹

DIVISION ACCORDING TO RACES

	NAME	CALLING	NUMBER
China	Confucius	(Ethical Teacher)	1
Arabic	Mahomet	(Saviour)	1
Hindu	Gautama Buddha	(Saviour)	1
Hebrew	Moses, Jesus, St. Paul	(Lawgiver) (Saviour), (Theologian)	3
Rome	Cæsar, Cicero (?)	(Conqueror), (Jurist)	1 (2?)
Islam	Mahomet	(Saviour)	1
Carthage	Hannibal	(Conqueror)	1
France	Napoleon	(Conqueror)	1
England	{ Shakespeare, Newton { Darwin (?)	(Poet) (Scientists)	2 (3?)

¹ Galton ("Hereditary Genius") estimates that there are scattered through *all history* about four hundred men of extraordinary genius. England at present produces "men of the time" (*i.e.*, whose deaths elicit obituary notices), about two hundred and thirty-eight to every million inhabitants, or one person in four thousand. The "illustrious," *i.e.*, those of national reputation who become historic personages, are one in many millions. (While "superior men" are about one in four thousand, at the same time idiots and known imbeciles — not counting those kept out of sight — are one in four hundred, or *ten times as numerous*.)

	NAME	CALLING	NUMBER
Germany	{ Goethe, Beethoven	(Poet), (Composer)	
	{ Kant	(Philosopher)	2 (3?)
	{ Raphael, M. Angelo	(Painter), (Sculptor)	
Italy	{ Dante	(Poet)	3 (4?)
	{ Columbus (?)	(Explorer)	
America	Washington (?)	(Patriot)	1 (?)
Ancient Greeks	{ Phidias	(Sculpture)	
	{ Ictinus	(Architecture)	
	{ Homer	(Poetry)	
	{ Æschylus	(Drama)	
	{ Aristotle	(Science)	
	{ Euclid	(Mathematics)	
	{ Plato	(Philosophy)	
	{ Pericles	(Statesmanship)	
	{ Demosthenes	(Oratory)	
	{ Alexander	(Military conquest)	
	{ Socrates	(Moral teaching)	
	{ Thucydides (?)		
	{ Hipparchus (?)		11 (13?)

Of these twenty-seven men of transcendent genius, eleven were produced by one small district. Ten of them were brought forth by one small city about the size of Fall River, Mass., or Paterson, N. J.

The little city of Athens produced in a few years more men of consummate genius than did all the millions of inhabitants of China, Arabia, India, Palestine, Rome, Carthage, and all of Europe breeding for two thousand years!

We may indicate the nation's rank in genius as follows:

China, Islam, India, Carthage, Rome, and France (each)	1
America	1 (?)
England and Germany (each)	2
Palestine, Italy (each)	3
Ancient Greece	11

We may grant Darwin to England, Cicero to Italy, and Kant to Germany, but in this case we should add to the Greek list Hippocrates, the great genius of medicine, Hipparchus, the greatest astronomical genius before Newton, and Thucydides, perhaps the greatest of all historians.

The table then reads:


China, Islam, India, Carthage, America, and France (each)	1
Ancient Rome	2
Italy, Palestine, England, and Germany (each).....	3
Ancient Greece	14(1)

Greece is still equal to Rome, Italy, Palestine, America, England, and Germany all counted together.

CHART OF GENIUS

(Each section represents a century.)

Beginning at the topmost point (300 years after Moses) and moving the eye to the right around the circle, the reader will see that this diagram represents an epitome of man's intellectual history. From 500 to 300 B.C. he spent a bright, vigorous, glowing morning amid the isles of Greece. Perhaps he overstrained his powers, we do not know, but at any rate he became ill-tempered, quarrelsome, and by evening he was wearied out. Bruised, spent, heart-sick, he fell asleep into the long, dark night of the Middle Ages when he was tormented by hideous dreams, and only rubbed his eyes in that awakening which occurred at the dawn of the Renaissance.



If human superiority is to be measured by genius, then there is little doubt that the ancient Greeks were the greatest race that humanity has as yet brought forth. Theirs was indeed the record performance. We have to-day, it is true, more hurdles and many, many more persons entered in the lists. The stadium has now become a vast arena swarming with humanity. The number of contestants, the variety of their activities, the theories of trainers, all have multiplied thousands of times, but the record still stands, far above our reach, untouched as yet by the straining multitudes. To the high vitality of the race and the fact that its culture penetrated more deeply into all classes of society than in any other instance known to us, is due, we cannot doubt, the abundant production of men of genius among the Greeks — especially in Athens. The droll suggestion is frequently made that Greek civilization could not have been, after all, superior to others or it would not have perished, since the fittest are bound to survive. Such critics forget that unfitness refers merely to lack of adjustment to environment and bears no reference to merit. The most fit are not always the best; neither is it by any means always the best, unfortunately, who are fittest to survive, or good men would never fall in battle, nor honest men remain poor. Would any one maintain that the Pyramids of Egypt are superior to the Parthenon because the latter has been shattered by shells of the Venetians while the former still stand? Does any one assert that the Chinese nation is superior to the Greeks because it has survived?

Darwin himself may perhaps be supposed to have known as well as any one what is understood by the phrase, "survival of the fittest." In the "Descent of Man" he says:

"It has been urged by several writers that the old Greeks, who stood some grades higher in intellect than any race that has ever existed, ought, if the power of natural selection were real, to have risen still higher in the scale, increased in numbers, and stocked the whole of Europe. Here we have the tacit assumption, so often made, that there is some innate tendency toward continual development in mind and body. But development of all kinds depends upon many concurrent favorable circumstances. Natural selection acts only tentatively."

Again he writes:

"We are apt to look at progress as normal in human society, but history refutes this."

The extraordinary ability of the Greek people, their physical beauty, their mental power, their moral elevation, their political and social talents, their artistic gifts, have called forth fresh admiration and amazement from successive students of human development, but adequate use of this admiration for purposes of social guidance and for the formation of a theory of progress does not seem to have been made.

Here follow a number of citations from various authors in praise of the Greeks, which have been casually collected in the course of my reading. The number could be indefinitely extended, since there are but few writers in any department who have not, at some moment, paused to utter the exclamations of amaze-

ment and admiration evoked by the achievements of the Hellenes — but we may allow these to suffice:

Hegel ("Philosophy of History"):

"Greece is the focus of light in history."

Milton:

"Athens, the eye of Greece, mother of arts and eloquence!"

Lecky ("History of European Morals") Vol. I, p. 418):

"It is one of the anomalies of history that within the narrow limits and scanty population of Greece arose men who in almost every form of genius, philosophy, epic, dramatic, and lyric poetry, eloquence, statesmanship, sculpture, painting, probably also in music, attained almost or altogether the highest limits of human perfection."

Benjamin Kidd ("Social Evolution"):

"Although western civilization has developed a strength, a magnificence, and a promise which overshadow the achievements of former civilizations, the more accurate methods of research of our time have only tended to confirm the view that in average mental development we are the inferiors of these ancient peoples. Judged by the standard of intellectual development we of the modern races have no claim whatever to consider ourselves in advance of the ancient Greeks.

"If the average mental development reached by the Greeks was superior to ours, we have here a fact the import of which in human evolution has not yet been clearly perceived. It is difficult to reconcile this fact with any theory which makes intellectual development the dominant fact in human evolution."

Lowes Dickinson says of Athens:

"All the beauty, grace, and joy of Greece, all that with a yearning that is never stilled chains the desire of mankind to

that one golden moment whose fair and balanced interplay of perfect flesh and soul no later gains can compensate, centers about that bright and stately city of romance, whence from generation to generation has streamed upon less illustrious ages and influence at once the sanest and most inspired of all that have shaped the secular history of the world."

Henry George ("Progress and Poverty"):

"Physical improvement of the human race within the time we know anything of has not taken place. Neither in strength nor symmetry has the race improved in the last two thousand years. The supposition that there has been mental progress is still more preposterous. We have no poets, artists, architects, philosophers, rhetoricians, statesmen, soldiers of greater mental power than those of the ancient world."

Lowes Dickinson:

"Greece was the fairest and happiest halting place in the secular march of man."

Fourier ("Theory of Social Organization"):

"While the emotional or religious state was wholly preponderant throughout all antiquity prior to the rise of Greek civilization, in Greece human reason emancipated itself for the first time in history from the dominion of the emotions. Intelligent liberty was achieved by the genius of that race."

Thoreau ("Early Spring in Massachusetts"):

"That is the glory of Greece, that we are reminded of her only when in our best estate — our Elysian days, when our senses are young and healthy again."

Renan (St. Paul):

"In the Greek religion no tears, no prayers, no inward compunctions. Here is the secret of the divine cheerfulness of the Homeric poems and those of Plato; the description of Socrates' death in the Phædo shows scarcely a trace of sadness.

Life consists in giving one's flowers to the world, then one's fruit, what more? If, as some maintain, preoccupation with the idea of death is the most important feature of religion, then the Greek was the least religious of races. They were little concerned with the supernatural. Such simplicity of nature springs partly from the climate, from the purity of the air, from the astonishing joy which one inhales, but it springs still more from the instincts of the Hellenic race, adorably idealistic. A tree, a flower, a lizard, a tortoise, called up a thousand poetic tales; a thread of water, a crack in the rock, a well with a cup on its rim, an arm of the sea so narrow that butterflies cross over it, yet navigable for the largest ships, as at Poros; orange trees, cypresses throwing shadows on the water, pines growing among the rocks, are sufficient in Greece to produce the contentment which is awakened by beauty. To walk in a garden at night, to listen to crickets, to sit in the moonlight playing on a flute; to go to the mountains, to drink spring water carrying along a loaf and a flagon of wine which one drinks with song; to hang a wreath of foliage above one's door, to crown one's self with flowers, to dance and play — these are the Greek recreations, recreations of a race, poor, frugal, eternally young, living in a lovely country, finding its contentment in itself and in the gifts the gods have given it."

Galton:

"Let us compare the Athenian standard of ability with that of our own race and time. We have no men to put beside Socrates and Phidias because the millions of all Europe, breeding for two thousand years, have never produced their equals."

Galton in his work on "Hereditary Genius" estimated that the intelligence of the Greeks was two degrees higher than the level of our time. (Galton's conclusions, I am informed, were accepted by Darwin.)

Lowes Dickinson ("Greek View of Life"):

"Greek life was fuller and richer than that lived by any other race; their capacity for enjoyment was keener, their senses finer, their intellects broader."

In his "History of Federal Government," Freeman writes:

"The intelligence of an Athenian audience, assembled to hear a new play of Sophocles or Æschylus, was higher than that of the present House of Commons, although the first consisted of the ordinary citizens while the second is made up of picked men."

Copleston:

"Although Æschylus is more severe than Shakespeare, yet the ordinary Athenian citizen could enjoy Æschylus at the first hearing, while those of the next generation knew his plays almost by heart and could appreciate the most distant allusions in them."

Sir Robert Collier:

"An Athenian jury was probably more intelligent than any popular assembly which has ever existed before or since. It was versed in the art of rhetoric from constantly hearing speakers who have never since been surpassed."

Ridpath:

"The great Greek century was the most intellectual epoch of the human race."

Withington:

"In the age of Pericles there lived within the narrow limits of the Greek world more men of genius than ever existed together since."

On a certain afternoon about 469 B.C. there was assembled at the theater in Athens a concourse of citizens to witness a dramatic contest. Among those present were Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Cimon, Anaxagoras, Pericles, Thucydides, and Phidias. That is to say, the greatest tragedy-writer, the greatest

statesman, the greatest historian, and the greatest artist of all time, with a great philosopher and a host of other artists and poets whose fame has lasted through twenty centuries.

Galton says:

"Athens opened her arms to all men, but she made the conditions of her public life such that *none but very able men could take any pleasure in it*. On the other hand, she offered attractions to men of ability such as they could find nowhere else. Thus, by unconscious selection, she built up in the space of scarcely more than a century a magnificent strain of human animals."

H. C. Butler ("The Story of Athens"):

"No one will deny that the monuments of the Periclean age in Athens set a mark of flood-tide in the history of art which all succeeding art development has striven in vain to surpass."

Goethe, when asked who has been his masters, replied:

"The Greeks, the Greeks, and always the Greeks."

Ridpath:

"Greece in her palmy days was the scene of the most extraordinary activities ever displayed by the human race. Intellectually the Greek took precedence of all the ancient world. He could think, combine, reason; and he could express his thoughts with a clearness and cogency never surpassed. In a coarse age the Greek mind rose like a lily above a pond; in a time of darkness there was light in Hellas. Freedom ruled Greek life. It gave birth to such an array of genius as cannot be paralleled elsewhere in history."

Galton ("Hereditary Genius," p. 329):

"The ablest race of whom history bears record is unquestionably the ancient Greeks, partly because their masterpieces in

the principal departments of intellectual activity are yet unsurpassed, and partly because the population which gave them birth was very small."

Emil Reich ("Success among the Nations"):

"Put their hands, put their minds to what they would, the Greeks almost inevitably produced perfection."

Mahaffy:

"The century from 435-335 B.C. was the most important in history for the culture of the human race. Not in quantity or extent of culture—far from it—but in quality. There was then attained an intellectual standard which has never been exceeded, to which we have ever since been striving, as to an ideal, and striving for the most part in vain."

Gladstone says:

"The people who inhabited that little cluster of mountains and vales played a great part upon the stage of history and left an indelible mark upon the human race."

Schopenhauer ("Philalethes in a Dialogue"):

"Under Pericles occurred the finest development of humanity, excellent institutions, wise laws, rational freedom, all the arts at their best, the production of works which after thousands of years are unparalleled, the creations, as it were, of a higher order of beings, which we can never imitate."

Mahaffy:

"It is established beyond contradiction that the literary and artistic excellence of Greece before Alexander was never again attained by any nation or any age. The 'silver age' of Greek art (which includes the Apollo Belvedere, the Laocoon, the Dying Gaul, the Venus of Melos, the Sarcophagus of Sidon) was more splendid than the golden age of other nations."

Mahaffy says again:

"The Greeks among all people have done most to promote human knowledge. Many of the problems which still puzzle

us were settled by the Greeks. Others were fully discussed with a freedom and acuteness now unattainable.

"The culture of the audiences which Æschylus addressed was vastly superior to the best our age can collect. They were not what we called learned; they did not know many of the sciences and histories which have accumulated since then; they were naturally ignorant of the results of our civilization, but in civilization itself, in mental power, in quickness of apprehension, in correctness of taste, in accuracy of judgment, no modern nation has been able to equal by its most labored acquirements the inborn genius of the Greeks. The great fact about the Greeks is the extraordinary frequency of exceptional genius among them. This is the greatest claim which any nation can bring to the admiration of posterity."

Professor Butcher:

"Greece not only produced immortal artists and writers, but she gave to human society a new starting point and a new direction. . . . We remember the Greeks as the only people who for a brief space looked upon the universe with a clear and untroubled spirit, who in the freshness of their powers and with a finely gifted nature, in which mind and body, heart and intellect, reason and imagination perfectly conspired together."

Prof. A. J. Grant:

"The Greeks, it is no exaggeration to say, were intellectually the most highly gifted race the world has known."

Grote ("History of Greece"):

"The harmonious sustained manhood, that godlike type in which divine energy seems to thrill with equal force through every faculty of mind and body, was probably more keenly appreciated and more frequently exhibited in ancient Greece than in any succeeding civilization."

Lübke ("History of Art"):

"The Greeks reached an absolute height of culture. Their whole mental life was so elevated, so filled with universal

human significance that it furnishes a basis for the culture of all future ages."

Renan ("History of Religion"):

"This favored corner of the earth, this divine mulberry leaf flung into the midst of the ocean, saw the chrysalis of human consciousness bloom in its natural beauty for the first time. This is why Greece is truly a holy land for him whose civilization is worship. Here is the secret of that invincible charm which she has always exerted over men initiated into liberal life.

"The true beginnings of the human mind are there; all the nobles of the intellect recognize there the country of their fathers."

John Fiske:

"Athens produced a larger number of men of the highest caliber than any other community which has ever existed. Of no other have the members been so highly cultivated. It was not merely literary culture which they possessed, but that sort which is derived from direct intercourse with nature and life and constant familiarity with the thoughts of rich and powerful minds."

A. W. Schlegel:

"The mental culture of the Greeks was a finished education in the school of nature. Of a beautiful and noble race, gifted with impressible senses and a cheerful spirit under a mild sky, they lived and bloomed in perfect health of being, and, favored by a rare combination of circumstances, achieved all that could be achieved by man. They invented the poetry of joy."

Thomas Davidson:

"The brief career of the Athenian State with its splendid array of noble men seems the brightest spot in the world's history."

Sir Harry Maine:

"Except the blind forces of nature nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin."

PAINTERS

GREEK	13TH AND 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
<div> Polygnotus Agatharcus Micon Panenus Zeuxis Apollodorus Cephisodorus Agatharcus Timanthes Aglaophon Farrhasius Euphranor Aetion </div>	Cimabue Giotto Gaddi Martini A. Gaddi Orcagna Duccio Guido da Siena Barlo Esteban Pisano Taffi Van Eyck	Da Vinci Fra Angelico Botticelli Pisanello Perugino Lippi Da Forlì Gozzoli De Cosimo Ghirlandaja Mantegna Pinturicchio Francia Luini Fabiano Squarcione	RAPHAEL M. ANGELO Titian Tintoretto Correggio Giorgione Del Sarto A. Duerer Veronese Albertinelli Carracci Bartolommeo Vaga D'Oggiono Ferrari Romano Udine Piombo Pontorno Peruzzi Agostino Agresti Bronzini Vasari Abbate Lotto	REMBRANDT Velasquez RUBENS Domenichino Guercino Guido Reni Van Dyck Muriilo Albani Rosa Carlo Dolce C. Lorraine Teniers Dow Van der Velde Hals Heus Heyden Hobbma Van Hooche Hoet Hooge Kupetzki Martinez Herrera	Gainsborough Reynolds Romney Le Brun Ragburn A. Kaufmann Stuart Hess Hogarth Hoppner Huane Morland	Millet Corot Turner Meissonier Rosa Bonheur P. de Chavanne Landseer Millaiss Kaulbach Roussau Fromentin Troyon Degas Leighton Manet Cabanel Bouguereau Monet Gerome C. Duran Bastien-Lepage Delacroix Overbeck Constant Cagni Rossetti Robert

Burne-Jones					
Fuller					
Pisaro					
Church					
Sargent					
Vedder					
Bierstadt					
Isibey					
Inness					
Whistler					
Boldini					
Verastschagin					
Brush					
Alma-Tadema					
Hunt					
Lalarge					
Thayer					
Vibert					
J. Alexander					
Chase					
Israels					
Lavery					
Henner					
Ingres					
Hilton					
Homer					
Horney					
Hübner					
Menzel					

SCULPTORS

GREEK	13TH AND 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
PHIDIAS PRAXITELES Polyclitus Alcamenes Antenor Ageladas Critias Hegias Callon Myron Colotes Agoracritus Naucytes Scopas Aganias Agesander Pyrrhonomachus Euphranor Cephisodotus Canachus Onatus Bathycles Scyllis	Giotto Donatello Orcagna Bartolommeo	Ghiberti Della Robbia Brunelleschi Verrocchio Pollaiuolo Rossellino Civitali Fiesoli Setignano Amadeo Contucci	M. ANGELO G. de Bologna Leopardi Cellini Ammanati Sansovino Ferrari Abacco Montorsoli Bandinelli Montalupo De Witte Campagna	Puget Algardi Bernini Cano G. Gibbons Girardon Roldan Coysevox Guillain Schlitter Duquesnoy Quellyn Desjardins Stone	Flaxman Canova Houdon Adam Falconet Lenoire Chaudet Milhomme D'Angers Wilton Nollekens	Rodin Thorwaldsen Rauch Barye Ferrari Rude Kiss Ferrari Bartolini Dupré Barrias Carpeaux Dubois Falguère Tenerani Mercié Cain Schwartz Powers Greenough Foley Marochetti Hänel Rietschel

Wolf	St. Gaudens	Woolner	Armstrong	Noble	Thornycroft
Bendel	French	Woodner	Armstrong	Boehm	Ford
Schilling	MacMonnies	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	Gilbert
Jouffroy	Barnard	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	Brook
Crawford	Ward	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	Palmer
Bartlett	Halbig	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	Browne
Rogers	Hogan	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Adams	Hosmer	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Azinger	Zumbusch	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Frémiet	Monteverde	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Bartholdi	Guillaume	Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Ball		Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Story		Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	
Vela		Woolner	Armstrong	Boehm	

Abadie
Balu

Dunblane
Elgin
Bourges
Laon
Caen
Troyes
Le Mans
St. Francis Assisi
Minden
St. Peter, Norwich
Lincoln
Salisbury
Yorkshire Abbeys

14TH CENT.

Giotto

POETS

ANCIENT	UP TO 13TH CENT.	14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
HOMER Job Isaiah Solomon Hesiod Pindar David Sappho Simonides Anacreon Alceus Alcman Theognis Lasus Corinna Agathon Calinus Tyrtaeus Archilochus Mimnermus Solon Xenophanes Hipponax Terpander Stesichorus Arion Theocritus Aratus Apollodorus Timotheus Philocles Diocles Pittacus	VIRGIL Horace Lucretius Ovid Juvenal Terence Lucan Ennius Tibullus Catullus Propertius Plautus Vergilweide Cavalcanti Eschenbach Strassburg Omar Khayyám The troubadours Spanish romancers	DANTE Chaucer Petrarch Boccaccio Pucci Gower Lydgate Pistoia Froissart	Poliziano Lorenzo Pulci Boiardo Villon Leonardo da Vinci Dunbar	SHAKESPEARE Spenser Ariosto Tasso M. Angelo Camöens Cervantes Hans Sachs Marlowe Marot Berni Chapman Sidney Malherbe Tassoni Surrey Rabelais Ronsard Herrera	MILTON Corneille Racine Calderon Dryden Boileau Fénelon La Fontaine Abriani Regnier S. Kosa Herbert Defoe La Fayette A. Marvell Herrick	GOETHE Schiller Burns Lessing Alfieri Voltaire Metastasio Pope Wieland Herder Bürger Parini Gay Hölz Hoogoliet Chateaubriand Klopstock	Tennyson Browning Shelley Byron Keats Wordsworth Heine Southey Coleridge Scott V. Hugo E. Browning Swinburne Lamartine Leopardi Lamennais Poushkin Béranger De Musset Whitman Poe De Vigny Manzoni Novali Morris M. Arnold E. Arnold Petöfi Kingsley

Carducci	
Clough	
Ibsen	
Lord de Tabley	
Longfellow	
Lowell	
Whittier	
Emerson	
Lanier	
Aldrich	
Stoddard	
Patmore	
Henley	
Stedman	
Austin	
Kipling	
Thompson	
Watson	
Maeterlinck	
Sudermann	
Hartmann	
Markham	
Gautier	
Baudelaire	
Coppée	
Freiligrath	
Lermontoff	
Halleck	
Holst	
Fossolo	

DRAMATISTS

ANCIENT	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
ÆSCHYLUS SOPHOCLES EURIPIDES ARISTOPHANES Agathon Ion Iophon Eupolis Crates Cratinus Phrynichus Cherilus Pratinus Thespis Susanon Sophocles II Menander L. Andronicus Ennius Nævius Pacuvius Plautus	Machiavelli Politian Enyma Bogardo Domizio Belcari Alberti Bruni Villena	SHAKESPEARE Marlowe Ariosto Lope de Vega Fletcher and Beaumont Aretino Trissino Rucellai Nardi De Rueda Naharro G. Chapman De Virues Asinari Groti Gringore Alamanni Middleton Speroni Cecchi L. Dolce Beccari Guarini Argensola Cervantes Lasca John Heyward Bermudes De Castri Ronsard Jodelle	MOLIERE CORNEILLE RACINE Calderon Ben Jonson Massinger Dekker Dryden Milton Shirley Bonavelli Ford N. Field Vau De Montalvan De Alarcon Moreti Calpreneda Duryer Rotron Scudéry Tristram Campistron Quinault Duché Lafosse Regnard Cartwright Southern Wycherly	GOETHE Schiller Lessing Voltaire Congreve Metastasio R. Steele Alfieri Beaumarchais O. Goldsmith Sheridan Marmontel Goldoni Frederici Crébillon Piron Destouches De la Chaussée L. Holberg Rowe Farquhar Addison Colley Cibber Maffei G. Lillo De la Crug Moratin De Bellay Saurin Gresnet Diderot	IBSEN SARDOU ROSTAND V. Hugo M. Gorki A. Dumas A. Dumas Fils Halévy Tennyson Hauptmann Feuillet De Musset Hervieu Merimée George Sand Manzoni Silvio Pellico Labiche Giraud Nota Nerolius Lemercier Gil y Terata Delavigné Scribe Körner D'Annunzio Tieck De la Motte Fouqué

Garnier	De Chenier	Brentano
Hardi	J. E. Schlegel	Grillparger
De Larivey	Schröder	Kleist
Udall	Klopstock	Browning
I. Lyly	Klinger	Hebbel
R. Greene	Kotzebue	Freytag
H. Chettle	Gilbert	Laube
G. Peele	Sumarokoff	Heyse
T. Lodge	H. Fielding	Blomson
A. Munday	S. Foote	Sudermann
Hans Folz	A. Murphy	Swinburne
	M. Whitehead	Pincro
	H. Kelley	Shaw
	Marmontel	
	Mme. de Staël	
Randolph		
N. Lee		
T. Otway		
Vanbrugh		
Webster		
Marston		
Martelli		
Zeno		
Field		
Rojas		
Vondel		
Alarcon		
Mme. de Sévigné		
Le Sage		

STORY-TELLERS

ANCIENT	TO 13TH CENT.	14TH AND 15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
HOMER Old Testament writers Æsop	<p>Nibelungenlied Arabian Nights Boccaccio Mandeville Heliodorus A. Diogenes Lucian Jamblicus Apuleius A. Tattius Longus John of Damascus Arthurian legends Chanson de Roland Chansons de Geste Beowulf</p>	<p>Chaucer De la Salle Lydgate Gower Masuccio Sacchetti Malory</p>	<p>RABELAIS CERVANTES Thomas More Verville De Fail Lasca Bandello Sidney Lyndale Caxton M. de Navarre G. Cinthio Stragorola Greene Lodge Nash Lyly Mendoza M. Aleman Montemayor Sannazaro</p>	<p>BUNYAN La Fontaine Bergerac Perrault Hamilton A. Behn De Scudéry</p>	<p>ROUSSEAU VOLTAIRE Richardson Sterne Swift Fanny Burney Richter Fielding Johnson Diderot Addison Goldsmith Marivaux Crébillon St. Pierre De Sage Marmontel Florian Barthélemy H. Walpole Mackenzie Radcliffe Cazotte De Staël De Goë Edgeworth Abbe Prévost Kriloff Smollett Gozzi Godiorn</p>	<p>VICTOR HUGO SCOTT Tolstoi Balzac George Eliot Dickens George Sand Thackeray Turgenieff Dostoyevsky Zola Gorky Senkiewicz Gogol Grigorovich Kipling Manzoni Jane Austen Grimm Brontë Dumas Daudet Flaubert La Motte-Fouqué Cooper H. Andersen Hoffmann Guerrazzi Grossi Bremer H. Martineau</p>

SCIENTISTS

GREEKS	1ST TO 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
ARISTOTLE Archimedes Hipparchus Hippocrates Empedocles Apollonius Aristarchus Democritus Eratosthenes Thales Pythagoras Anaximander Anaxagoras Cleomedes Heron Hippocrates of Chios Diocles Praxagoras Philolaos Heraclitus Ptolemy Erasistratus Theophrastus Aristaeus Theodorus of Bythia Eudoxus Pythias Varro Vitruvius Anaximenes Xenophanes Niketas Archylas Theophrastus Nicomedes Ctesibius Posidonius	Galen Averroës Roger Bacon Celsus Herophilus Pliny the Elder Serapion Antyllus Orbasius Alexander of Tralles Strabo Paulus Aegineta Al-Kindus Avicenna Avenzoar Maimonides Arnold de Villeneuve Plutarch William of Salicet Frontinus De Chauliac Pappus Diophantus Ptolemy Albategnius Columella Al Batani Gaber Alhazen Hugo Bertius Vitello	Da Vinci Columbus Vasco da Gama Boehm Leoncentus Linacre Benivieni Regio Montanus B. Walther Lucas de Burgo Gebraist	Galileo Copernicus Napier Brahe Fabrizio Fallopio Fernel Bruno Eustachius Paracelsus Vesalius Paré Jés Fabricius Hildanus Plater Porta Guilleman Botal Sanctorius Heurnius Vieta Cardan Peitarius Albert Girard Maurolycus Rheticus Reinhold	NEWTON Kepler Bacon Leibnitz Harvey Pascal Gilbert Huygens Boyle Grew Grimaldi Halley Hooke Harrcks Stahl Hævelius Hodierna Sydenham Ragivi Malpighi Du Bois Severino Steno Mauriceau Borelli Browne Scultetus Wiseman Cowper Denis Hoffmann Hodges Homburg Van Hoorne Bernoulli Wallis	Laplace Herschel Lavoisier Boerhaave Berthollet Gall Humboldt Lamarck Réaumur Buffon Franklin Rumford Cuvier Volta D'Alembert Adamson Marie Agnier Abanzit Bradley Cavendish Jenner A. Smith Renss Ostwald Watt Whitney Arkwright Fulton Euler Morzagni Abernethy Physick Rush	DARWIN Faraday Clark-Maxwell. Helmholz Huxley Agassiz Kelvin Ampère Herschel Lyell Arago Bichat Lister Bunsen Dalton Liebig Audouin Pasteur Virchow Berthelot Koch Tyndall Edison Young Ramsay Jenner A. Smith Renss Ostwald Haeckel Rutherford Lodge Rowland Wallace Lubbock Foster Röntgen M. et Mme. Curie

Simon Stevin	Brown	Crookes
De Dominis	Auenbrugger	Lankester
Harriott	Cullen	Rayleigh
Schneider	Gaub	Stokes
Briggs	Hahnemann	Stevenson
	Darwin	Westinghouse
	Cooper	Siemens
	Pinel	Bessemer
	Werthof	Loeb
	Frank	Laënnec
	Mead	Billnoth
	Petit	Pangenbeck
	Desault	Loring
	Tenon	Walker
	Scarpa	Andral
	Von Siebold	Bell
	Richter	Weir Mitchell
	Cheselden	Hicks
	W. Hunter	Hind
	J. Hunter	Abercrombie
	Bell	Brown-Segard
	Smilie	Finsen
	Haller	Rokitansky
	Blumenbach	Broussais
	Sommering	Esquirol
	Waterhouse	Cruveilhier
	Hawson	Bernard
	Hildebrandt	Bell, 1774
	Huber	Schönlein
	Claraut	Marconi
	Priestley	Dupuytren
	Werner	Delpech
	Hutton	Hooker
	Smith	Homeyer
	Galvani	Hughes
	Black	Howe
		Holden
		Hoe
		Hodgkinson
		Morton, 1799
		Morton
		McClellan
		Mott
		Flint
		Horner
		Vidal
		Hall

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHERS

GREEKS	1ST TO 9TH CENT.	12TH, 13TH, AND 14TH CENT.	15TH AND 16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
PLATO						
ARISTOTLE						
SOCRATES	St. Paul	Aquinas	Calvin	Spinoza	KANT	SPENCER
Pythagoras	Epictetus	St. Bernard	Luther	Bacon	Fichte	Comte
Protagoras	Seneca	Abelard	Erasmus	Descartes	Bentham	Hegel
Parmenides	Plotinus	Averroës	Melanthon	Pascal	Berkeley	Schelling
Anaxagoras	Plutarch	Maimonides	Bruno	Leibnitz	Butler	Schopenhauer
Heracitus	Cicero	Albertus Magnus	Hooker	Locke	Swedenborg	Mill
Zeno	St. Augustine	Peter Lombard	Rodin	Grotius	Rousseau	Hamilton
Epicurus	St. Chrysostom	Anselm	Montaigne	Melebranche	Paley	Lamennais
Democritus	St. Jerome	Bonaventura	Campanella	Hobbes	J. Edwards	Chalmers
Thales	St. Ignatius	Duns Scotas	Pomponazzi	Mather	Diderot	Channing
Antisthenes	Origen	Eckhart	Cremolini	Taylor	Tucker	Bauer
Arcesilaus	Tertullian	Gerson Bacon	Ramus	Brouet	Montesquieu	Cousin
Anstippus	St. Ambrose	Avenpace		Abbadie	Schleiermacher	Lotze
Carnades	Philo	Roger Bacon		Cudworth	Bufon	Von Hartmann
Chrysippus	Isidore	Abu-Bekr		Fontenelle	Shaatesbury	Martineau
Gorgias	Lactantias	Amabrich of Bena		Vico	Clarke	Parker
Hegesias	Boethius	David of Dinant			Helvetius	Colenso
Prodicus	Clement	William of Champeaux			Voltaire	Strauss
Pyrrho	Climaxus	B. Sylvester			Hutcheson	Renan
Spensippus	Justin, Martyr	William of Couches			Robertson	Feuerbach
Theodoros	St. Hilary	De la Parrie			Price	Newman
Xenocrates	Apollonius	Wm. of Occam			Adam Smith	Manning
Xenophon	Tacitus	Pierre Oured			Priestley	Bain
Posidonius	Al Kindi				Reid	Stephen
Panetius	Al Sazal				De Maistre	Wiewell
Anticuchus	Avicenna				Hales	Nietzsche
Anaximander	Al Boribi				Stewart	James
Diogenes of Apollonia					Condillac	Bradley
Diogenes					Concorcet	Renouvier
Empedocles					Constant	Fouillé
					Vauvenargues	

GREAT LEADERS (I)

Men of Action: Conquerors, discoverers, travelers, rulers, etc.

ANCIENTS	1ST TO 14TH CENTS.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
ALEXANDER CÆSAR Hannibal Scipio Philip Pericles Miltiades Themistocles Aristides Leonidas Cyrus Phocion Darius Cimon David Alciades Ramesses II Augustus Nebuchadnezzar Demosthenes Epaminondas Lysander Conon Xenophon Dionysius Philopomen Antipater Famæno Pyrrhus Nearchus	Charlemagne Marcus Aurelius William the Conqueror Alfred the Great St. Louis Trajan Innocent III Julian Henry V of England Le Cid Richard Saladin Canute Alaric Edward I of England Attila Barbarossa Dioctetian Vespasian Charles Martel Hadrian Titus Antoninus	Joan of Arc Columbus Vespucci Henry of Portugal Bayard Mohammed II Jean Dunois Villiers Gonsalvo Hernandez Alonso de Albuquerque	William of Orange Charles V Henry IV Philip II Queen Elizabeth Magellan Ponce de Leon Drake Alva Gustavus I Don Juan of Austria Farnese Lord Howard Haykins Tilly John of Austria Alexander of Parma Gonsalvo	Cromwell Marlbrough Wallenstein Gustavus Adolphus Hudson Turenne Condé Duke Villars Prince Eugène Montrose La Salle Marquette Joliet	WASHINGTON Frederick the Great Lafayette Nelson Peter the Great Charles XII Rodney Clive Lord Howe Dureau Gates Kosciuszko Dumouriez Moreau Duke of Berwick Lord Peterborough Paul Jones Warren Hastings Dupleix Mungo Park Toussaint l'Ouverture Bruce	NAPOLEON Wellington Grant Von Moltke Sherman Farragut Sheridan Lee Garibaldi De Solt Ney Hoche Stanley Kane Nansen Blücher Humboldt Kossuth William I of Germany Peary De Wet Cronje Botha Dewey Oyama Duroki Henglin Holman Hooker

Hamilar	Robert Bruce	Hüges
Hasdrubal	Alexander Severus	Masséna
Fabius Cunctator	Godfrey	Havelock
Marcellus	Iametrane	Skopeloff
Scipio	Peter the Hermit	Todleben
Marius	Theodoric	Osman Pasha
Martial	Constantine	Mahomet Ali
Sulla	Aëtius	Hall
Drusus	Genserich	
Germanicus	Clovis	
Arminius	Omar	
Constantine	Bruce	
Polybius	Wittekind	
Camillus	Egbert	
St. Leo	Rollo	
Augustus	Robert the Devil	
Junius Brutus	Bohemond	
Æmilius Paulus	Godfrey of Bouillon	
Antiochus	Tschengio-Khan	
Mithridates	Rudolf of Hapsburg	
Pompey	Edward, the Black	
Agricola	Prince	
Mark Antony	Pelayo	
Herod	Otho	
	St. Henry III	
	Alexander	
	St. Francis of Assisi	
	St. Clothilde	
	St. Barthilda	
	St. Stephen of Hungary	
	St. Elizabeth of Hungary	
	Blanche of Castile	
	St. Ferdinand III	
	Edward III	
	Wallace	

GREAT LEADERS (II)

Men of Power and Persuasion: Statesmen, orators, patriots, rulers, lawgivers, jurists

ANCIENTS	1ST TO 14TH CENTS.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
PERICLES Demosthenes Solon Aristides Themistocles Lycurgus Cicero Epinionondas Augustus Cimon Asoka Cato Marius Scipio Scipio Africanus Scaurus Lepidus Galbe Laelus Hortensius Fabricius The Gracchi	Marcus Aurelius Alfred the Great Hadrian Trajan Canute Diocletian Rienzi Gregory VII Louis IX Wallace Bruce Arteveld	Machiavelli Ferdinand Isabella	William of Orange Elizabeth Wolsley Cranmer Raleigh Charles V Henry IV L'Hôpital Cavendish Coke Hotman Barneveld	Cromwell Gustavus Richelieu Mazarin Hampden Laud Fox Fénelon Somers Lemaitre Patru La Salle D'Aguesseau Guilford Clarendon Holt De Witt	WASHINGTON Furgot Jefferson Burke Chatham Pitt Wolsey Talleyrand Frederick the Great Hamilton Lafayette Mirabeau Kosciuszko Eskine Blackstone Marshall Necker Warburton Law Mazzini Cobden Bright Parnell Kossuth O'Connell O'Connor Chateau Abdul Kader Victoria Montalembert Robespierre Danton Marat Bolivar Lasalle	Lincoln Bismarck Gladstone Disraeli Webster Franklin Peel Clay Garibaldi Canning Metternich Palmerston Lord Grey Randolph Gambetta Cavour Mazzini Cobden Bright Parnell Kossuth O'Connell O'Connor Chateau Abdul Kader Victoria Montalembert Robespierre Danton Marat Bolivar Lasalle

COMPOSERS OF MUSIC

16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
<p>PALESTRINA, 1544 John Bull, 1563 Peri, 1564 Monteverde, 1565 Cavaliere, 1550</p>	<p>SCARLATTI, 1656 Lully, 1630 Purcell, 1658 Carissimi, 1582 Humfrey, 1647 Orlando Gibbons, 1583 Stradella, 1645</p>	<p>BACH, 1685 Mozart, 1756 Handel, 1685 Haydn, 1732 Gluck, 1714 Cherubini, 1760 Clementi, 1752 Durante, 1684 Marcello, 1686 Pergolese, 1690 Graun, 1701 Grétry, 1741 Méhul, 1763 Arne, 1715 Hiller, 1728 Albrechtsberger, 1735 Vogler, 1749 F. A. Hiller, 1768 Cimarosa, 1749 Martini, 1706 Arnold, 1740 Sacchini, 1734</p>	<p>BEETHOVEN, 1770 WAGNER, 1813 Schubert, 1797 Schumann, 1810 Mendelssohn, 1809 Berlioz, 1803 Gounod, 1818 Verdi, 1814 Brahms, 1833 Rubinstein, 1829 Chopin, 1809 Liszt, 1811 Grieg, 1843 Dvorák, 1841 Strauss Goldmark, 1843 Sullivan, 1842 Rossini, 1792 Weber, 1786 Spohr, 1784 Meyerbeer, 1794 Halévy, 1790 Franz, 1815 Tschaikowsky Adam, 1803 Abt, 1819 Bellini, 1802</p>

GREAT LEADERS (III)

Educators (non-religious): Teachers, reformers, critics, philanthropists, political economists, teachers of government and the structure of society, historians, patrons of learning, etc.

ANCIENTS	12TH, 13TH, AND 14TH CENTS.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
SOCRATES						
PLATO						
ARISTOTLE						
PERICLES						
Confucius	MARCUS AU-					DARWIN
Solon	RELIVS					RUSKIN
Lycurgus	A Kempis					MARK
Moses	Abelard			BACON	ROUSSEAU	Carlyle
Solomon	Alfred the			LOCKE	Thomas Paine	Emerson
Xenophon	Great	Cosimo de Med-	RABELAIS	Milton	Froebel	H. SPENCER
Thucydides	Clement of	ici	Calvin	Pascal	Pestalozzi	Huxley
Herodotus	Alexandria	Lorenzo de Med-	Luther	Fénelon	Gibbon	Taine
Cæsar	Charles V	ici	Montaigne	Bossuet	Humboldt	Lassalle
Polybius	Charlemagne	Ferdinand	Machiavelli	Hobbes	Hume	Comte
Mencius	Petrarch	Isabella	Henry IV	Grotius	Adam Smith	Owen
Hieron	Cicero	Henry the Navi-	Melancthon	Fontenelle	Turgot	Horace Mann
Pliny	Roger Bacon	gator	More	Frankce	Malthus	W. L. Garri-
Samuel	Quintilian	Erasmus	Copernicus	Charron	Franklin	son
Livy	Anselm	Boethius	Sturm	Hollis	Diderot	Bellamy
Sallust	Seneca	Agricola	Neander	Comenius	Herder	Tyndall
Diodorus	St. Pamphilus	Cornaro	Colet	Colbert	Howard	Cobden
Antiochus	Hoolâ Koo	Marsilio	Latimer	Petty	Basedow	Macaulay
Strabo	Colonna	Venerable Bede	Ascham	North	Johnson	Heine
Dionysius of	Protagenes	L. da Vinci	Mulcaster	Mun	Heyne	Fourier
Halicarnas-	Alcuin	Caxton	Bodin	Child	Thiers	St. Simon
-sus	Buridan	Bernardino	Davanzati	Conring	D'Alembert	M. Arnold
Arrian	Innerius	Biel	Scaruffi	Campanella	Shaftesbury	Mommsen
Megasthenes	Oresme	Pontarno	Botero	Harrington	Lavater	Niebuhr
	Lucretius	Carafa	Hooker	Fleury	Goldsmith	Ranke
	Lucian	Froissart	Paruta	Vico	Berkeley	Thierry
	Engelbert	Joinville	Holinshead	Pellisson	Mary Woll-	Prescott
	Juvenal	Seysse	Brantôme	De Retz	stonecraft	Motley
	Tacitus	Nardi	Du Haillan	Mezeray	Robert Inger-	Droysen
	Dubois	Segni	Varchi	Père d'Or-	soll	Treitschke
	Marsigli of	Villani	Adriani	leans	Hippel	Renan
	Padua	Villehardouin	Costanzo	Père Daniel	Bandini	J. S. Mill
	Josephus	Guicciardini	Herrera	Saint Real	Batta	Schopenhauer
	Suetonius	Fox		Maimbourg	Quesnay	Nietzsche
	Pausanias	Camden		Perefixe	Broggia	Shelley
	Dion Cassius	Comina		Clarendon	Mirabeau	Coleridge
	Q. Curtius	Hace		De Thou	Ortes	Thoreau
	Appian	Stowe		Burnet	Genovesi	Mazzini
				Hoof	Du Pont	William Mor-
				Tillemont	Godwin	ris
				William of	Argenson	Grote
				Malms-	Mosheim	Buckle
				bury	Busch	Guizot
				Roger Ho-	Forbonnais	Frederic Har-
				venden	Gallani	rison
				Florence of	Steuart	Martineau
				Worcester	Verri	Henry George
				Giraldus	Raynal	Lowell
				Cambren-	Justi	St. Beuve
				sis	Smollett	Arnold
						Bright

PROGRESS MEASURED BY GENIUS 83

GREAT LEADERS (III)—*Continued*

ANCIENTS	12TH, 13TH, AND 14TH CENTS.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
					Sonnenfels	Wendell Phillips
					Henry	Beisher
					Ferguson	Carnegie
					Watson	Gladstone
					Millar	Florence Nightingale
					Gillies	Frances Willard
					Dunbar	Clara Barton
					Walckenaer	Higginson
					Volney	Lamartine
					Montesquieu	Morgan
					Robertson	Lancaster
					Muratori	Cabet
					Michelet	Octavia Hill
					Freeman	Rowland Hill
					Curtius	Hirsch
					Froude	Holyoke
					Schosser	Hopper
					Green	Dr. Howe
					Lingard	Maurice
					Gardiner	Kingsley
					Milman	James Mill
					C. Cantù	Proudhon
					Ewald	Richter
					Stade	E. Scherer
					Parkman	Hodgson
					Bury	Chalmers
					Duruy	S. Laing
					Sayce	Ricardo
					Finlay	A. Hamilton
					Maspero	Cairnes
					Theal	Marshall
					Ed. Meyer	Senior
					Monteil	De Laveley
						Say
						Jevons
						Sismondi
						Fawcett
						McCulloch
						Cherbuliez
						Block
						Bastiat
						Le Play
						Nebenius
						Blanc
						Herrman
						Mangoldt
						List
						Schweigard
						Ciccione
						Cary
						Böhm-Bawerck
						Leroy-Beaulieu
						Walker
						Lecky
						Maine
						Rodbertus
						Durckheim
						Lester F. Ward
						Tarde
						Gumplowicz
						Kautzsky
						Salverte

THE RISE AND FALL OF HUMAN GENIUS

	GREEK	UP TO 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
PAINTERS						
SCULPTORS							

PROGRESS MEASURED BY GENIUS 87

ARCHITECTS,	POETS	DRAMATISTS
	Up to 13th Cl.	


THE RISE AND FALL OF HUMAN GENIUS

	GREEK ET AL.	14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
STORY-TELLERS	<p>To 13th Cent.</p>						
SCIENTISTS	<p>1st to 14th</p>						

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHERS		1st to 19th Cts.	12th, 13th, and 14th Cts.	15th and 16th			
COMPOSERS OF MUSIC							

THE RISE AND FALL OF HUMAN GENIUS—GREAT LEADERS

	ANCIENT	1ST TO 14TH CENT.	15TH CENT.	16TH CENT.	17TH CENT.	18TH CENT.	19TH CENT.
MEN OF ACTION (1)							
MEN OF PERSUASION (2)							
EDUCATORS (3)		12th, 13th, and 14th Cents.					



The line of art-genius rises to two high peaks, one occurring three or four hundred years B.C. and the other in the sixteenth century—the two about two thousand years apart. The line of poetic genius is remarkable for its ups and downs, manifesting four distinct great upward throbs. The line of the speculative philosophers by contrast is curiously even and level, never rising very high, and never sinking very low, suggesting that man thinks more evenly than he feels. Apparently man has never in any age, either of joy or of gloom, sorrow or triumph, weakness or strength, ceased to ponder upon the why and the wherefore of his existence.

The charts show the upward line of modern music to be notable, as well as the steady upward trend of science.

A curious fact is to be noted, that when the arts were at their highest in the Renaissance, there was at the same time a period of low production in the four classes of Great Leaders, viz.—Men of Action (1), of Power and Persuasion (2), Educators (3), and Prophets (4). What is the explanation of this? It may be that the great art periods were filled with the joy of living, while in times of unrest and uneasiness came great leaders. They come when men *want to be led*. Leaders arise then who offer to lead them to conquest, to discovery, to education and learning, to material comfort and security, to power. Or in times of despair, when all these seem out of reach, prophets are called upon to lead mankind at least to the hope of happiness in another world. Leaders of all kinds were not in great demand in the joyous art periods when men had all they could do to express adequately in beauty each day's delight. "Now" and "here," not "elsewhere" and "sometime," were the watchwords man used in his periods of highest vitality. It is this that renders art the chief test of a people's deepest well-being.

CHAPTER II

PROGRESS MEASURED BY MORE THINGS

"External goods, like tools, have a limitation to their usefulness."

ARISTOTLE ("Politics").

"Be assured that happiness has its sources not in extensive possessions, but in a right disposition of the mind."

ARISTOTLE.

BUT, surely, it will be urged, while this conclusion about the genius of the Greeks may be interesting enough, it does not affect our belief in progress. There is still a substantial ground for the opinion that our generation are both the tokens and the promoters of human advance.¹

This assertion is indeed widely and variously made. In three directions our advance is confidently proclaimed. The modern world, it is said, has progressed morally, spiritually, and in material wealth. The modern man is

¹ (1) This "wonderful century" has had many complimentary epithets bestowed upon it. It has been variously called: "The Age of Darwin," "The Musical Century," "The Age of Steel" (Carnegie), "The Age of Individualism" (Gosse), "The Woman's Century" (Victor Hugo), "The Age of Machinery," "The Age of Progress," "The Electric Age." The Japanese, who perhaps more than any other contemporary nation have reason to be pleased with this century and still more with the part they have played in it, salute it as "The Age of Enlightenment."

richer, more moral, and more spiritual than was the pagan.

He is held to be richer because he has more things.

He is held to be more moral because he is more charitable, more considerate of the weak, more careful of human life, etc.

He is held to be more spiritual because he has accepted Christianity.

His claim to wealth is based upon more things; his claim to greater goodness rests chiefly upon the increased practise of almsgiving; his claim to spirituality is based upon the supposition that he has developed a perfectly new spiritual sense involving a realization of his own infinite worth, a sense of sin, a sense of capacity for union with God, and finally a sense of a state of salvation through the blood of Christ.

It is said that the masses of mankind in our day are better fed, housed, and clothed; that the working classes have more opportunity for advancement in industry and politics, that improvements in production have made it possible to maintain in comfort a larger population, that wider life is offered by travel, newspapers, etc. Communication has been facilitated, knowledge of the world enlarged, comforts multiplied, thousands of little devices have been perfected which contribute to make our lives richer and fuller.

"This is the greatest age in history," we are informed. "Why?" "Why, indeed! Because we have the railroads, the telegraph, the printing-machine, the Gatling gun, etc. Because we have more things and can go to

more places and can "get there" more rapidly. Favorite phrases of the day allude to our "fuller, richer life," and our "enlarged human existence." Professor Wallace writes a book on "The Wonderful Century."

A writer in the *Steel Age* says:

"The century received from its predecessors the horse, we bequeath to our successors the bicycle, the locomotive, and the automobile. We received the goose-quill; we bequeath the typewriter. We received the scythe; we bequeath the mowing-machine. We received the sickle; we bequeath the harvester. We received the hand printing-press; we bequeath the Hoe cylinder press. We received gunpowder; we bequeath nitroglycerine. We received the tallow dip; we bequeath the arc light. We received the galvanic battery; we bequeath the dynamo. We received the flintlock; we bequeath automatic Maxim guns. We received the sailing ship; we bequeath the steamship. We received the frigate 'Constitution;' we bequeath the battleship 'Oregon.' We received the beacon signal fire; we bequeath the telephone and wireless telegraphy. We received wood and stone for building materials; we bequeath twenty-storied sky-scrapers of steel and concrete."

In the same strain Mr. Byrns ("Progress of Invention in the Nineteenth Century") writes:

"Man has connected continents by the telegraph, has cross-hatched the land with railroads, pierced the earth with artesian wells, connected oceans by canals, reclaimed land from the sea by dykes, pierced mountains by tunnels, drained marshes, irrigated deserts, reared great structures, thrown great bridges across the streams, raised beacons and built breakwaters. . . . Never before has human conception so expressed itself in materialized embodiment; never has thought been so fruitfully wedded to matter; never has the divine function of creation been so closely approximated; never before have so many helpful instrumentalities added to the wealth of an enlarged human existence."

Mr. Byrns describes in detail the telegraph, the Atlantic cable, electric dynamos, motors, and lights; the steam-engine, the telephone; printing, the typewriter, the sewing-machine, the reaper, the bicycle, the automobile, the phonograph, chemistry, photography, the invention of rubber, gas-lighting, firearms, the Röntgen rays, explosives, liquid air, cable cars, elevators, stem-winding watches, matches, fire-proof safes, electrocution chairs, etc.

The Western Union Telegraph Company, we learn, sends sixty million messages a year, and the value, the writer informs us, of the "time saved" is beyond human estimate. There are fifteen hundred submarine cables; messages sent from Washington to Santiago were answered in twelve minutes. The combined power of all the steam-engines in the world is equivalent to the work of one hundred million horses or five hundred million men. One man with a steam-engine performs the work of one hundred and twenty men in the last century. The cotton-gin raised one man's efficiency from four pounds per day to several thousand pounds per day. The railway tracks in the United States, if extended in a straight line, would reach to the moon. The railways carry every day a weight of freight equal to the weight of seventy millions of human beings, *i.e.*, six million tons. A 125-ton Pittsburg locomotive can draw a train of cars one mile long loaded with wheat, — the yield of fourteen square miles of land.

Twenty million pins are consumed per day. There are machines making one thousand buttonholes in an hour.

The mammoth harvester clears seventy-five acres per day, cutting a swath twenty-eight feet wide, threshing, blowing out the chaff, and filling in bags at the rate of three bags a minute.

Battle-ships cost eight million dollars each. One of the triumphs of Christendom is the torpedo-boat, a "little demon of destruction," which consists of an engine and a boiler encased in a thin shell and carrying in its bowels a crew who suffer untold discomfort and danger when it is in action. Rapid and deadly as a scorpion, it steals up to its enemy and delivers a mortal wound — often perishing itself in the destruction it works. Improvements in guns are such that we can now kill a man through two tree trunks. With machine guns we can now mow men down in battle as the farmer cuts his grain; ten thousand were so mown down at Omdurman. Is this not as wonderful as the mammoth reaper?¹

There are wonderful new processes of milling flour which are guaranteed to leave at least a small part of the nutriment in the dust, and there are miracles of butchering which will serve you a grunting hog as dressed pork in fifteen minutes, with "every part utilized except the squeal." Rotary steam turbines have raised the speed of machinery from one thousand revolutions per

¹It used to be urged that the invention of improved implements of warfare would put an end to war.

Nikola Tesla writes: "I myself believed this for a long time, but I now think it to be a profound mistake. Every new arm invented invites new skill and gives fresh impetus to further improvement. It was thought when gunpowder was invented that that would stop war, but the effect has been the opposite."

minute to thirty thousand per minute. Chemistry has presented us with aniline dyes, coal oil, acetylene gas, celluloid, bleaching powders, cement, and out of refuse it makes sugar, beer, and breakfast foods.

"The most ingenious piece of practical mechanism in existence," writes Mr. Byrn, "is the Mergenthaler Linotype." The octuple press is also a wonder of the age. It cuts, pastes, folds, and automatically counts thousands of eight-paged newspapers per hour. The paper goes through the press at the rate of fifty miles an hour. The paper is made of forest trees. In New York State alone two million pounds are turned out daily. Forest trees are converted into newspapers in two and one-half hours. For a single edition of a large New York daily, six acres of well-set spruce timber are cut down.¹

Owing to the increased means of production the gross wealth of the world has been greatly augmented. Has this been a benefit to mankind or not?

The evil of poverty no one can dispute, and therefore in so far as wealth cures poverty it must be set down as

¹"A German paper manufacturer at Esenthal has made an experiment to see how rapidly it is possible to transform a tree into a newspaper. Three trees in the neighborhood of his factory were cut down at 7.35 in the morning. They were instantly barked and pulped, and the first roll of paper was ready at 9.34. It was lifted into an automobile that stood waiting and conveyed to the machine room of the nearest daily paper. The paper being already set, the printing began at once, and by ten o'clock, precisely, the journal was on sale in the streets. The entire process of transformation had taken exactly two hours and twenty-five minutes."

a positive indisputable blessing to humanity. The difficulty is that our increased wealth has not cured poverty.

Poverty in the great cities of Europe and in America, and in many countries as well, is more dire than it was in Greece. In the United States, destined to be the richest country in the world, there are no fewer than four million paupers in a time of unprecedented prosperity. It is estimated that in good times 14 per cent. of the population, in bad times 20 per cent. of the population, are in "distress." In New York City one person in every ten is buried in the potter's field spite of the utmost endeavors of the poor to keep their friends from such a fate. Students of conditions on the lower east side report a steady decline, while the volume of charity cannot succeed in perceptibly reducing the volume of poverty. In England matters are worse. In London one death in every five occurs in a public charitable institution. Booth declares that in London 30 per cent. of the population are in dire poverty. London is the richest city in the world, but the upper and middle classes together number only 17.8 per cent. of the population. The poor constitute 82.2 per cent. of the people.¹

¹ Mr. Frederic Harrison (Report of Industrial Remuneration Conference, 1886) wrote: "Ninety per cent. of the actual producers of wealth have no home that they can call their own beyond the end of the week; have no bit of soil, or so much as a room that belongs to them; have only as much old furniture as will go in a cart; have precarious wages; are housed in places hardly fit for a horse; are separated from destitution by so narrow a margin that a month of bad

Of the total of wealth existing in the United States, one-half of the population own nothing; 38 per cent. are poor, 11 per cent. are middle class, and only 1 per cent. are rich. (Spahr's Tables.) The unequal distribution of wealth which characterizes the modern world is producing all the evils which Aristotle foresaw and foretold as certain to follow such a condition.

Increased wealth, obviously, does not cure poverty, and unless some method of distribution be adopted different from that we practise at present, there is no ground for supposing that any conceivable increase of wealth will ever succeed in abolishing poverty. It will simply result in swelling the colossal fortunes at the top, and by so doing will increase rather than lessen the pressure upon the poor at the bottom. Increased wealth unaccompanied by rational distribution of wealth is a curse rather than a blessing and conduces in no wise to progress. Under it we have already the possibility of the billionaire at one extreme and the brutalized mine-worker, the slum-dweller, and the Chicago butcher at the other.

How does this compare with the conditions in Athens?

The richest man in Athens, according to some authorities, was probably worth about two hundred thousand dollars.

John Fiske tells us that there were no beggars or paupers in Athens.

trade or sickness brings them face to face with pauperism. If this condition is to be permanent, then to me, at least, this would be enough to condemn modern society as hardly an advance on slavery or serfdom."

Let the reader try for a moment to realize what a vast volume of evil can be traced largely to the effect of poverty—the sickness, suffering, disease, death, crime, insanity, vice, drunkenness, suicide; again, let him realize the moral evils which undoubtedly tend to accompany the possession of huge wealth—greed, sensuality, arrogance, unscrupulousness, vice, cruelty, lawlessness, corruption. Let him contemplate this social disease as it is manifested in atrophy and hypertrophy, in the extremities, bleeding at the bottom, bloating at the top, decay in both, — and then remember that this almost incalculably vast evil, due to extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth, did not exist in Athens. Not impossibly this one fact alone renders invalid any claims which we can make to having advanced beyond their grade of humanity.

In order to examine more in detail the effects of increased wealth-production upon our society, let us institute a comparison between the three classes into which populations naturally fall, viz., workers, middle class, and rich.

The writer personally believes that as far as the lowest working-class of our day is concerned slavery has been abolished only in name. Men who cannot choose their work, cannot limit their work, and cannot enjoy their work are not free men. Their actual condition—physically and mentally—is much below that of the Athenian slave, who was, for the most part, a domestic servant, living in the same house with his master, under the protection of the law, treated with kindness, permitted to

rise out of his class whenever he could, and while in it to share, to a large extent, in the extraordinary culture of the day. Compared with his lot, the lot of the lowest class of workers in our day in mine and factory, sweat-shops and slaughter-houses does not mark a condition of progress.¹ The proportion of slaves exploited for gain was comparatively small. Society was not primarily concerned in making money. Its chief interests were the pursuit of art and science, and making war, for neither of which were slaves utilized. The slave class was employed at farming and in service. It produced for use, not for profit: in these words lie an entire explanation of the comparative comfort of their lot.

(For a further discussion of Greek slavery, see p. 184.)

Improvements in machinery have rendered the lot of the slave class in some respects harder than before. The lot of the hand worker then was not that to which the factory operative in the Black Country to-day is doomed. Machinery is the great disappointment of the modern world. We have quadruple-expansion engines which have a thirty-seven thousand horse-power

¹The workers of to-day are probably neither so well fed nor so well housed as were those of Athens. There were no slums in Athens, no crowded tenements. The population lived mostly out of doors in summer, and were sheltered from inclement weather in decent houses of stone and wood in the city, and cottages in the country. As for food and drink there was no whisky in Athens, no rum or gin, no tea, no coffee, no spices, no lard. Who that knows the taste of unleavened bread, fruits, olives, cheeses, nuts, salads, and pure sound wine, which formed the simple diet of ancient peoples, and who that considers in contrast our fried grease, hot biscuits, sweets, starches, teas, coffees, condiments, and all brands of liquid poison, can doubt which people were better fed?

but they have not rendered less arduous the labor of coal miners. The sewing-machine was hailed as the deliverer of the sewing woman, but since its invention the sweating system has spread. The digging of the Suez canal brought India four thousand miles nearer to Europe, but India remains as miserable and poverty-stricken as before. Ocean freight rates on wheat from England to the United States have dropped to one-third in thirty-five years, but twelve millions of people, it is reported, remain in that country on the verge of starvation.

It is true that hours of labor for certain portions of our slave class have been reduced, but when we consider the increased tension at which labor is carried on, with the greater danger to life and limb, and the increased nervous strain in the struggle for existence, it becomes apparent that there has been no real relaxation in the system which for ages has continued its practise of taking out of the slave class all there is in it except sufficient to reproduce itself, and so maintains it generation after generation in a state of subjection. This class has never been, and is not now, free.

How does our middle class compare in quality with the middle class at Athens? To begin with, how about its physique?

"The Greeks," says Professor Gulick, "produced a larger proportion of handsome men and women than any people who have ever lived. They were tall and well-proportioned, having firm skin and supple muscles, well-formed heads, straight noses, and brown hair. Above all, they were noted for their extraordinarily beautiful eyes, possessing a keen and steady gaze."

"In beauty of body," says Ridpath, "the Greeks were peerless; in agility and nervous vigor they were the finest whom the world has produced. The Greek was more alive than any man of antiquity. This highly-wrought physical manhood was the foundation of his wonderful mind, of his energy, his reason, his imagination, his courage. In Greece nature accomplished the finest motherhood of man. In the fair skin, blue eyes, beautiful body, and radiant face of the Greek youth she held aloft the best gift of her abundant love. No other people were so greatly gifted with personal beauty and none other ever so adored the gift."

"The noble harmony of their bodies," says Curtius, "the mild and simple lines of their face, the large eye, the short forehead, the straight nose, belonged to this people. Their height rarely surpassed the right mean: excessive fattiness and fleshiness were equally rare. They were freer than other mortal races from all that hinders and oppresses the motions of the mind."

"Living close to nature, the free life in the air and light gave to their lungs great health and strength and to their bodies elasticity. . . . The Greeks enjoyed above all nations who have ever dwelt in the same latitudes as they the blessings of bodily health and beauty. A noble physical form was held to be the natural expression of a well-formed mind. With other nations beauty, with the Greeks want of beauty, was the startling exception to the rule."

The Athenians were much more hardy than we. They had no steam-heated houses, but they seem to have endured their winter cold with apparently little discomfort. Their clothing consisted generally of only one garment, a chiton, over which in cold weather they threw the himation, or long cloak. On the feet were worn only light sandals or shoes of soft leather. Socrates despised this custom as an effeminacy and even in the Thracian campaign marched barefoot over the icy battle-fields

of Potidæa. Bœckh ("Public Economy of Athens") says that Socrates appears to have possessed one pair of dress shoes which lasted him for life. Head covering was not common; but light caps of quaintest cut were sometimes worn in bad weather.

With greater hardihood went a finer development of the senses. That their eyesight was better than ours admits of little doubt. The theater seated twenty (some writers say thirty) thousand persons who enjoyed the play without the aid of opera-glasses. Their prowess in athletics seems to show by the records that they had better lung power, stronger hearts, and tougher muscles. The Spartan troops who arrived at Marathon after the battle was over had marched one hundred and fifty miles in three days — a feat unparalleled by modern armies.

Epictetus says of Diogenes that he went about "radiant with health and with his very body he turned many to good." In Sparta the ephors laid a fine upon their king Archidamus for marrying a little woman.

"The Greeks are the only people," says Lowes Dickinson, "who have conceived athletics spiritually. The body was never an end; it was the instrument of the soul, and that it might respond to her slightest motion, they would have it perfectly tuned."¹

¹ There were many instances of notable longevity.

Plato died at eighty-two and was occupied intellectually to his last hour. Isocrates wrote his "Panathenæus" at ninety-four. His teacher Georgias lived to be one hundred. Chrisippus wrote on "Logic" at seventy-two. Cleanthes taught up to his ninety-ninth year. Sophocles wrote his "Œdipus at Colonnus," one of the greatest tragedies ever composed, when he was ninety years old. Diogenes lived to be ninety. Hippocrates seems to have been able to obey the mandate to physicians,

"Greek life," writes Prof. John Fiske, "was simpler than ours — no milliners' bills, no evening parties, no Protean fashions, no elegant furniture. On the other hand, there were no paupers or beggars in Athens. Since wealth was not required to keep up appearances, the lack of it entailed no loss of social position. The art of money-making was in its infancy. The Athenian freemen were more free from petty cares than any community known to history."

In the suburbs of Athens the citizen owned a few acres of land and a vine-clad cottage where with his family he spent the warm months. Here were raised the barley, the few olives and radishes and the wine which sufficed him and his family for a year. From the goats browsing among the hills came the milk upon which the children thrived and from which cheese was made — a staple article of Athenian diet. (Cows were seldom used, goats' milk being preferred.) Up from Piræus or from Phalerum came fishermen with fresh fish, while now and then a sunburnt boy brought in what was regarded as a great luxury (since sugar was unknown), some honey made by the wild bees upon Hymettus. In Athens fifty cents a day (in our money and purchasing power) for the maintenance of three children and two servants was called extravagant. A poor man's meal was a barley cake or some porridge. A few dried figs and a leaf of

"Heal thyself," for he lived to be one hundred and four. Cratinus, the comic poet, died at ninety-seven. Pindar, the poet, lived to be eighty; Simonides, eighty-nine; Pyrrho, ninety; Timon, ninety; Xenocrates, eighty-two. Xenophon lived to be over ninety; Zeno, the Stoic philosopher, died at ninety-eight, while Anacreon, the poet of beauty, love, and wine, lived to the age of eighty-five and then described himself as a cheerful, joyous old man.

lettuce would suffice him for "a long time." Epicurus, whose name by a misunderstanding has come to suggest luxury, lived upon the products of his own little field. He declared that barley cakes and water were sufficient for all his needs and said he could live properly on one obolus (three cents) (worth 12 or 15 cents now) per day.¹ (Gulick.)

We may take the circumstances of Socrates as typical of the material conditions of his class in the Athens of his day. His mother was a midwife; he was a statuary earning his daily bread by carving copies of the great statues or making little ornamental statuettes. He supported a wife and three or four children by this manual labor. He never accepted money for teaching. Demetrius says that he owned a little house and had seventy minæ put out at interest with Crito. We know approximately the circumstances of men of his class. Their wants were simple and they were easily satisfied. They had no telegraphs, telephones, railways, steam-engines, electric lights, steam heaters, store clothes, tea, coffee, cigars, tobacco, or newspapers. Many other modern luxuries were wanting, yet we know that they

¹ (Gulick) Fasting was in favor among the Greeks for its curative powers. Cleanthes, the aged Stoic, was directed to fast in order to cure an ulcer. Grote says that the therapeutics of the Greeks consisted more of diet and regimen than of medicines.

Aristippus said: "It is no sign of health to eat more than you can digest." Plato said that the names given to diseases by doctors only served to cover the fact that their patients had worked too little and eaten too much.

A *bon mot* current in Athens affirmed that those who had dined with Plato never had a headache the following morning, so frugal was his table.

possessed everything which is necessary to the production of men intensely intelligent, highly moral, and superbly hardy. Is it possible for us to point to any types of our middle class and say: "Here are men of a more developed type, more intelligent, healthier, more moral, and *made so* by our vast improvements in the material conditions of life?"

The physical level of our day is not high. Physical deterioration speaks in the vast consumption of drugs in city and country, the apothecary shop or saloon at every street corner in the towns, the army of physicians, the number of hospitals, the general tone of anxious solicitude about health (especially among the women of the artisan and middle classes, who, after middle age, apparently scarcely think or speak of any other subject); the appearance of the lung complaints, the ravages of zymotic disease, the rareness of robust health in the male population, and the almost universal ill health among women. England, whose empire has been built upon the brawn of her yeoman, is seriously concerned about the poor physical quality of those classes from whom her army must be drawn. City life, toward which everywhere the population is steadily setting, is notoriously destructive to health, so that the third generation from the country lad, it is said, is largely drained of its vitality.

William Farr estimates that to one annual death two persons are severely ill, and three are ill enough to require medical relief. Francis Galton has declared himself impressed by an exhibition of selected British athletes, none of whom seemed to him to compare in form and

grace with the classic models of antiquity. The weight of evidence shows that a decline, especially in lung power, among the working people has accompanied the concentration of population in towns.¹ Modern ill health is to be accounted for by centuries of unfavorable conditions, by the elimination of the strong in battle, and, above all, by the rise of the factory system.

There are no evidences to show that our middle class is healthier, happier, or more intelligent than was the middle class of Athens (its progress in morals will be considered later).

Increased wealth cannot be shown to have made man healthier and stronger, nor can it be held to be an adequate compensation for the hardihood he has lost. By frittering and distracting men's minds more things have actually weakened his powers. They choke and clog the free exercise of his intelligence.

It cannot be demonstrated that increased wealth has proved a benefit to humanity if we cannot point to higher types of men produced thereby.

But surely, it will be argued, our middle class is relatively far larger than in Athens. Education was then confined to the aristocratic few. The boasted culture of the day was enjoyed by a handful of philosophers and artists, while the remainder of the population were mostly slaves and were left in ignorance.

Not so. This notion, so commonly held, is quite

¹ In a German city recently dentists were employed to treat all the school children, and less than one hundred in a total of over twelve thousand were found to have teeth requiring no treatment.

erroneous. There was never an age before or since when culture was as deep as it was in Athens; never has it been so little confined to the favored few, never has it spread so widely into all circles of society. "The middle and lower classes," declared Matthew Arnold ("Mixed Essays"), reached then "the highest development of their humanity" which "*these classes* have ever yet reached. It was the many who relished that civilization. . . . There has never been a people in whom intelligence was so deep-seated. Culture *came nearer being universal* at that time than it has ever done.¹

Darwin argues similarly in the "Descent of Man" when he writes:

"When in any nation the standard of intellect and the number of intellectual men have increased, we may expect from the law of the deviation from an average that prodigies of genius will appear somewhat more frequently than before."

¹ The full passage is: "Culture without character is frivolous, vain, and weak; but character without culture is raw, blind, and dangerous. The most interesting, the most truly glorious peoples are those in which the alliance of these two have been effected most successfully and the results thereof most widely diffused. This is why the spectacle of ancient Athens has such profound interest for a rational man. It is the spectacle of the culture of a *people*. That was not a mere aristocracy, leavening the multitude but leaving it the unformed multitude still. That was not a mere democracy, acute and energetic but tasteless, narrow-minded, and ignoble. That was the spectacle of the middle and lower classes in the highest development of their humanity that these classes have ever yet reached. It was the many who relished these arts, who were not satisfied with less than these monuments. In the conversations recorded by Plato and Xenophon, which, for freedom and refinement, have set the tone for the whole civilized world, shop-keepers and tradesmen of Athens mingle as speakers. This is why a handful of Athenians of two thousand years ago are more interesting than the millions of our contemporaries."

The converse of this rule indicates that when prodigies of genius are abundant, the number of intellectual men and the standard of intellect in the community was correspondingly high.

"The practise of the *dicastery* and *ecclesia* at Athens," writes John Stuart Mill ("Representative Government"), "raised the intellectual standard of *the average citizen* far beyond anything of which there is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern."

It is true that we have public schools in America to-day which Greece had not, but schools cannot make intelligence. England has enjoyed free education for only about twenty-five years, but her people are as intelligent as ours, while her most brilliant period was in the schoolless time of Elizabeth. Shakespeare, it is said, was not well educated, although about his intelligence there is no great dispute. Intelligence consists in the strength of the brain, not in its fulness, as the strength of wood lies in its fiber, not in its polish.

The mental quality of our middle class may in some measure be indicated by the theater which it patronizes and the periodicals which it favors, together with the enormous consumption of literary rubbish. The sensational exaggerations of the vernacular press may perhaps be compared with the street orator who stood to the Athenian citizen in lieu of a daily newspaper. We are told that the sort of journalism which the Athenian populace required was this: they first of all taught their orators to avoid turgid perorations, and they let it be known that they considered it good form at the climax

of an address for the speaker to become more cool and quiet. His listeners, they gave him to understand, wished to be convinced, not dazzled. They were always suspicious of emotion and put their faith in reason. The orator's task, they conceived, was not to excite but to clarify their minds. If he expected to win their adherence he must endeavor to purify their intelligence, not inflame and confuse it.

"In the presence of a great orator," writes Professor Butcher, "a Greek audience maintained a vigilant incredulity and, in return, the homage which the orator paid to his audience is evinced in the astonishing calm of the Attic peroration."

How is it with the rich or "upper" classes of to-day? Have they been benefited as men and women by the increase of wealth production? Has greater volume of national wealth had the effect of producing in the leisure class a race of supermen? Can we point as a result of wealth to a class of big, fine, handsome, generous, lordly, magnanimous, benevolent, intellectual, noble men, the very flower and perfection of humanity? In America, certainly, there is no class corresponding to this description. In England, to the credit of the English people, there is such a class, and, in so far as there is such a class, greater wealth has proved a blessing to society. It is in virtue of these qualities, moreover, that the English people permit their aristocracy to continue to exist — nay even love it and look up to it. For the aristocracy of England is rich in two qualities — beauty and courage — which men of all classes honestly and strongly admire.

Mr. Chesterton ("Heretics") has observed:

"The English lower classes do not fear the upper classes in the least; nobody could. They simply and freely and sentimentally worship them. . . . The strength of the aristocracy is in the slums. When a navvy wishes to praise a man he says that he has behaved like a gentleman. The . . . power of the oligarchy in England does not rest upon the cruelty of the rich to the poor, nor even upon the kindness of the rich to the poor. It rests on the perennial and unfailing kindness of the poor to the rich."

But the English upper class, though perhaps the most worthy, fair-minded, and well-behaved of any in our day, has nevertheless not escaped the curse that rests upon the possession of great wealth nor avoided the extravagance, vanity, and selfishness which mark such condition. Like Athens it is cursed with a profligate type, like Alcibiades, or cold-blooded weak aristocrat, like Nicias, and all the other types of luxurious vice. There is little to choose between the ancient and the modern world in respect to the mental and moral qualities of its ruling class. Of them, as of the slaving class, it seems most accurate to say that they remain morally practically stationary age after age.

Increasing wealth in *more things* and in all the implements and appurtenances of genius may quite possibly be accompanied by increasing poverty in the genius itself. How superb, for instance, is the modern grand piano as compared with the quaint little harpsichord upon which Beethoven composed his immortal symphonies! The production of masters has not kept pace with the improvement in the tools intended for masters to

use. The scenery of an Elizabethan play consisted of a few sign-boards and a table and a chair; but the stuff of the play was woven out of Shakespeare's intellect. A few pounds' worth of properties but tons' worth of brains went into the performance. The curtain of the modern theater rises, by contrast, often upon fifty thousand dollars' worth of tinsel, spangles, paint, tights, pasteboard, and a handful of silliness.

Eleanora Duse is reported to have declared:

"To save the theater, the theater must be destroyed, the actors and actresses must all die of the plague. They poison the air, they make art impossible. It is not a drama they play, but pieces for the theater. We should return to the Greeks; play in the open air. The drama dies of stalls and boxes and evening dress, and people who come to digest their dinner."

The architect of our age has dozens of materials and hundreds of implements and machines at his command where the Greeks had one. The stylus and parchment roll with which Plato wrote his essays were crude compared to the typewriting machine. The great Flemish tapestries, loveliest masterpieces of their kind, were created out of not more than twenty tints, while the modern factories, producing bad dreams in wool, have over fourteen hundred tints at their command. The art of making many books has advanced greatly, but concerning the quality of the books turned out and read in legions by the people, let the following words of an investigator witness. A librarian, writing on "What the People Read — an Index to their Standard of Intelligence," reports:

"Fifty million volumes were issued from the libraries in 1900; seventy per cent. of them were fiction. The people like to be amused and, to some extent, informed; but they evade with considerable care anything that calls upon them to make an effort to think."¹

✓ Many modern inventions, instead of being sources of pride, should be occasions to us of the deepest humiliation, and others are only suggestive of the varied misery whose existence demanded their invention. Thus ingenious firearms witness to burglary and need of self-defense and the sleepless hatreds between men; varieties of medicine indicate new varieties of disease, while surgery points to the failure of the whole science of medicine, even as charities reveal the depth of national poverty and the breakdown of the national economies; the police force marks the extent of national crime; insane asylums, prisons tell their own story, as do the mountains of false hair, legs, arms, and the annual consumption in the United States alone of twenty millions of false teeth! Even the large number of churches, sign though that be of an active and prosperous condition of religious life among the people, marks no less a lack of moral certainty and faith in themselves, requiring constant stimulus and aid from ceremony and service, exhortation

¹Mr. Frederic Harrison ("The Nineteenth Century and After") writes: "Libraries, of course, are not learning; museums and laboratories are not knowledge; much less is an enormous reading public literature. And, however much libraries may be crowded with readers, however spacious and lavish are the mountings of technical schools, and though seventy millions of articulate men and women can pass the seventh standard of a board school, the question of the fruit of all this remains to be answered."

and prayer. It marks no less a homesickness of the heart for another and a better life which speaks ill for the amount of peace and health which, under proper conditions, should have already become man's portion in this.

Our contemporaries point to the variety and multiplicity of things at our command as proud indications of the richness of our civilization, but viewed in their true light they may indicate much more plainly the incurable uneasiness of the age and its proneness to confuse quantity with quality. Men seem to think that quantity, if large enough, suffices to atone for quality though never so bad. Never mind how poor things are if we only have plenty of them, they say. Therefore we are content to consume cheap things in great numbers, decking ourselves and our houses with gimcracks which we immediately hurry to consume as fast as possible in order that we may get something else — "different." Thus variety points not so much to the resources of our industrial system as to our unconscious but immeasurably deep and restless dissatisfaction with its results.¹

Let us speak of food. To be well fed the human adult needs four kinds of food: grain, oil, acid, and greens. A perfectly handsome, healthful, buoyant human body may be maintained in the pink of condition on these four foods, represented, we will say, by bread, butter or oil, fruits, and relishes. To this might be added cheese

¹As Thoreau has said, "Our inventions are improved means to an unimproved end." Ruskin has declared, "We are manufacturing everything except men."

and wine and nuts. A meal might consist, as it did among the Greeks, of bread and wine, cheese and radishes, or bread, olives, and dried fruit. This was an Athenian menu. Here no cooking was required except for the occasional bread-making. At the main meal fish was common, meat used to some extent, and honey occasionally. Among the early Greeks even the athletes were fed upon no more than wheat bread, cheese, figs, and wine. Altogether there were about thirty or forty kinds of food known to the Greeks. Compare this with our crowded menus and voluminous cook-books. From a grocer's list before me I count over five hundred articles in daily use, of which number only about twenty were known to the ancients, namely, apples, artichokes, barley, beans, beef, cheese, cherries, dates, chickens, eggs, wheat, figs, radishes, fish, grapes, lemons, lentils, milk, nuts, and olives.

Our hundreds of articles of food are combined in an almost infinite number of ways. A household cook-book before me, of moderate pretensions, contains recipes for over twelve hundred different dishes, a number which is, of course, far surpassed by such works as the vast three-volume encyclopedias of cookery patronized by the French.

This mammoth multiplication of foods would be no folly if it could be shown to benefit correspondingly the human race, but the contrary is true, for along with the development of several new diseases which take their rise in the overworked alimentary canal, our generation exhibits further the general indications that mean more

food and worse nourishment — indications which may be seen in premature wrinkles, in flabby muscles, in thick, pasty, or muddy skins, weak lungs, thin hair, catarrhal membranes, defective eyesight, rotting teeth, and unsound nerves. Emaciation and obesity are about equally prevalent. Then it appears that all this endless multiplying of dishes, this continued search for "variety," this mixing and messing of foods, this saucing and seasoning and smothering of them, this cutting and chopping and pounding and grinding, this baking, frying, boiling, broiling, braizing, shredding, fricaseeing, deviling; this perfumery and coloring and millinery; this freezing and burning and melting; this cutting into squares, cubes, heart shapes, star shapes, spirals; this laundering with frills and curl papers and silk petticoats and linen and lace flounces and pink candles — all of this foolery is worse than useless. Most of the vitality is cooked out of natural foods, and when part of the good has gone off in steam, and part over the house in smells, and part thrown down the sink with the cooking water, then what remains is enbalméd in spices and sauces until its original character is effectually smothered. This is called the culinary art. No wonder that of this perfumed and seasoned residuum we are driven to eat far too much and far too fast. Man does not live by cooking alone, but by such morsels of nutriment as remain after the cooking is over.¹

¹ In Egypt one day I compared repasts with my donkey boy who had been running swiftly ten miles at my side as I rode. My lunch consisted of birds, sardines, caviare, champagne. His was a thin biscuit of

We read of the old simple days when corn and oil and wine were all men asked, when the Roman legions conquered the world, subsisting sometimes for days, it is said, upon raw wheat which they munched on the march; of how, in Greece¹ and Egypt, a draft of milk and a few dates were a meal, when a loaf of bread, a jug of wine, with a head of lettuce and some nuts, were a feast.

The old phrase, "a land flowing with milk and honey," in modern terms would be a land flowing with bacon and eggs and doughnuts, a land flowing with pie and pickles and hot biscuits and fried potatoes and iced tea and twelve hundred other abominations. To sit beneath

unleavened bread about the size of a tea plate, a hand's breadth of cheese, and a mouthful of greens. Though his fare was light and his legs possibly weary, his eyes were brighter, his muscles suppler, his chest deeper, and his heart lighter than mine, as he started for another ten miles, running every step of the way, homeward.

¹ Professor Gulick ("Life of the Ancient Greeks") thus describes their frugal fare: "They had spinach, lettuce, cabbage, peas, beans, eaten either raw or cooked with oil and vinegar, also honey, radishes, onions, garlic, leeks. Pea porridge was a regular dish and was sold upon the streets. Raisins and figs were common; dried fruit was preferred to fresh fruit. Nuts, especially walnuts and almonds, were eaten before the symposium to provoke thirst. They had wheat, barley, millet, and spelt. No oats or rye. Public bakers rendered home cooking largely unnecessary. Lentils were often mixed with the dough. The Greeks had no sugar; their only sweets were cakes made with honey. Bread was both leavened and unleavened. They had a few herbs, pennyroyal, marjoram, and silphium—the last the favorite. They had no pepper or other spices and no extracts. They had no lard. Fish, flesh, and greens were cooked in oil. Butter was not used. They had *no tea, coffee, cocoa, cordials, or spirituous liquors*. They drank goats' milk and sheep's milk—not cows' milk. They drank with meals wine, diluted with two or three parts water."

your own vine and fig tree, the symbol of peace and content, in modern terms means to live near a corner grocery and butchery with its thousand varieties of adulterated food, including preserved carcasses in all stages of corruption. "But is not life fuller and richer for all this variety?" I shall be asked.

"Fuller, it is, surely."

So much for food; how is it with clothing? Does our pandemonium of fashion really mean a richer, fuller life? Observe its follies, the diabolical inventiveness with which it devises each year fashions so ugly that even our coarse taste cannot long endure them, but must needs seek a change if only to something no less ugly. I see before me a moving picture of woman as she has appeared since I have been observing her. I see her hair go now up, now down, now loose, now tight, now "banged," now "chignonned," now "pomped." I see her shoulders now rising in tumorous deformity almost hiding her ears, her sleeves, now swelling into balloons, now contracting to skin-tightness in which the arms can no longer bend. I see her waist constricted, her bust thrust up under her chin, her skirt drawn tightly about her hips so that she can neither sit nor walk in comfort. I see trailing skirts, dragging over dusty streets or flopping damply between her ankles. I see every conceivable absurdity in feathers, flowers, and furbelows which delirium could invent, perched or inclined at every imaginable outrageous angle upon her head, in what she calls a hat.

We have hundreds and thousands and tens of thousands of things in what should be a simple process of

clothing ourselves in comfortable, suitable, beautiful, and decent raiment. Visit a department store and you shall see this process gone into madness; you shall see every conceivable article which women can stitch, pin, glue, tie, hook, button, sew, buckle, or hang upon themselves displayed in endless and absolutely useless variety. There are scores of brands of each trifling article such as dress braids; buttons are made of bones, metals, crockery, in hundreds of different designs. Every detail of dress is varied to the utmost, everything is done to bewilder the purchaser and create in her a desire for new and more unnecessary things. Cotton is sold for wool, and wool for silk, and one thing for another whenever it can be disguised. The utmost ingenuity is exercised in bestowing false colors, false weights, false polish, false luster, false texture, false glitter, false character, and a false price to everything. All classes are swindled. The rich lady buys paste jewels at a fabulous profit, and the poor housewife finds her cheap calicoes have been weighted with lime. It is rare to find in these commercial bazaars articles which it was worth any one's while to make, or is worth any one's while to own.

In contrast we may recall the two or three graceful, comfortable, and suitable garments which the Greeks wore, the sandals leaving free play for the foot, the long cloak, the natural arrangement of the women's hair, the quaint little hoods and caps, and the charm and individuality which marked every one of the few but precious articles of household use. Each vase, each plate, each jug and ewer, each cup and hand mirror, each jeweled

necklace or cloak clasp, was a choice work of art to be handed down from generation to generation.

For this wise people knew when to stop. A beautiful fashion once achieved was retained for centuries. They were satisfied with perfection, they knew that it is only the good which satisfies. Our unceasing demand for new things, more things, different things is proof that the things we get are not good. Whisky does not assuage thirst. Our things never satisfy us.

Quality obviates the demand for quantity. He who can enjoy the best books needs but few. He who relishes good food wants but little and does not crave variety. He who wears honest wool needs but one coat to three of his neighbor's shoddy. This rule holds no less of conduct than of possessions. When men seem to be trying to do as many things as possible in a given time you may be sure that what they do is not worth doing. It is only trifling acts that will bear crowding. Persons who are habitually in a hurry are trying to make many nothings into something. It is because our acts are so foolish that we are in a hurry to get through with them. There is much vain protest against the habit of hurry, but at what we are doing we *must* hurry. Great deeds cannot be hastened, but ignoble acts must be rushed. Burglars, murderers, money-getters are always in a hurry.

It is proposed frankly in some quarters to make material prosperity the final test of progress. Mr. Vanderlip, for example, writes, in *Scribner's Magazine*:

"The strength of nations is coming more and more to be measured by their wealth. History will come to be written in ledgers and balance sheets and trade statistics. The element of personal bravery is being taken out of warfare and success is a matter of technical skill and executive ability. It may seem sordid and unromantic (!), but I believe that a study of prices and trade balances of a nation will give the data of a nation's history. . . . America has sent coals to Newcastle, cotton to Manchester, cutlery to Sheffield, potatoes to Ireland, champagne to France, watches to Switzerland, and Rhine wine to Germany."

In such words the superiority of this nation is convincingly set forth by one whose patriotic ideal seems to be that his nation shall sell everything to the world without ever buying anything in return. The question where the world is to get the money to do this with, the writer alludes to playfully as "an unanswerable financial problem."

To all such arguments Herbert Spencer's words may be cited in reply:

"I detest that conception of social progress which presents as its aim increase of population, growth of wealth, spread of commerce. In this ideal of human existence there is contemplated quantity only, and not quality. Instead of an immense amount of life of low type, I would far sooner see half the amount of life of a high type. A prosperity which is exhibited in board of trade tables, year by year increasing their totals, is, to a large extent, not a prosperity at all, but an adversity."

To mistake quantity for quality lies at the bottom of most of our illusions of progress. . . . The possession of *more things* does not confer wealth upon men who are incapable of wealth. A new brush does not make a

new painter. Modern machinery gives artificial power to the impotent, but the power lies in the tool, and bears no more relation to real greatness than the wax apples tied to a Christmas tree resemble live fruit. Modern machinery makes kings out of ordinary men, it does not make great men even out of kings. The power of the czar lies in his scepter, not in the man.

Quantity is persistently preferred to quality. Men buy many poor cheap things instead of a few good ones; they seek many acquaintances instead of a few cherished friends; they devour a large variety of mixed over-cooked and adulterated foods instead of thoroughly assimilating a few pure, natural, and wholesome ones; they collect a medley of ill-assorted bric-à-brac instead of enjoying a few works of true art. The farmer scratches over dozens of acres instead of intensively cultivating a few rods; he raises tons of inferior produce instead of bushels of good stuff; he breeds herds of poor animals instead of improving the quality of his stock.¹

Young people skim through dozens of weak, foolish books, instead of mastering a few great works; the man of leisure trots extensively around the globe instead of

¹ The cry for more things is repeated in the cry for more people and in the rivalry of nations for rapid increase of population. Although Darwin declared that at the present rate of increase there will be in less than a thousand years not standing room on the earth for man's progeny, although it is calculated that the earth will then contain over four billion human beings, in spite of these facts the demand for quantity at any cost, regardless of quality, and regardless whether we are ready to care for them or not, leads the unthinking to look upon mere increase of population as progress.

becoming acquainted with the Walden Pond in his own woods; he proselytes the heathen in the antipodes and neglects the slums in his own city. He grasps at more dollars instead of studying the true value of those he already holds and putting them to a rational use. His supreme delusion is in his mania for producing *more things* instead of seeing to it that those already produced are properly distributed. He has replaced the Greek motto, "Nothing too much," with one of his own devising which reads, "Everything as much as possible."¹

Even the Chinese, according to the author of "Letters of a Chinese Official," adopt higher standards.

¹ Professor Karl Joel (*Philosophenwege*) writes: "Let us imagine Socrates introduced in a dream into our times. Astonished, he would gaze at our wonderful means of transportation, the mass of factory products, the long-range guns, the luxurious comfort of our private houses, the crowded libraries, the splendor of the theaters — in a word, all the wealth of our age.

"Should we not be proud and happy?' we might ask him. In his characteristic manner he might answer: 'I cannot tell yet, as I am not acquainted with your modes of thought, and have not yet learned whether you are good and wise. Show me your living masters.'

"The next day in the Palestra Socrates would relate to his companions, 'I dreamed last night that I was in Persia. There everything is bigger than you can imagine. Enormously huge are the cities, the buildings, the treasures, the armies, the factories, — everything gigantically big, nothing is small, except the people.'

"To a Greek of the classic period our culture would undoubtedly seem barbaric, since the basis of our civilization is far nearer that of an Oriental mass than that of the Hellenic individuality of culture. It is not to be denied that our achievements are mostly material and statistical. With our quantitative, no qualitative culture has kept pace. While our age leaves all other ages behind as measured in statistics, its inward product cannot for a moment bear comparison with the great classic period."

"Increase of wealth is not, to our (the Chinese) mind, necessarily good in itself. Everything depends upon the way in which the wealth is distributed and upon its effect on the moral character of the nation."

Aristotle wrote:

"A state exists for the sake of a good life and not for the sake of life only."

The enormous number of inventions which are daily rendering the mechanism of our existence more complex may be roughly divided into four classes, those whose purpose is:

I. To make more things.

II. To get there more quickly, or to communicate more quickly.

III. To kill men faster.

IV. To alleviate suffering.

These, then, would appear to be the leading ideals of our age. To have *more things*; to get there quickly; to kill men rapidly; and to save pain.

There is one element common to the first three classes of invention — they are designed to save time. The mammoth reaper which mows a county in a few days, the express train with its sixty miles an hour, the marine cable bringing an answer from the antipodes in a few minutes, the machine guns which cut down an army like a field of timothy, or the torpedo-boats which sink a navy — down to the latest egg-beater and corkscrew, are all designed to save time. We may almost say that the whole aim of man's ingenuity, embodied in thousands upon thousands of contrivances, has been directed

toward the one sole object of saving time. His railroads, trolleys, canals, tunnels, cables, elevators, bicycles, automobiles, etc., are all for the purpose of enabling him to save time in getting there. His telegraphs, telephones, etc., are devised in order to save time in sending messages. His myriad machines are invented for the purpose of saving time in producing *more things*. His Gatling guns, torpedoes, automatic firing rifles, etc., are designed to save time in killing men. Mr. Byrn, in alluding to the services of the Western Union Telegraph Company, observed that "the value of time saved by it is beyond human estimate." If, we may be pardoned for asking, the value of the time saved by one single telegraph company is so great as to be "beyond human estimate," what can be the value of the time saved by all the other appliances of modern invention? Think of the time saved by the cotton and woolen and silk mills, by the iron foundries, the sewing-machines, the mowing-machines, the mammoth reaper, the harvester, the Hoe cylinder press, the electric trolley, the Maxim guns, the elevators, the battle-ship, the electrocution chair! Think of the time saved by the railroads, the drills, the hydraulic machines, the pneumatic despatch, the stem-winding watch, the lucifer match, the canned-food factory! What a vast volume of time saved! Time that used to be wasted now "saved" and put away where moth doth not corrupt nor thieves break in and steal. What æons of it! Time enough to double men's lives. Time enough to give every human being an abundance of leisure. An industrial revolution, the miracles of

modern machinery, millions of brains directed upon the problem, all having for their one sole object — to save time!

And what is the result?

The result is that men have less time now than they have ever had since the world began. What becomes of all the time thus saved? Where does it go?¹ Excepting in the rural districts (where there is no machinery for saving time; but where alone there is any to be found), every one is pressed for time.

The leisure which we gain by time-saving machinery seems to be tainted. Like the gambler's winnings, secured too easily, it is never put to any good use, but is soon expended in a hundred new follies. A Western farmer, enjoying a calm moment at the close of a busy life, one day reflected upon his past, and discovered, to his consternation, that he had spent his existence in growing corn to feed hogs, in order to buy some more land, on which to grow more corn, to feed more hogs, in order to buy more land, on which to grow more corn, to raise more hogs, etc. Thus we invent machinery for the purpose of saving time, in order to produce more things, and to get there more quickly, in order to save more time, in order to get more things, to get there more quickly still, etc.

The current sentiment of our day is, almost without dissent, satisfied and even enthusiastic with this state

¹ Some economists would fain tell us that the surplus time saved by machinery is being used up by a larger and larger unproductive and parasitic class.

of things. Here is a picture of modern man surrounded by his amazing improvements, as drawn by Mr. Byrn:

"The nineteenth-century man, asleep on his spring bed, is wakened at the precise moment by an alarm-clock; . . . rising, his bare feet fall upon a comfortable machine-made rug, are thrust into machine-made hose and slippers. Drawing the loom-made lace curtains, he starts up the automatic window shade and adjusts, in his shirt, patent collar buttons and studs. He touches an electric bell for a servant, and proceeds to the bath with its modern appliances. All his clothes represent modern inventions. He winds a stem-winding watch. A cup of coffee from a patent coffee-pot, artificial ice in his drinking water, machine-ground sausage, batter cakes made with an egg beater, waffles from a patent waffle-iron, hot biscuit from the cooking range—all help to make him comfortable and happy." (Good Heavens!)

Mr. Byrn does not follow his machine-made man throughout his day's activities (perhaps doubt of his surviving his breakfast unconsciously checked the author's flow of imagination), but we can easily supply the picture of him continuing his day in the midst of a forest of machine-made superfluities, dodging deadly modern improvements, and if, perchance, he escaped from them alive, saving by means of them a goodly quantity of time.¹

In contrast let us call up for a moment the picture of an Athenian youth. Asleep on a plain hard couch which to his firm, young limbs is as easy as a patent spring bed, he is awakened, not by an alarm clock, but by

¹ One of our newspapers, after describing the recent murder of a man by street thieves, gravely concluded with the congratulatory remark, "Fortunately he had no money with him, and so lost nothing but his life."

the birds in his father's garden, or, as Thoreau was, by the beams of the rising sun, or perhaps, better still, by that morning freshness in his blood which produces in perfect health the tingling desire to get up. He thrusts his feet, not into machine-made hose and slippers turned out in factories by the millions, but into soft sandals made carefully of sound material to fit his feet and designed to last for years. He draws no loom-made lace curtains and lets fly no automatic window shade, since his window, giving out into the garden, is open wide to sun and air. For his bath he goes for a dip in the river or to the beautiful marble swimming pools which adorn the city. His clothes represent no roaring mills fed by weary workers, nor were they fashioned by the sickly fingers of sweated toilers. They come from his mother's loom and the spinning-wheels of his sisters. They are few and simple but are made for beauty and endurance. He winds no stem-winding watch, but a glance at the sun tells him the hour. His breakfast — it need scarcely be said, considering his firm, rosy flesh and glowing beauty — is not hot biscuits, waffles, sausage, coffee, batter cakes, and ice-water, but probably a slice of wheaten bread dipped in wine, or a rye cake and a bunch of grapes, or a bit of barley bread with a handful of olives, a finger of cream cheese and a lettuce leaf.

We may ask who is to be the legitimate successor of Mr. Byrn's machine-made man, since to the increase in the number of conveniences and the corresponding helplessness of man there is no end as yet in sight. All

the motives which have led us up to this point in our machine-made civilization still exist, and *will lead us further*. There is no goal, no end, no aim, *no point of satisfaction in sight*. Especially is the craving for increased speed insatiable. Not only do men choose the fastest express trains in order to arrive most quickly at the point they wish to reach, but they seek the fastest procurable automobiles when they do not wish to reach any point—from the sheer love of hurry. They are no better satisfied with sixty miles an hour by train than they were with ten miles an hour by stage-coach. They talk now of a hundred miles an hour instead of sixty. Should danger to life and limb be doubled or trebled by this new rate of transit, it is not apparent from any evidence we have of public disposition that this fact would matter in the least. In the five years from 1897 to 1901 there were 262,631 persons killed and injured on the railroads of the United States. Would the destruction of a few hundred thousands more each year deter men from more rapid transit if that could be secured?

The faster men travel the faster they want to travel. The more things they have the more they want. The man of the future will look back upon Mr. Byrn's improved machine-made man with contempt, and call him a primitive savage.

"Fancy having to depend," he will say, "upon a miserable rattling alarm clock to waken one in the morning! Fancy having to rise oneself and walk on one's own legs, all the way to the bath! Fancy having to draw one's own lace curtains oneself! One

might as well be a beast of burden and be done with it! And window shades, what an annoyance! And dressing, what a labor!"

Judging by the present rate of progress measured by mechanical improvements the man of the future will have discarded all our primitive appliances. He will, without doubt, be wakened, lifted out of bed, bathed, rubbed, powdered, dressed, and fed by automatic machinery, bristling about his bedroom and set the night before. He will be as tenderly cared for and almost as soft and helpless as a new-born babe. His dinner — one hesitates to describe it — from a menu the size of a quarto volume, embracing all the viands and beverages known to the wide earth, he will select a machine-made repast to save his digestion — a repast which has been cooked and recooked, reboiled, rebaked, malted and pre-digested, shredded, ground, and milled, until his stomach, literally thrown out of work by the introduction of modern machinery, shall join the great army of the unemployed.

So confirmed is the general habit of mistaking quantity for quality that some one is sure to exclaim at this point: "Well, but suppose it be true that we have not produced any intellects greater than *one or two* among the ancients. Yet if we have a far *larger number* of good average intelligences — is not this progress?"

Certainly not. Progress concerns itself only with quality; it means the increased *power of human faculty* not the mere numerical increase of human beings.

This is perfectly clear if one reflects a moment upon what took place in the past, during the march from the anthropoid age up to, say, Shakespeare. Suppose at any step of this ascent it had been asserted that to multiply the species in its then stage would be progress; suppose, for instance, that a community of apes, being fairly well fed and merrily engaged in pelting one another with cocoanuts in the forest primeval, should have decided that the multiplication of apes in this (to them) satisfactory condition should be esteemed progress. Obviously they would have been mistaken. Progress meant moving toward Shakespeare, and progress could not take place until the anthropoid ape passed up into a higher species. This is as true of our stage as it has been of any previous one. Neither the mere multiplication of human beings such as we are, nor the indefinite provision of *more things* for the use, amusement, or distraction of such men as we are, can by any means be called progress. Progress takes place when certain individuals emerge from the common level and establish a higher standard of human capacity and excellence. Unless this happens the standard obviously does not advance. Thus the superior man is a convenient and accurate point of measurement.

If we once allow the plea of quantity in any department, no further discussion is possible, since almost everything in the world has increased in numbers in the last two thousand years. If progress were to be measured by quantity, the modern world would naturally always win in every department. There are more things of every

kind. There are more cities, more houses, more paintings, tools, laws, clothes, corn, animals, luxuries, diseases, furniture, crimes, books; all these *more things* following on more people. But along with this vast multiplication of things there has not been an increase of other, at least equally desirable, possessions; we have not more time, more health, more beauty, more strength, more happiness, more genius. Nevertheless there is no belief cherished by our age which is so embedded in the popular consciousness as this persuasion of the value — intrinsic and immutable — of *quantity*. The gospel of more things is assiduously preached; the glorification of modern machinery, praise of multifariousness, of bigness, of fastness are on every tongue. Men rack their brains to discover new trivial wants and madden themselves in an effort to want what they do not need. By every trick they are being stimulated into breeding new and artificial desires. Society is furiously busy in producing the *more things* which it has lashed itself into thinking that it wants. The beauty and usefulness of these things are matters of small moment; it is their number, their variety, their showiness, their ingenious artificiality, which are considered. At the bottom of the common consciousness, more sincere than religion, more precious than honor, as persistent as the love of life itself, gnaws continually an insensate craving for *more things* — a fathomless lust void of any just concept of man's true and certain welfare, his progress or his destiny.

But the voice of the objector is probably not stilled.

He reiterates his argument. In imagination I hear him repeating to me these words:

"You appear to be under the impression that you can base a theory of progress upon genius. But geniuses are not everything; there are other things quite as valuable as genius."

Question: "What, for instance?"

Objector: "Why, railroads and machinery and wealth, etc."

Q. "What are those valuable for?"

O. "Why, for people to use."

Q. "To use for what?"

O. "Why, for their convenience."

Q. "Convenience for what?"

O. "Why, to have things useful and necessary."

Q. "Necessary for what?"

O. "Necessary for life."

Q. "Good! necessary for life. But are railroads, modern machinery, etc., necessary for life?"

O. "Yes, certainly."

Q. "You do not mean to say that men did not have life before these things were invented?"

O. "Why, no, I suppose they managed to live somehow. But those are necessary to the higher life."

Q. "What higher life?"

O. "The higher, broader life, which is enlarging men's minds to include all the earth and creating a new social consciousness."

Q. "What do you mean by 'new social consciousness'?"

O. "I mean that sense of broad humanity which recognizes all nations of the earth as kin and which is interested in the doings of other men at the remotest ends of the globe."

Q. "And do you believe this consciousness to be new?"

O. "Certainly."

Q. "Do you suppose then that intelligent men have not in previous ages felt the liveliest interest in other nations and peoples everywhere?"

O. "Perhaps so, but they did not recognize the fact, as we do, that all men are brothers, the children of one family."

Q. "And do we recognize this?"

O. "Why — ye-es."

Q. "I suppose you know that wars between nations are more fierce and deadly in our day than ever before, and race hatred as implacable as ever. Our negro and Chinese problems demonstrate no less than anti-Semitism and numerous other instances the mutual dislike between different races."

O. "Well, it may be true that perhaps modern improvements have not yet brought about universal peace, but they certainly are useful."

Q. "Useful for what?"

O. "Why, to improve men's conditions."

Q. "What effect has it upon them to improve their conditions?"

O. "Why, it improves them, makes them stronger and healthier."

Q. "Are they stronger and healthier? What else do we expect modern improvements to do for men?"

O. "Why to make them happier, I suppose."

Q. "Are they happier?"

O. "Yes, I think they are, I think they have more freedom, more opportunity, more leisure."

Q. "More leisure! They are hurried as never before. They are hurrying the very teeth out of their heads, and the very stomachs out of their bodies."

O. "But they have more freedom."

Q. "Freedom for what?"

O. "Freedom to do as they like."

Q. "Freedom must be consumed in some way, must it not? It is not an end in itself."

O. "It is a good thing in itself. It is good for men to be free no matter what they do with their freedom. It is good for a man to be free to do as he likes even if he uses his freedom to go and hang himself."

Q. "And this sort of freedom you think is new?"

O. "Oh, I don't know as to that. But I am sure men never had so great opportunities as now."

Q. "Opportunities for what?"

O. "Why, to get on".

Q. "To get where?"

O. "Why, to — to get money."

Q. "Money for what?"

O. "Why, to buy things with."

Q. "What sort of things?"

O. "Why, all kinds of things; a great variety to eat and wear and use and enjoy."

Q. "Then they do enjoy them?"

O. "Certainly!"

Q. "How do they show that they are happy?"

O. "Why they laugh and joke, and go to comic operas and the circus, and smoke and drink and have a good time."

Q. "And these things show that they are happy?"

O. "Of course."

Q. "Do not these things indicate rather that they are seeking happiness than that they have found it? May I ask what is your idea of the method by which men usually express real happiness?"

O. "Oh, I suppose they smile and clap their hands and dance round or something of that sort."

Q. "This is the child's way. The mature brain expresses happiness in one way — by creating beauty. If the energy of real health and happiness is in a man — it comes out in that form. So long as he is incomplete, raw, restless, unhappy, he seeks to *acquire*, but when he becomes ripe, whole, happy, then he begins to *produce*."

O. "But even if we do not seem to have a large number of great geniuses, we still have a high average of intelligence. And look at our educational system; it is wonderful!"

Q. "Education for what?"

O. "Education, knowing about things."

Q. "What things?"

O. "Why, useful information — science, history, geography, grammar, etc."

Q. "Useful for what?"

O. (Exasperated.) "Useful for what? Why, to make men more intelligent."

Q. "Are they more intelligent?"

O. (Indignantly.) "Of course they are."

Q. "More intelligent than what?"

O. "More intelligent than animals, more intelligent than savages. More intelligent than primitive man."

Q. "Granted; but we need speak only of civilized men. Do you really believe that men are more intelligent to-day than they have ever been in previous generations?"

O. "Oh, well, now of course you are thinking of those Greeks again."

Q. "Do you consider that the aim and goal of human society is to produce wealth?"

O. "Certainly not. I concede that wealth is only a means to higher ends."

Q. "What higher ends?"

O. "Oh, art, philosophy, literature, etc., I suppose."

Q. "And these must finally be produced by men of genius?"

O. "Of course."

Q. "Then the final aim of society is the production of men of genius?"

O. "Possibly."

Q. "What do you say of civilization which is steadily growing more and more opulent in things and less and less fertile in genius?"

O. "If you allude to America, all I have to say is that as yet we have had too much practical work to do — genius will come later. We had a continent to subdue; we had to build our house before we could live in it!"

Q. "Very well, but now when it is nearing completion, the question is, *Are* you going to live in it?"

PROGRESS MEASURED BY MORE FACTS

In the intellectual world the craving for more things takes a scarcely less unreasoning form in a craving for *more facts*, which is resulting in an accumulation of data that forms an ever-growing burden upon the weakening memories of each succeeding generation. We have on hand now hundreds of times as many facts

as we can coordinate and understand. No brains of *our order* can cope with them. They bewilder and oppress us and each year's increase is making it more and more impossible to get order out of chaos.

No one not conversant with the circumstances can have even a faint idea of the mountains of unassimilable learning which are rapidly rising. Microscopes, telescopes, and similar instruments are daily bringing more and more objects within range to be named, counted, and described; and thousands of men and women earn their living by so naming, counting, and describing because the accepted view is that if we keep on naming, counting, and describing long enough, somehow truth will be reached at last. It is as if a child should think by heaping pebbles to build a house.

By way of illustration let us take the subject of spiders, since I know of none more apt for my purpose. Seven groups of Arachnids are described: the Acaridea, Pycnogidea, Phalangidea, Solpugidea, Scorpionidea, Theliphonidea, Araneidea. Under these groups are thirty-four families, Tartarides, Phrynides, Theraphosides, Colophonides, Filistatides, Ecobiides, Tetrablemides, Dysderides, Drassides, Palpimanides, Dictynides, Agelenides, Salticides, etc., etc. Under these families are about two hundred and sixty genera, and in one alone of these thirty-four families nearly *one thousand species* are known! Concerning all these many thousands of species we have tabulated minute, specific facts concerning their abdomens, palpi, fauces, mouths, legs, eyes, respiration, nervous systems, digestion, repro-

ductive organs, cephalo-thoraxes, etc., etc. Thousands upon thousands of Latin names, hundreds and hundreds of thousands of minute microscopic facts—about spiders!

There is no visible limit to which the accumulation of data about any single object may not be carried, nor to the classifications demanded by new accumulations. The botanist classifies flowers according to one system; the microscopist, examining veins of leaves and scales on petals, calls for a new classification, while the chemist demands a third. Look, for instance, at this mass of minutiae concerning a single object—the cranium of birds. Here are descriptions of every bony process, every angle, arch, and crook, involving for each a special and intricate Latin nomenclature. A man's lifetime could be consumed in mastering it; yet all the while the two most interesting, most obvious, and most valuable facts about birds, viz., how they fly and how they find their way in migration, are quite unknown to us.¹

Astronomy is adding new stars continually to its list and the heavens are being photographed night after night. Making astronomical catalogues will ere long resemble what it would be to attempt to count and

¹ Says one writer: "The migration of birds is perhaps the greatest mystery in the whole animal kingdom. It attracted the attention of the earliest writers; but can be no more explained by the modern man of science than it could by the simple-minded savage or by the poet of antiquity. The ebb and flow of the mighty feathered wave has been sung by poets and reasoned of by philosophers; yet we must say of it still that our ignorance is immense."

describe and give a Latin name to each of the grains of sand on the beach.

I have for some years been looking for some recognition on the part of scientists of the uselessness of large portions of their labors. At last it has come, and from the highest authority. Prof. Simon Newcomb, seconded by Prof. Karl Pearson, Lord Rayleigh, Mr. G. H. Darwin, and others, in the Carnegie Institute Report for 1904, calls a halt on the frenzied accumulation of more facts. Professor Pearson declares that at least fifty per cent. of the scientific observations made and the data collected are worthless, and that no man, however able, could deduce any results from them. "I doubt," says he, "whether even a small proportion of the biometric data being accumulated in Europe and America could be made to provide valuable results."

Not contented with the plethora of undigestible facts, science burdens itself with an endlessly involved phraseology. A bud, bursting into flower, is described as "a gradual differentiation and confluence of the primitively similar segmental bodies and their attended whorls." Biology gravely declares that "living beings are made up of living molecules which can be made up into living beings." Sometimes this is phrased as: "The morphological unit is an individual mass of protoplasm, and higher forms of life are aggregates of such morphological units variously modified." Liebig explains decay as "the result of the decomposition of atoms in a state of motion." Hegel, according to Dr. William T. Harris, throws light on the problem

of existence by explaining that, "being is simply that form of identity which occurs in the dual process of the self-relation of the negative" (!)

But, it will be urged, it is quite unfair to deride science for not having yet attained her ends. She has a long road to travel. Scientists must faithfully pursue the accepted method of collecting facts, since it is only by this means that they can hope finally to arrive. Neither can they be justly reproached with not having discovered the fundamental laws of the universe, since the problems involved in such discovery, as they were the first to attract man's attention, will also be the last which he will be able to solve.

I readily grant this. Scientists and artists are the treasures of the human race — the ablest and noblest members of society. It may perhaps be truthfully said that they are the only members of our society who are doing the best they can. To deride their efforts would be inexcusable; I wish only to point out that their results are meager, their failures egregious, not at all because of lack of effort and honest intention, but because society is not providing them with the mental stimulus and nourishment which are necessary to the accomplishment of great acts. The essential conditions of large brain development — namely, healthy surroundings, economic security, freedom, leisure, abundant encouragement and appreciation, instant recognition, lavish applause — are wanting.

Thus we find that all the chief themes of science remain in dispute. We have not determined, for

*Don't know
if I will
have time
to write
this.*

instance, either man's origin or his nature. Darwin traces man's ascent through succeeding species of lower orders. Agassiz, on the other hand, denies all possibility of descent or ascent.

As to man's nature, he is declared, in the scholastic phrase, to be a "rational animal," that is, part reasoning being, part instinct-driven animal. Hence his reason must have come from one source and his body from another. Spiritists declare that his reality is spirit, while his body is only appearance or shadow. Modern science, on the other hand, inclines to believe that he is "all animal" in his origin, but may concede that he has perhaps in addition an immaterial spiritual "principle" which lower creatures do not possess. Man's arrival on this planet is attributed by one school to "natural selection," by another to "supernatural intervention."

The amiable Mr. Mivart has endeavored to placate both sides in this controversy by suggesting that man gets his body through the process of natural selection and his soul through supernatural intervention, but both schools reject with scorn his genial compromise.

Endless dispute circles about the question whether man is descended from one race or from many. History and geology are ransacked and the Bible torn to pieces in the effort to manufacture light out of darkness and to achieve conclusions which are beyond our reach and are of no consequence anyway. The "one race" defender has to explain how, if all races sprang from the same stock, they come now to be so

different. Aristotle over two thousand years ago suggested that, having wandered far and wide, they had been tanned under the tropic sun and bleached under the northern sky; but so simple an answer no longer suffices. Bushmen and negroids, we are told, do not become alike under the same sun and types do not change after many years. Thus scientists waste their time in trying to prove, from materials furnished by a few generations, laws to establish which an outlook extending over æons would be necessary, and which we do not possess. Surmises as to man's "antiquity" have ranged far and wide and each scholar ends by adopting that theory which best suits his fancy. Archbishop Usher's naïve assertion that man was "made" in the year 4004 B.C. at 8 A.M. was very popular at one time. Since his day, however, our ideas have enlarged and guesses are now quoted at from twenty thousand to one hundred thousand years.

Philology, after severe labor, announces: "There may have been one primitive language or there may have been several." Says the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, ingeniously, on this subject, "Greater accuracy of method and largely increased knowledge have only left the way open to the most widely divergent suppositions."

The descent of man is becoming involved in so many problems that our pedigree seems more obscure now than it did before Darwin put pen to paper. Huxley ("Man's Place in Nature") says: "I adopt Darwin's hypothesis, subject to the proofs that physiological

species may be produced by selective breeding. . . . just as the chemist might adopt the atomic theory subject to the proof of the existence of atoms."

The question whether animals have souls or not is complicated by the fact that nobody knows what a soul is. "The real nature of these unseen principles," says the candid Doctor Pritchard, "eludes our search." All attempts to establish rules of heredity have failed. The transmission of characteristics is controlled by laws beyond our calculation. In logic and mathematics the "axiom" plays an important rôle, but the learned world is not yet agreed upon what an axiom is — whether it has its origin in experience or necessity. Newton left the explanation of gravity unsolved, and steps toward its solution since his time have been, we are told, "almost imperceptible." These steps include three guesses known as "ultramondane corpuscles," "the generation of fluids," and "waves."

Spontaneous generation has been neither established nor refuted. Aristotle and the ancients favored the idea: opponents substitute the germ theory. Huxley thinks that in the beginning of things it "may possibly be expected to have occurred."

The writers on esthetics have produced a voluminous literature to determine the nature of beauty. Why do we think an object beautiful? Is it really so or do we only think it? Do we think so without knowing? What faculty do we use to decide? Does one man's opinion determine its beauty, or must many men concur with him? If so, how many?

Scarcely two esthetic philosophers agree, and the discussion remains practically where it was in Aristotle's time. Certain accepted authorities (though why accepted is uncertain) pronounce some things beautiful, but why they do so we cannot say — nor can they. Socrates believed that the beautiful is the useful, and that beauty is relative. Plato taught "absolute" beauty. Aristotle supplied a few standard rules which Lessing has rendered more precise. The modern Germans have run a riot of metaphysical speculation on the subject of esthetics. One of them has cast his doctrines upon beauty into the form of mathematical theorems, which are pronounced, even by specialists in the obscure, as "exceedingly incomprehensible." Prof. James Sully offers a prospectus for a search for a definition of beauty which embraces "first, collecting the widest possible generalizations on the various esthetic and emotional susceptibilities, next, considering the compatibilities among these in order to establish the ideal," etc. His program would necessitate centuries of research, and it resembles an attempt to get at the secret of generation by collecting all the eggs in the world.

The nature of "art" seems to be no less uncertain. Tolstoi in "What is Art?" gives an array of curious and vain attempts to answer this question. What is the aim of art? Is it merely to reproduce nature or is it to interpret nature? Is art for art's sake, or for some other sake? No clear answers are forthcoming to any of these questions.¹ The problem of ontology underlies

¹Of the science "sociology" we hear, at least of its present stage, a no

the entire subject matter of psychology. But its main factor — the abstract idea — eludes definition. It has been represented (1) as having an objective existence; (2) as an idea composed of all the qualities in which the particulars agree and of no others; (3) as the idea of an individual retaining its individual characteristics, but with the knowledge that these are not the properties of the class; (4) as a miscellaneous assemblage of individuals belonging to a class. All attempts to determine finally the nature of this abstraction, which underlies all intellectual processes whatever, have been futile. Says one writer, "No other subject ever debated in philosophy has stimulated more controversy and subtlety of thought." The anonymous writer of the introduction to the "Encheiridion" of Epictetus remarks:

"The problem of perception has dominated philosophy down to the present day; nor in two thousand years has any logical answer been found. Lotze, the latest first-rate thinker, abandons all inquiry into theories of perception and starts with the assumption that we are living in a cosmos."

Another mystery of psychology, the association of ideas, first stated by Aristotle, has been attacked without avail by Locke, Hume, Hamilton, Reid, Hobbes, Hartley, Berkeley, Priestley, Stewart, James Mill,

less confused account. A writer in *The Popular Science Monthly* remarks: "It needs only a brief examination of the writings of professed sociologists to discover that there is no consensus of opinion regarding either the scope and method of the new science or its fundamental laws. The name sociology is applied to a vague and conflicting mass of speculations which merely represents the ideas of various thinkers about social phenomena."

Herbert Spencer. The phraseology of this subject is almost pathetic — “simultaneity, co-suggestion, co-identity in modification, co-adjacency, immediacy, etc.”

Berkeley said that although ideas do indeed travel in pairs it is possible that it is not necessity which joins them. Hume ventured the startling suggestion that associated ideas attract each other by some law of “mental gravitation.” Brown inclines to the opinion that suggestion may be found to depend on prior coexistence. Mr. Spencer maintains that “association by contiguity is due to imperfect assimilation in consciousness of present to past.” In this sentence each of the principal words — association, contiguity, assimilation, consciousness — has, in turn, been the storm center of prolonged dispute. It seems to be hoped by scientists that, on the principle that two negatives make an affirmative, by bringing together a sufficient number of disputed ideas something indisputable may be the outcome.

Theology has been describing its deity in the likeness of the speaker ever since Aristotle declared that the gods were pure intellect, and Epicurus declared that their chief characteristic was “quiet indifference.” Descartes said that God consists of all the attributes of perfection, while Spinoza declared that he possesses neither intelligence nor freedom, has no rule over the world, and “consists merely in substance” — an idea too abstract to be intelligible. Theists affirm that God made himself and also made matter; while materialists

assert that matter made itself and made God, too, if there is one. Both uttering idle words.¹

"The absolute" is a term common in philosophy and is used as freely by those who believe that we know nothing about it, as by those who hold the contrary opinion. Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel — all begin with it. Kant denies our knowledge of it, yet thinks it possibly the regulative principle of our inmost experience. The principle of life remains unknown to us. Succeeding ages have named the unknown variously: 'God, nature, chance, force, fate, spirit, matter. Professor Wallace writes: "Even if we could get back to a universe of primitive atoms, there would then begin a new series of questions still more difficult to answer." Lord Kelvin's vortex theory, called by Wallace "a grand conception fit to rank among the great intellectual achievements of the nineteenth century," is, after all, pronounced "inconceivable." Says Professor Wallace:

"An incompressible, frictionless, universal fluid, the origin of its vortex motion, its infinite combinations, complex chemical actions, vibrations, etc., are all inconceivable. And when we have grasped all these inconceivabilities there remains a still greater inconceivability—how consciousness ever rose from this 'clash of ethereal vortex rings'. . . Evolution deals only with the derivation and modification of things from step to step. The farther back we go the more uncertain are our conclusions, while we can never make any approach to the

¹A waggish professor not long since remarked to me, "Cultured society in Cambridge has had a prolific season this winter. There have been evolved no fewer than three several and distinct concepts of God, all infinite, eternal, and mutually exclusive."

absolute beginnings of things. All attempts to do so land us either in a contradiction or in some unthinkable proposition." ¹

Herbert Spencer's conclusion is:

"We find it impossible to think of the world as constituted of appearances, and to exclude all thought of reality; but when we try to form a conception of that reality we fail. There is a constant effort to pass into the unknowable and a constant inability to pass it. The riddle remains unsolved."

Buckle wrote of mental philosophy:

"No subject has been so long and so zealously prosecuted which yet remains so barren of results. In no other department has there been so much movement and so little progress. After centuries of inquiry the various systems are diverging from each other with an accelerating velocity. The study of mind has been thrown into a confusion only to be compared to that of religion after the controversies of the theologians."

Huxley said:

"Of all the senseless babble I have ever had occasion to read, the demonstrations of the philosophers who undertake

¹"Kant has taken pains to classify these contradictions, or antinomies as he calls them, which mental processes in their action resemble the way in which a nail will double back on itself when we attempt to drive it into a brick wall. Professor Ernst Hæckel (*Die Weltraetsel*) writes: "We grant at once that the innermost character of nature is just as little understood by us as it was by Anaximander and Empedocles twenty-four hundred years ago, by Spinoza and Newton two hundred years ago, and by Kant and Goethe one hundred years ago. We must even grant that this essence or substance becomes more mysterious and enigmatic the deeper we penetrate into the knowledge of its attributes."

Prof. William James, after considering the two arguments unfavorable to human immortality, namely, the unthinkable multiplication of souls and the fact that consciousness ceases with death, concludes: "On this whole subject science must confess her imagination to be bankrupt. She has absolutely nothing to affirm. She is *ignoramus ignoramibus*."

to tell us all about the nature of God are the worst — except that they are surpassed by the absurdities of those who try to prove that there is no God.”

Macaulay (on “*Ranke’s History of the Popes*”) says:

“The philosopher of to-day is no more favorably situated as regards religion than was Thales. The reasoning of Socrates on design is exactly that of Paley. As to the question what becomes of man after death, a highly educated European to-day, if left to his unassisted reason, is no more likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of those sciences in which we excel the Indian throws the smallest light on the state of the soul after animal life is extinct. . . . In three thousand years the human mind has discovered no solution to the riddles which perplexed Job.”

Locke, too, was never tired of pointing out the contrast between the narrowness of human understanding and what there is to know.

The vanities of science may be summed up as:

I. Those which are concerned with the invisible past.

II. Those concerned with the invisible future.

III. Those endeavoring to reach back into a “first cause.”

IV. Those concerned with “inconceivables.”

V. Those engaged in the useless accumulation of data about the unimportant.

Each science diligently accumulates facts about its subject, but all fail in discovering the vital principle which lies at the heart of the subject. The psychologist admits that the nature of consciousness eludes

him. The biologist is perplexed not to discover what life is. The evolutionist confesses that the real nature of his doctrine is becoming daily more disputable. Electricians would like to know what electricity is; pathologists are not sure of the nature of disease; materialists cannot tell us what matter is; idealists are uncertain as to the nature of the ideal; theologians are in dispute as to who and what God is. Economists do not know what wealth is — still less do they know what economy is. Science is the most honest and disinterested of all departments of human endeavor. It is solely her results, not her intentions, that are deficient. Her failures illustrate the futility of trying to increase a fraction by adding to the denominator instead of to the numerator. *It is not more facts that are needed, but more intelligence to deal with the facts we already have.*

Problems are accumulated without regard to the question whether we have any one who can solve them or not. Scientists, like a sick widow's children, keep gathering nuts which nobody at home can crack — and they point to the nuts as wealth. The nuts will not constitute wealth until somebody can crack them. What we need is not more nuts, but more muscle in the arm that handles the nut-cracker.

Progress is made when men penetrate more deeply into the heart of things, not when they merely scratch more and more frantically over the surface of them. In every department of man's life he is vainly striving to make quantity answer as a substitute for quality.

All this is due to the dearth of genius. In Athens the

people were like a thriving plant which poured the currents of its vital energy, with a minimum of waste, into fruit. To-day the plant's strength runs to rank, pulpy leaves and useless woody stalk, while the fruit is poor, flavorless, scant. This is not the fruit's fault, perhaps it is not the plant's fault. But certainly it is the gardener's fault. If leaves and wood were cut back, and proper conditions lavishly provided, the strength of society would pour into the now starving brains of its undeveloped geniuses.

At present the achievements of science react upon society unfavorably in three ways: first, by the indiscriminate production of more things; second, by discovering and inventing injurious things — such as adulterations, cheap gewgaws, firearms, death-dealing machinery, the implements of exploitation, etc.; third, by incorporating masses of its undigested facts into already over-crowded educational systems, thus aiding in the cramming process and contributing to the burden and torment of the young.

For it is no light matter that we go on accumulating knowledge when our capacity for assimilating it does not grow. Every year's increase of undigested and indigestible facts is making our task more difficult and is diminishing the hope of our ultimately mastering our world. "Our race is overweighted. It will degenerate under circumstances which make demands that excel its powers," says Francis Galton. He has pointed out further that savage people in Australia, Cape of Good Hope, New Zealand, and other places, have been swept

away in three centuries by coming in contact with a civilization which they were *incapable of supporting*, and he adds that we of the most civilized nations are beginning to show ourselves *unable to keep pace with our own work*. "Our civilization," he says, "is more complex than our statesmen are capable of dealing with. There is a crying need for greater ability than men possess."¹

Prof. W. J. Thomas ("Is the Human Brain Stationary?") *Forum*, October, 1904, writes:

"We have no reason to believe that the brain or the average intelligence of our race has improved or deteriorated within historical time. If we have more than the wisdom of our ancestors it is certainly only in the accumulated materials of knowledge and not in human faculty; and certainly nature is not producing a better grade of mind now than in the time of Aristotle and the Greeks."

Increased elaboration of education is to be classed with the multiplication of tools and appurtenances of all kinds, by means of which our age hypnotizes itself into the belief in its own greatness. Even as many churches indicate man's lack of religion, many prisons his lack of virtue, many almshouses his lack of justice,

¹ Professor August Forel, of Zürich, (*International Quarterly*, March, 1904) writes, "The human Encyclopedia is increasing in an alarming fashion, but our brains have grown no larger in the last two thousand years."

Hamerton ("Intellectual Life") wrote: "The burdens laid upon the memory have, in modern times, been steadily augmented, but its powers are not increased in proportion. Our brains are not better constituted than those of our forefathers, although where they learned one thing we attempt to learn six."

many hospitals his lack of health — so many schools and educational theorizing mark a lack in our youth of powerful natural intelligence — the sort of natural intelligence which nourishes itself on any education at all, and grows, even if let alone.

Our society, adopting as its motto not "Nothing too much" but "Everything as much as we can get," tends to grow materially richer and mentally poorer. Its aim is to own things, rather than to create; and its pains of desire are continually aggravated by economic insecurity.

Let us address ourselves to the problem of complexity once more and more directly. Is complexity, or is it not, a mark of progress? Surely it is, we think at once. Surely the modern printing-machine is superior to the pointed stone of the savage. Surely a Wagner score, performed by a large orchestra, is a great advance upon the ditty piped by the primitive shepherd upon his oaten reed. Surely the railroad train is a huge improvement upon the ox cart or the stage-coach. Surely the vast play of varied human interests, the infinite diversity and variation of modern civilization, betoken an evolution from a lower and simpler to a higher and more complex type of social development.

Now complexity may be a mark of decay as well as of growth. The fancies of the diseased mind are often more complex than those of the normal brain.¹ Again,

¹ That quality in modern civilization which presents itself to me as confusion, is viewed by others as a mark of diversity and "richness."

variety may be superfluous and inoperative. Does the elaborate menu of the clubman produce in him a highly developed physique? On the contrary. Since the body can make nothing more out of food than plain bone, muscle, flesh, etc., rare and expensive viands do not produce rare kinds of muscle or superior brands of bone. A plain wheaten loaf, a draft of sweet milk, contain all the elements which the body needs or can utilize, and since complex foods do not produce superior bodies, it follows that they can possess no advantage over the simple foods which attain the same ends at less cost of time and labor.

M. Guizot is perhaps the ablest exponent of this view. In his "History of Civilization" he writes: "Europe exhibits a prodigious diversity of sentiments and ideas. . . . When we consider separately particular developments in art, letters, etc., in all directions in which the human mind can advance, we usually find it inferior to the corresponding development among ancient peoples. But when we regard European civilization in the aggregate, it shows itself incomparably richer than any other. . . . This confusion, diversity, struggle, have cost us very dear; to them has been due the slow progress of Europe. Nevertheless I do not think that we need regret them. All things considered, the State, so agitated, toilsome, violent, the prey of storms and sufferings, has availed much more than the simplicity of the ancients. The human race has gained by it more than it has lost." I quote this distinguished writer merely to disagree with him. Indeed it is fairly clear that in a later passage he disagrees with himself, for we find him saying, "Down to the fifteenth century society was in confusion . . . it was necessary that a more vigorous civilization should first grind together these incoherent elements, and that a powerful centralization should be brought about." That is to say, the very diversity which he has presented as the chief merit of European civilization had first to get itself reduced into simpler and stronger — more Hellenic — proportions before true growth was possible.

Similar reasoning may, perhaps, apply, for instance, to music, the typical modern art. Man is capable of experiencing a limited number of emotions — joy, sorrow, mirth, melancholy, etc. — which are subject to stimulation under the influence of music. It seems commonly to be supposed that complex modern music serves to arouse complex emotions. But there are no complex emotions, any more than there are complex bones, muscles, etc. The clubman's menu, with its hors-d'œuvres and entremets, no matter how elaborate, becomes in the due course of time nothing higher than bones, blood, muscle, etc.; and the modern symphony or opera, no matter how complex, educes nothing more superhuman than the same old feelings we have known from childhood — joy, sorrow, hope, fear, restlessness, peace, mirth, despair. There can be no new music, there can be only new arrangements. There are only seven notes in the scale, and although they may succeed one another more or less rapidly there can be no new notes, only new combinations. Thought, it is true, is susceptible of infinite development and the attainment of entirely new achievements, but emotion is, from its nature, limited and fixed in scope.

Thus, though the combinations and arrangements of stimuli may vary and the rapidity with which they succeed each other may differ, yet none but the same familiar elemental emotions can by any means be produced. Complex stimuli do not produce complex results, and the resorting to them, instead of indicating a superior development, may merely point to a

lessening sensibility. While the appetite of the peasant is awakened by his first bite into his wheaten loaf, the club man's palate fails to respond to such a call, demanding instead the most elaborate culinary efforts accompanied by condiments, spices, and flavors assembled from every quarter of the globe. Similarly the emotions of the Wagner devotee fail to be stirred by anything less than a deluge of melody and harmony, although the emotional delights thus laboriously aroused are no other than the elemental feelings men have known for ages. The modern man measures everything by cost and thinks that when his thrills "come high" they must be of a high order, not perceiving that a thrill's a thrill for a' that, and that his thrills, though never so expensive, are no whit more elevated than those of the old Arcadian who was melted to tears at the soft notes of the lute, or who leaped with joy at the rude twang of the lyre.

In music we have passed in three hundred and fifty years from pastoral simplicity to the utmost harmonic complexity. Tolerance of discord widens constantly. In regard to dissonance we first endure, then pity, then embrace. Mozart now seems childlike; Beethoven, whose dissonances caused his contemporaries much distress at a first hearing, has already become entirely lucid, while Wagner, hailed as a madman, is rapidly coming to appear almost naïve as compared with later, more complex, and interminable composers. And since there is no end in sight, we may contemplate at no very distant date the arrival of deliberate, orchestral chaos, with a demoniac piano accompaniment. All of which

will be said to appeal to "complex emotions," and nobody will think to remember how the very depths of feeling in the poet Keats were once upon a time moved to bursting by merely a few notes falling out of the sky from a nightingale singing "in full-throated ease," or how only tangled shadows flitting through swaying apple blossoms once stirred to the heart the violet-crowned Sappho.

But surely, it will be said, you cannot deny that a Beethoven symphony is a higher form of art than the beating of a savage's tom-tom. Certainly not; the tom-tom does not produce music, and the savage is ~~not a man~~. Music consists in the utterance and arrangement of sounds in such a manner as to produce upon civilized man his whole repertoire of emotions. Nevertheless, beyond a certain point, the mere multiplying of instruments, the added volume of sound, the duplication of parts, increased variety, vividness, and complexity, indicate, not the attainment of a higher faculty, but rather a lessened sensibility on his part. It is as though a man becoming blind should boast of the increasingly brilliant illumination with which he finds it necessary to provide himself. When I, at evening, turn on the sixteen-candle-power electric light by my reading chair, I seldom fail to breathe a hymn of praise to this triumph of modern science, but my satisfaction is tempered by the remembrance that my grandfather could read as long and as comfortably by the light of a single tallow dip which would be to me as darkness. Our civilization lives largely upon stimulus and is con-

stantly obliged to increase its dose. I find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that when man has reached the point of requiring that his stimuli be made so many, so varied, so hot, and so blatant, it would seem, indeed, that his soul is not more alive, but on the contrary, that it must be either dead or sleeping. The complexity of which we boast is often a token, not of advance, but of fatigue. We complicate our civilization, not because our powers are enlarged, but because they are jaded. It seems to be a commonly accepted view that the elaboration of civilization is to be considered as in itself a mark of advance, but before accepting this conclusion would it not be well to ask ourselves just what such elaboration means, what purpose it really serves, what is its ultimate effect upon mankind and finally at what cost it is procured?

Regarding civilization as a machine for the turning out of high-grade humanity (as its ultimate product) we may apply the test which determines the efficiency of all machines — does it produce the maximum results at minimum cost? — the cost of the social machine being the expenditure of human life and energy.

In the first chapter of the present work it was attempted to show that we are far from achieving in our age the maximum product of high-grade humanity. This chapter, which attempts a survey of the enormous material achievements of our age, points out that such accumulations of wealth fail of their proper object if they do not secure a rise in the quality of mankind. We may close our examination of this part of our sub-

ject with a few observations on the inefficiency of our system as evidenced in its notorious wastefulness.¹

Wastefulness is of many kinds. There is, for example, the waste of free natural wealth, as air, sunshine, water, etc. A great deal of ill-health could be prevented by utilizing the fresh air which circulates in unlimited quantities on the other side of closed windows. "Seeing that the atmosphere is forty miles deep all round the globe," Horace Mann once wrote, "it is a useless piece of economy to breathe it more than once. If we had to trundle it in wheel-barrows there might be some excuse for parsimony."

The waste of water in arid lands, the waste of soil fertility, the waste of sewage, the wastes of adulteration, the wastes of useless luxury, the wastes of incompetence (Mr. Atkinson estimated that in the United States a billion dollars a year are wasted through bad cooking), are among the marks of inefficiency, to which may be added the wastes of competition, of duplication, and of over-production in an unorganized industrial system. We remember, too, the waste of natural resources, the wastes of crime, and the keeping up of huge punitive institutions.

The fundamental waste is the waste of health. To earn one's living and at the same time maintain a high degree of health is in our civilization almost impossible.

¹ The comparatively greater efficiency of the Greeks may be considered in the fact that, with only a few square miles of indifferently fertile lands and no great natural resources, and at an exceedingly low expenditure of human life, they secured so remarkable an output.

Forty per cent. of the population die of preventable disease. "The quality of a man's work," says Horace Mann, "depends upon his health. High health is worth at least fifty per cent. more brain."

The largest of wastes is the waste of human life through overwork, care, disease, dissipation. In England, the defective classes (sick, crippled, imbecile, insane, old, broken-down) constitute, it is estimated, more than one-half of the entire population! Had ancient Greece been burdened with such an incubus as this, there is small probability that it would ever have produced that outburst of genius which is the mark of surplus energy.

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS MEASURED BY MORALS

"There is much ahead of us. We don't know what gravity is; neither do we know the nature of heat, light, and electricity, though we handle them a little. We are only animals. We are coming out of the dog stage and getting a glimpse of our environment. We don't know, we just suspect a few things. It will take an enormous evolution of our brains to bring us anywhere. Our practise of shooting one another in war is proof that we are still animals. The make-up of our society is hideous."

THOMAS A. EDISON,

In the *Independent*, January 6, 1910.

To prove that we have become more moral it must be shown either (1) that we possess some brand-new virtue unknown to the ancients, or else (2) that we have developed the old virtues to a higher degree.

Have we developed any new virtue?

Or have men become in our day demonstrably more just, or honest, or truthful, more temperate, modest, forgiving, than were the men in that period which we have been admiring? If we can be shown to have grown in all these virtues, or indeed in any one of them, then our claim to be "more moral" must be admitted.

This must be our method in regard to practical morality; but to estimate the theory of morals is not so difficult, for the study of ethical theory leads one strongly

to affirm Buckle's conclusion that in this department, at least, advance has not only not taken place, but is not possible. The general outlines of ethics had been traced, and men knew very well what it meant to be good, over two thousand years ago. The Greek ethical systems of Plato and Socrates and Aristotle have almost the grandeur and finality of Greek architecture.

Sidgwick ("Outline of the History of Ethics") remarks: "In the general view of present scholarship, there is no moral philosopher of modern times, with the doubtful exception of Kant, who equals in importance and impressiveness Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle."

Sir James Mackintosh was so struck with the stationary character of moral principles, that he denied the possibility of further advance, boldly affirming that no further discoveries in morals can be made.

Kant also, in his "Logic," says: "In der Moralphilosophie sind wir nicht weiter gekommen als die Alten."¹

With the downfall of Greece came the rise of morbid ethics. Men began for the first time to take a peculiar

¹ "There is unquestionably nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as the great dogmas of which all moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbor as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to honor your parents; to respect those who are set over you; — these and a few others are the sole essentials of morals. But they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies, and text-books which moralists or theologians have been able to produce." — BUCKLE, "History of Civilization."

satisfaction in harping upon their private moral diseases, proclaiming the weakness of their souls and their dependence upon superhuman aid. The body, which to the Greek had been an instrument of glory, became a burden under which men groaned, declaring that it hindered and hampered the soul (which no doubt it did). They spoke of the body contemptuously as a "corpse," and the more fetid they allowed it to become, the more fetid were their thoughts about themselves. As the disease increased it passed into extreme forms of asceticism and mysticism. Professor Sidgwick says of this period: "Hellenic 'pursuit of knowledge' now culminated in a preparation for 'ecstasy'; Hellenic idealization of man's natural life ends in a settled antipathy to the body."

How shall we compare these ethical theories as theories? Shall we say that Anselm's "original sin" is a nobler doctrine than Socrates' "knowledge of the good"? Was the mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux finer than the controversialism of Thomas Aquinas? Was the casuistry of Athanasius more elevated than the Aristotelian "golden mean"? Is there more excellence in Kant's "categorical imperative," in Comte's humanitarianism, the evolutionist's "preservation of the race," Schopenhauer's "negation of the will," or von Hartmann's "annihilation," than there was in Pythagoras' maxims of moderation, courage, loyalty, obedience to law, Socrates' devotion to the good, or Plato's exposition of the fourfold life of virtue?

The proof of the ethical, no less than of the culinary

pudding, lies in the eating. Those ethical systems must be held to be truest which produce the finest types of men and women.

Now, we know something of the ethical development of the Greeks. Has the Christian system, or the scholastic system, or the modern system of the psychological school produced more perfect types of human beings? The modern school may be soon dismissed, since, while Messrs. Bentham, Hobbes, Hume, Paley, Hegel, and many others have been productive of much edifying controversy, it cannot properly be discerned that they have brought forth any recognizable types of character. Nor do we find in the scholastic type of mind anything which speaks of a higher moral development than that which we have already encountered. Far otherwise, we shall be told, is the case as regards Christian ethics. Here is to be found a distinct advance commensurate with its spiritual significance.

There are two aspects of Christian ethics as taught by the founder of that system. One relates to the individual life, the other to the social life. The ideal of the individual life was distinctly and unmistakably that of humility, simplicity, and self-denial. The type which that teaching pointed to was, and is, the ascetic saint,⁹¹¹ as he was developed in the Middle Ages. There can be no doubt that Bernard of Clairvaux was the perfect ideal Christian, the kind of man with which Christ wished to see the world peopled, the type of character to which Jesus himself belonged. His teaching on this point is very distinct. Again and again he set forth

very clearly his directions concerning the type of character he believed in, and what sort of men he wished his followers to become. The duty of the Christian believer undoubtedly is to endeavor to form himself into the sort of man Christ was; that is to say, a pure, humble, chaste, very poor, gentle, pitiful, non-commercial man; a dreamer — meek, poetic, celibate, delicate, non-resistant. Now the modern man does not in the least resemble this type, and (what is more important) has not the slightest desire to do so. His ideal is to be aggressive, strong, domineering, rich, successful, married, practical, prosaic, cunning, self-assertive. So determined is he, moreover, upon attaining his own ideal rather than that of Christ that he has deliberately adopted, or at any rate has evolved, an economic and social system which encourages to the full the type of man he admires, while it renders the production of the type which Christ believed in practically impossible.

During the Middle Ages mankind made an intense and earnest effort — its first and last — to realize Christ's ideal of humanity, and, in the purified saints of that period, it succeeded. But whatever the intrinsic worth of this realized Christian ideal of character may be, one thing is certain, — the world will have no more of it. Modern society has apparently made up its mind to dispense with saints. Whether it would be demonstrable that the pure attenuated Christian saint of the Middle Ages was a higher moral being than, for example, Aristides the Just, or Socrates, is not here necessary to consider; the fact is enough that the

Christian world (which produced the type) has now discarded it.

The social portion of Christ's teaching, on the other hand, resting as it does upon absolute principles of brotherhood and economic equality, might possibly produce higher types of character than any that have ever appeared, if it should be put in practise, but since it has never yet been given a fair trial, since Christian peoples have never yet seen fit to put it into operation, we are unable to pronounce upon its efficacy.¹

Were the Greeks as superior morally as they were intellectually? Men living in an era nearer to them

¹ In the "Letters from a Chinese Official" we read the following indictment: "You profess Christianity but your civilization has never been Christian. . . . Christian teachings, if they be fully accepted and fairly interpreted, must be seen to be incompatible with the whole structure of your society. Enunciated centuries ago by a mild Oriental enthusiast, unlettered, untraveled, inexperienced, they are remarkable not more for their tender and touching appeal to brotherly love than for their aversion to or indifference to all other elements of human excellence. . . . Provincial by birth, mechanic by trade, by temperament a poet and a mystic, he enjoyed in the course of his brief life few opportunities, and he evinced little inclination, to become acquainted with the rudiments of the science whose end is the prosperity of the State. The production and distribution of wealth, the disposition of power, the laws that regulate labor, property, trade, these were matters as remote from his interests as they were beyond his comprehension. Never was a man better equipped to inspire a religious sect; never one worse to found or direct a commonwealth. Yet this man it is whose naïf maxims of self-abnegation have been accepted as gospel by the nations of the West — the type of all that is predatory, violent, and aggressive! . . . Your creed is of the earth, earthy; while from heaven far above cries, like a ghost's, the voice of the Nazarene, as pure, as clear, as ineffectual as when first it flung from the shores of Galilee its challenge to the power of Rome."

than ours seem to have had no doubt of it. Abelard ("Opera," ed. Cousin, II, p. 409) wrote:

"The Gentiles, who had no scriptural law and heard no sermons, yet put us to shame by the example of their virtue, by the excellence of their precepts, and by the consistency of their lives with their teachings."

Roger Bacon ("Compendium Theologiæ") wrote:

"If we cannot emulate or even understand the wisdom of the ancient philosophers, it is because we do not possess their virtue. Wisdom is inconsistent with sin and demands perfect virtue in its professors."

Mr. Alfred W. Benn, to whom I am indebted for the foregoing excerpts, continues the argument as follows ("The *Ethical* Value of Hellenism," *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1902):

"I am prepared to support the thesis that the Greeks were as great in what belongs to the conduct of life as they confessedly were in the creation of beauty or in the search for truth. . . . The moral life of no other people was so rich, so well-balanced. Huxley has called them 'the real chosen people.' Ruskin said, 'The Greeks have not lifted up their souls unto vanity.'"

"The Greeks set an example in truthfulness unequalled except by those moderns who have been trained in their school. Homer makes Achilles say, 'Hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his breast and tells another.' Solon gave the maxim, 'Tell no lies.' Onomacritus, having been detected in interpolating a prediction of his own into the collection from Musæus which he was editing, was expelled from the country."

The Greeks considered obedience to law to be the essence of civilization. Euripides' Jason says: "It is

a blessing to live in a country that is governed not by brute force, but by law."

The passionate preaching of justice by the Hebrew prophets has been much extolled.

"But," says Mr. Benn, "there were established righteous governments in Greece under which the poor working man could not be plundered with impunity as he was in the Holy Land. Unaided by supernatural promises or terrors, the Greek legislators, magistrates, and orators *actually accomplished* that for which the Hebrew prophets vainly strove."¹

Isocrates in his "Nicocles" bade men not to do to others that which would make them angry if others should do it to them. He told husbands that they had no right to exact from their wives a fidelity which they did not themselves give. Monogamy was the Greek law as far back as we can trace their history, and they regarded polygamy with abhorrence — "a fact," says Mr. Benn, "which those should remember who set the Hebrews, a polygamous people, upon a higher moral plane."

Dion, the pupil of Plato, declared that he had been taught in the Academe to forgive injuries and to be

¹ "Equal rights to all, special privileges to none," is the slogan of our modern reform parties. This is how Euripides (*Suppliants*, 399-464) describes the condition of Athens as regards such a principle:

"The weak, the rich, have here one equal right,
And penury, *with justice on its side*,
Triumphs o'er riches; *this is to be free*.
Is there a mind that teems with noble thought
And useful to the State? He speaks his thought
And is illustrious. When a people free
Are sovereigns of their land, the State stands firm."

gentle to transgressors. The word *humanity* is of Greek origin. Plato says that one expects the inhabitants of a Greek city to be gentle and good, and Isocrates declared that of all qualities these were most highly esteemed.

Says Winckelmann ("On the Imitation of Greek Works"):

"The expression of the figures of the Greeks under every form of passion shows a great and self-collected soul. Noble simplicity and quiet grandeur are characteristic of all Greek masterpieces."

We may recall Ruskin's solemn assertion that bad workmanship means a low moral condition of the worker. William Morris also expressed the conviction that ugliness and vulgarity are but the outward expression of the "innate moral baseness into which we are forced by our present form of society." Pure and honest art may be accepted by all fair standards to be the outward mark of noble men of pure and honest minds.

Walter Pater ("Greek Studies") alludes to the workmanship of the Greeks and the proof it gave of their "reasonable soul."¹

Aristotle said that the just man fulfils the intention of the law. As the laws must be interpreted in the light

¹"Those solemn images of the temple of Theseus are a perfect embodiment of the human ideal of the reasonable soul and of a spiritual world; they are also the best made things of their kind. Perfect, many-sided development of tectonic crafts, a state such as the art of some nations ended in, was for the Greeks a mere starting-point for their moral and inspired presentment of man.

of their original intention, so also obedience or disobedience must be measured by the agent's intention. Involuntary transgressions should not be punished, but pardoned and pitied. That any one could be justly punished for what was no fault of his would have been from the Greek point of view unintelligible. So would also the idea that sin can be atoned for by the sufferings of the innocent. "Such an idea," says Mr. Benn, "is a survival of Hebraic barbarism."

Both the idea and the word *conscience* were discovered by the Greeks.

Their theme is not, however, the conscience of the sinner, but *the social consequences of his crime*.

"... Of the internal drama of the soul with God, the division of the man against himself," observes Dickinson, — "the remorse, the repentance, the new birth, etc. — there is no trace in the clear and concrete vision of the Greek. They were not conscious of a spiritual relation to God, of sin as an alienation from the divine, and repentance as a means of restoration to grace."

The attitude of the Greeks toward his gods was that of the healthy youth toward sun and wind and frost and sea. These forces were strong and lusty friends with whom it would not do to take too many liberties, but with whom in general he was on excellent terms. He was never sentimental about his gods. He did not crave personal contact nor dream of an ineffable union with them. He did not yearn to lean on Apollo's breast nor to be washed in Juno's blood.

"Greek religion," says Lowes Dickinson, "was something entirely different from ours. We think of religion as a definite

set of doctrines formulated into a creed and supported by an organization—separate from the State—devoted to that purpose. The Greeks never even conceived of such a system. They had no church, no creed, and no doctrine.”

John Fiske writes:

“Their moral and religious life sat easily upon them like their own graceful garments. Morbid self-consciousness, like that, for instance, which led men and women in the Middle Ages to immure themselves in monasteries, would have been to an Athenian perfectly inexplicable. They had an open, childlike, sunny conception of religion.”

Winckelmann attributes the greatness of Greek art in large measure to the capacity of the Greeks for joy, and the fact that they were clever enough to prevent religion from being depressing. Their gods were not retributive ogres nor jealous monsters. “The gods of the Greeks,” says Professor Butcher, “were their elder brothers, the companions of their sports.”

The Greek attitude toward death was calm and unafraid. The Ceramicus, their great cemetery, was filled with lovely monuments like an art gallery. Upon them was recorded no word of terror or despair. Noble resignation, serene and dignified sorrow, are depicted in these statues and reliefs.

“They picture,” says Howard Crosby Butler, “the simplicity and beauty of the Athenians’ lives and the contemplative sweetness of their parting.” The simple words, “Dear one, farewell!” upon some of them is the only mark of their sorrowful purpose. Laws were passed forbidding excessive display of grief and mourning. The funeral urns, of which many exquisite specimens have

come down to us, were tall and slender vases with gently curving bodies and long necks spreading into flower-like lips. The sentiment expressed was not that of eternal separation, but of such farewells as are uttered among friends upon the eve of a long journey.¹

The Greek arrived at morality not through sentiment but by the love of beauty. He delighted in noble conduct as he did in a fair youth or a fine horse. Everything beautiful interested and attracted him. There appeared to him to be something fine in high behavior. When he did right it was primarily because he loved beauty; he avoided wrong primarily because he hated sorrow and all forms of ugliness. "The love of beauty," said Plato, "is the cause of every good in heaven and earth."

We are to compare ancient and modern moral types. Are there in the world modern types of men of a higher moral nature than was reached by individuals among the ancients? Let us consider some ancient types of noble men. Here is Plutarch's picture of Philopœmen, called "the last of the Greeks:"²

¹ Mahaffy ("Social Life in Greece," 153) says: "No modern theology has taught higher and purer moral notions than those of Æschylus and his school. He censures high-handedness *even in the gods*. He shows the indelible nature of sin. The agreement of Sophocles with this high tone shows that there was much sober earnestness in Athens. Such immorality as that of the modern French stage was never tolerated among the Greeks."

² Says Mr. Benn (quoted above), "For lessons in veracity, justness, gentleness, and breadth of sympathy we go, not to the Jewish Scriptures, but to the literature of the Ionian race."

Mahaffy ("Rambles and Studies in Greece") writes of Plutarch's

"Philopœmen had a farm about two miles from the city, where he used to work with the laborers in the vineyard or at the plow all the morning, spending the afternoons in the city engaged with the magistrates on public business. A Spartan emissary sent to bribe him was so awed by the simplicity of his habits and the dignity of his life that he went away without stating his errand. A second visit met with the same result, but, being sent for the third time, he faltered out his proposition. Philopœmen listened obligingly and then went himself to Sparta, where he read the people a lecture, advising them not to attempt in future to bribe good men."

Philocles, the Athenian general, when taken prisoner, bade his conqueror to do with him what he, the conqueror, would have had to suffer had he instead been defeated. Then after a bath he put on a fine cloak and with great dignity led his fellow prisoners to slaughter — a curiously Greek variation on the Golden Rule.

Aristides' constancy amidst the vicissitudes of public life calls out our admiration. He was not elated by honors, and in adversity he remained tranquil and sedate, holding the opinion that he ought to offer himself to the service of his country irrespective of any reward, "not only of riches," says Plutarch, "but even of glory itself." When his opponent in a suit of law was about

"Lives": "The moral effect of these splendid biographies can hardly be overrated. From Shakespeare and Alfieri to the wild savages of the French Revolution all kinds of eager spirits have been fascinated and excited by these wonderful portraits. Alfieri speaks of them as the great discovery of his life, which he read with tears and with rage. From Chæroneia comes the eternal balm of Plutarch's wisdom, to sustain the oppressed, to strengthen the patriot, to purify with nobler pity and terror the dross of human meanness. Even the crumbling images of his gods arrest their decay by the spirit of his morals and revive their beauty in the sweetness of his simple faith."

to be hastily condemned, Aristides rose and earnestly begged that his enemy might first be properly heard.

Of Pericles, Plutarch writes:

"He was indeed a character deserving our high admiration, not only for his equitable temper, which amid many animosities he constantly maintained, but also for the lofty spirit which made him regard it the highest of his honors that he had never gratified his own envy or passion, nor ever had treated an enemy as irreconcilable. After his death even his enemies acknowledged that there had never been in nature such a disposition, more moderate and reasonable in power, more grave and impressive in his mildness."

Lycurgus induced his people to promise to abide by his laws until he should return to them, and then, by refusing food, put an end to his life. His laws were followed for five hundred years. His aim had been to make his people free-minded, self-dependent, and temperate.

Of Solon, Grote says:

"He possessed ethical sensibility, a thirst for knowledge, a concept of orderly government, sympathy with the poor, a total absence of all selfish ambition, and rare discretion. He inculcated moderation and gentleness."

Of Marcus Aurelius, Roman by birth, but Greek in mind and by conviction, Matthew Arnold declares "he is perhaps the most beautiful figure in history." Merivale says of him, "Of all the line he is the noblest and dearest." J. S. Mill describes him as "of unblemished justice and the tenderest heart." M. Taine asserts, "He was the noblest soul that ever lived." Mill places the "Meditations" as almost equal in ethical elevation

to the Sermon on the Mount. The code which Marcus Aurelius adopted for himself was: "To work hard, to deny myself, to avoid listening to slander, to endure misfortunes with fortitude, never to deviate from my purpose, to be grave without affectation, and delicate in correcting others."

When Socrates was asked, "Has not that fellow abused and insulted you?" he replied, "No, what he says is not addressed to me."

When Aristides asked the illiterate fellow who wished the name "Aristides" to be written upon his oyster shell as one condemned to banishment, "Why do you wish Aristides banished?" and the fellow replied, "For no reason except that I am tired of hearing him everywhere called 'the Just,'" Aristides made no reply, but wrote his name on the oyster shell and handed it back to the man. He made no reply. Was ever silence more dignified?

The streets of Athens were not swarming with lepers, with the halt, the lame, and the blind, and other mutilated victims of oriental filth, so that the virtue of almsgiving fills, naturally, a much smaller part in Greek than in Hebrew ethics. Nevertheless, kindness and charity were common in all classes. Cripples were pensioned by the State. Socrates took a poor widow into his household. But the problem of poverty never became pressing in Athens. When, at one time, the poor seemed to be getting too numerous, the city promptly removed them in large numbers out into the country, and, giving to each a piece of land, tools, and seeds, set

them to work. It was a common saying that idlers were not wanted in Athens. Plutarch tells us, however, that Cimon threw open his gardens and grounds that strangers and the needy of his fellow citizens might gather his fruits freely. At home he kept a plain but bounteous table to which all his fellow townsmen — the *Lacindæ* — had free access. He was always attended by two or three young men who were directed to exchange clothes with any decayed citizens they might happen to meet, and also to convey silently money into the hands of poor men as they stood by them in the market-place. His generosity outdid even the old Athenian hospitality and good nature and “seemed to restore to the world that community of goods which mythology says existed in the reign of Saturn.” (Plutarch.)

The Greeks had already learned how to forgive.

Theseus had formerly decreed that evil men should be punished with the same violence which they had used toward others, “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth”; but Lycurgus, when his eye had been put out by an angry young man, instead of punishing the ruffian, took him into his house and there reasoned with him until he had succeeded in converting him from an enemy into a stanch friend and “one of the discreetest citizens of Sparta.”

Likewise Pericles was on one occasion reviled all day in the market-place by a man of violent temper, who dogged him to his home, pelting him with abuse. Arrived at his house, Pericles ordered one of the servants to take a light and “see the gentleman safely home.”

We find many instances of magnanimity, as when Pericles proposed to recall his rival Cimon whom he saw that the people wished for. "So reasonable were men's resentments in those days," says Plutarch, "and so moderate their anger, that they always gave way to the public good. Even ambition, the least governable of human passions, could then yield to the necessities of the State."

Of that most lovable character, Agesilaus, Plutarch writes:

"Against his enemy he forbore to take any unjust advantage, and when even an enemy had done anything praiseworthy he would not detract from giving him his dues, while his friends Agesilaus knew not how to reprove, even when they did ill. When any of his adversaries was overtaken in a fault Agesilaus would be the first to pity him and would procure his pardon, by which conduct he won the hearts of all men."

Aristides was entrusted with the taxing of all the Greek cities, Greece submitting all her affairs to his sole management. And he, going out poor, returned poorer, laying the tax without corruption or injustice. "He delighted," says Plutarch, "as much in the honor of being poor as in the glory of his trophies." When the lines of Æschylus were recited in the theater,

"For not at seeming just, but being so
He aims; and from his depth of soil below
Harvests of wise and prudent counsels grow,"

all eyes turned to look at Aristides, as if this applied to him.

Lycurgus led the way for his people in frugality and hardihood. His fare was meal, wine, cheese, figs, and

"a very small portion of flesh and fish." He made an ordinance that the Spartan men should eat in common of the same fare and should not sit at home at splendid tables "delivered into the hands of cooks and tradesmen," says Plutarch, who would "fatten them in corners, like greedy brutes, and ruin not only their bodies but their minds."

Agésilas slept upon a coarse mattress and was so indifferent to heat and cold that all the seasons, as the gods sent them, seemed natural to him.

Alexander reminded his followers, who inclined to luxury, that "those who labor sleep more soundly and sweetly than those who are labored for."¹

Alexander was the prince of those who delight in overcoming difficulties. But he seems to have avoided delusions about himself. He allowed the people to think him a god if they chose, but he himself reserved his opinion on the subject. When bleeding from an arrow wound he remarked to a friend, "This is not the ichor of the gods, but human blood." Censure Alexander bore patiently, saying that it became a king to do good to others and be evil spoken of. He never omitted the smallest occasions of showing kindnesses to his friends.²

¹ Alexander seems to have been as kind to animals as the most ardent modern animal lover could wish. His war-horse, Bucephalus, lived to be thirty years old and Alexander named a city in his honor. It was said that he admired a good dog as he did a good man. "He was affectionate to all kinds of virtue and desirous to preserve the memory of laudable actions."

² When he and his soldiers were choking for want of water, a helmet full was brought to Alexander, but he returned it with thanks, saying

Courtesy was practised by the State as well as by individuals. When the Athenians captured a messenger carrying letters from their enemy, King Philip, to his queen, Olympias, they returned the letters to the sender with the seal unbroken.

Dying for one's country is no modern accomplishment. In Hellas it was deemed an honor, and many heroes so perished. Eucidas ran from Plataea to Delphi in order to fetch fire from the altar, a distance of one hundred and twenty-five miles in one day — expiring a short time afterward.

Plutarch thus sketches the sort of young man whom the Greeks admired:

“Agesilaus, though of the highest spirits, emulous above any of his companions, and showing an impetuosity which carried him over all opposition and difficulty, yet on the other hand was so easy and gentle in his nature that, though he would do nothing on compulsion, upon ingenuous motives he would obey any commands, and was more hurt by the least rebuke than he was distressed by any toil or hardship.”

Phocion, a lesser Socrates, but more caustic, is one of

that if he alone should drink, his soldiers would be out of heart. In his treatment of the wife and daughter of his conquered enemy, Darius, he was as courteous as a French knight. His temperance was under the circumstances noteworthy. He said that his teacher Leonidas had taught him that the best appetizers were a night march to prepare for breakfast, and a light breakfast to prepare for supper. He never dined until dark, and, loving to talk, sat long over his wine. He insisted that all who sat with him should be served alike and with proper attention. Upon one occasion, as he was ascending Mount Antilibanus, he was left far behind his soldiers and almost lost by reason of his efforts to help along his teacher, Lysimachus, a lagging, tired old man who had insisted upon accompanying the party.

the raciest characters in history. When the Athenians were looking for a leader they sent for advice to the oracle at Delphi. "Phocion is the proper man," came back the answer from the oracle, "for there is no one else save he who is dissatisfied with everything you do." When Phocion was applauded in the assembly for some opinion he had expressed, he turned to a friend asking, "Have I inadvertently said something foolish?"

Demosthenes said to him, "The Athenians, Phocion, will kill you some day when they are in a rage." "And they will kill you," Phocion replied, "some day when they are in their senses."

This biting, outspoken man was the idol of Greece, respected and deferred to from one end of the land to the other. He lived very plainly; they found his wife kneading bread with her own hands, and he himself drew water for household use. Alexander, upon one occasion, sent him a present of one hundred talents. Phocion asked why he was thus singled out and, being told that he alone was esteemed by Alexander to be a man of honor and worth, he said, "Permit me then to continue so," and returned the present. Phocion, like Socrates, was charged by false accusers and executed. Just before his death he sent a message to his son. "Bid him bear no grudge against the Athenians." When the people discovered that they had been deceived they were filled with sorrow and regret. They erected a statue to Phocion and put his false accusers to death.¹

¹ Democritus, the smiling philosopher, is another charming figure. In his youth he gaily squandered all his patrimony in gratifying his desire

The Greeks were courteous in their religious practises.

Far from the Hebrew custom of regarding their own tribal deity as the one and only God and consigning all other gods and all persons who believed in other gods to the deepest hell, the Greeks permitted altars to be raised to any god whom anybody worshiped, and lest some should be discourteously omitted they themselves erected an altar to "the unknown god." No man might approach the gods unless he was pure in their sight, but any man who was pure might do so; priests were unnecessary. In praying, the Greek stood upright with arms extended, palms upward; he did not kneel like a courtier, or a beggar. A charmingly poetic practise of Greek worshipers of nature was to confide one's secret cares to the earth or the sky.

Socrates has been called the most perfect gentleman in history. Xenophon says that his character was so per-

to know mankind through travel and observation. When at last, at the age of eighty, he returned penniless to his native city, he was warned of a law which forbade any one to be buried there who had wasted his substance. Whereupon the old man read aloud to the people his chief work, which so delighted them that they exempted him from the law and presented the genial old philosopher with five hundred talents. Finally when he did actually die at the age of one hundred and four, they buried him at the public expense. A little incident connected with his death is both touching and amusing. When about to die, he prolonged his life for three days ("by smelling honey") in order not to inconvenience a sister who wished to attend a certain festival. All his life he looked on the cheerful and comic side of things. In philosophy he taught the eternity of the universe and thus dispensed with a special creation. Jolly old atheist, loving the world and laughing at it, and prolonging his life at the age of one hundred and four for three days longer, to oblige a lady!

fect in all respects that he is surely to be regarded as the happiest of mankind. His virtues were, however, as much acquired as natural. One day a street entertainer, who pretended to be able to read character from the countenance, created great amusement for the bystanders, who knew Socrates as a sage and a good man, by enumerating the vices which he declared he read in Socrates' face. Socrates alone did not smile, and when the man had finished, Socrates gravely remarked, "He is right; all those vices are there, but I have them under control."

Upon being struck one day by an insolent fellow, Socrates forbade his friends to resent it, and when another gave him upon another occasion a box upon the ear, Socrates merely remarked that a man hardly knew, these days, whether or not to wear his helmet when he walked abroad. Although he did not hit back in either case, yet neither did he turn the other cheek.¹

If one recall the salient features of Socrates' character — his devotion to truth, his indefatigable human kindness, his heroic efforts to save mankind from error and lead it into paths of virtue and happiness, his simplicity and modesty, his courage, his splendid hardihood, his broad, rich humor, his homely cheerfulness, his gentleness and courtesy, his love of beauty, his perseverance, his moral bravery, his calmness, his

¹ "Socrates learned to sing and danced every day, conceiving the exercise healthful, and was not ashamed to play with little children. He was very careful of his health, because, he said, the exercises of the soul depend thereon."

THOMAS STANLEY, "Life of Socrates" (1701).

depth, the majesty of his bearing in his hour of trial, the unaffected sweetness of his farewell message to the world — when one briefly runs over the outline of this life and character, one may doubt whether the world has ever produced a finer type or one more essentially “moral.”¹

So much for the morality of the Greeks. Many more instances of “high behavior” might be cited, and the outlines sketched of many noble and beautiful characters.

¹ Felix Adler, our foremost exponent of ethics, has said, “Socrates was a man of the rarest beauty of soul; an expert in the art of self-control, modest to the very acme of humility, purely unselfish, a worshiper of the eternal law.”

To Socrates as a moral teacher, Grote pays this tribute: “Where are we to look for a parallel to Socrates? No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow.” . . . “Socrates enlarged the horizon, improved the method, and multiplied the ascendant minds of Greece in a manner never since paralleled by any moral teacher. No subsequent teachers have applied the same stimulating method with the same efficacy, none have struck out of other minds that fire which lights original thought — none have produced in others as he did the pains of intellectual pregnancy, or extracted from them the fresh offspring of a parturient mind. The Socratic elenchus (method of cross-examining) is the only known instrument for purifying the human intellect. The need for it still exists. But the scholar now must do with his lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the elenchus — the only cross-examining missionary in history — no longer stands in the market-place to lend a helping hand.” (J. S. Mills pays a like tribute to Socrates.)

“I am the gadfly,” said Socrates himself, “which the gods have given to the State, and all day long and in all places I am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping, and you may think that if you were to strike me dead (as Anytus advises), which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless indeed the gods in their mercy send you another gadfly.”

Byron has said:

" . . . and still a watchword to the earth,
When man would do a deed of worth
He points to Greece."

The morality of the Greeks was social, not institutional; by this I mean that they learned it of one another and were not taught it by any inspired institution. To illustrate, let us contrast the lives of two boys growing up, the one in the midst of a family circle of high-bred, refined, brilliant persons, the other in a circle of ignorant, vulgar, quarrelsome people. The first boy sees about him a constant interchange of civilities, refinement of manners, united to nobility and dignity of character. He hears wise and witty conversation. He is constantly being elevated by contact with people of superior minds and manners, on whose example his mind and manners are formed. He receives every day a hundred object lessons in morality. Should he never set foot in a church, and should he never even hear of dogmatic religion, it is quite possible for him yet to develop into a noble, honorable, high-minded man, possessing all the virtues of the heart, together with numerous charms of mind and manners.

The other poor lad has a far less happy lot. His good impulses are utterly confused by the evils which he daily beholds in action around him. The only models he has are those set by his elders, while there is no one to tell him how unlovely these are, and to what ends they lead. Though his soul sicken and turn away from his life in disgust, yet imperceptibly and by degrees

his character becomes deformed. It is at this point that a church becomes a necessity. It is needed to supply those ideals of conduct, those incentives to virtue, essential to moral education, but which society fails to provide.¹ The Greek was in the position of the first boy. He learned lessons in virtue at his family table; he attended lectures on ethics on every street corner; he came daily in contact with men of brilliant parts, of complete refinement, of unimpeachable honor, and of sleepless aspiration toward good. The sanction which goodness received was breathed in the atmosphere of general discussion by which the moral civilization of his race had been fostered.

Let us take up now severally various virtues as men practise them to-day, and ask ourselves whether we have made distinct progress in any of them.²

¹ Prof. Robertson Smith ("Religion of the Semites") has this to say: "Religion with the Greeks . . . was a body of practise to which every member of society conformed as a matter of course. . . . It was a part of the citizen's public life. Religion and the State were identical. Impiety and treason were the same. Of intolerance in the modern sense ancient society knew nothing. Religion did not exist for the saving of souls but for the preservation and welfare of society."

² Our comparisons are necessarily made with the period of Greek civilization, since the contention of this book is that at that time human development reached its highest known point. Needless to say, periods could be picked out all along the line of history, by measuring from which we could with great ease demonstrate our superiority. It would be easy, for instance, to point out marked improvements which have taken place in some matters during the last century. (Indeed, since in New York garbage barrels are no longer left standing on the sidewalk, and since spitting is forbidden, though still practised, in public conveyances, the writer joyfully concedes that there are signs of progress in these directions even in the space of the last few years.)

Are we more honest?

If this question be put to our own American fatherland, one scarcely knows where to hide one's head for shame. Every day brings fresh, mortifying disclosures of corruption and dishonesty in every conceivable department of public and private life. The devil of dishonesty seems here to be on the rampage and exercises every hour some fresh infernal device to tempt the venal, money-loving American. There is ground for believing that men were never so elaborately, so ingeniously, and so imperturbably dishonest since the world began. In politics, in business, in manufacture, in all men's dealings with one another, the same tale is being told. Nor is corruption confined to cities. Events have disclosed the facts that extreme political corruption prevails in the pastoral hill towns of the New England States, for instance, which are, moreover, populated not by foreigners, but by "pure American stock."

"The corrupt political system which is being gradually built up all over the United States," writes Mr. Lincoln Steffens, "is not the corruption of officials; it is founded on the dishonesty of the American people."

Andrew D. White (*The Forum*, December, 1890) writes:

"The city governments of the United States are the worst in Christendom, the most expensive, inefficient, and corrupt. They are centers of demoralization for the whole country. Like decaying spots on ripe fruit they tend to corrupt the entire body politic. I saw a franchise worth a million given away by a city council. I saw a delegation of the most eminent and honored men of the community go before that council and plead for justice — in vain."

Lecky ("Democracy and Liberty") writes:

"There is one thing worse than corruption; it is acquiescence in corruption. No feature of American life strikes a stranger so powerfully as the extraordinary indifference — partly cynicism, partly good nature — with which notorious frauds and political corruption are viewed by the American public."

Bishop McVickar has declared himself staggered at the discovery that bribery has become an institution like private property, and that his clergy do not dare denounce it. "They cannot speak out," said the bishop, "without coming to financial ruin." They are told that they are there to preach the gospel — not politics.¹

When one thinks of the buying and selling of legislatures, the adulteration and false appearance of goods, the tricks of trade, the gigantic swindles of frenzied finance, the constant litigation, the courts crowded to overflowing with frantic citizens trying to gain or to recover property from one another, of the prisons full of thieves who, within the walls, bitterly reflect on the far greater number of thieves still at large outside, of the shoddy, the cheap imitations, the scamped workmanship, the lying advertisements, the political corruption,² the constant misrepresentation practised in every

¹ While the United States maintains the worst reputation for dishonesty among nations, yet we may remind Europe of the Panama scandal in France, the South Sea bubble in England, the wholesale corruption of officials in Russia, the notorious petty dishonesty of the Italians — facts which indicate that the virtue of honesty is not much more flourishing in those countries. Probably the most honest nations of our time are Switzerland and China.

² Mr. Lincoln Steffens ("Rhode Island, a State for Sale," *McClure's Magazine*, February, 1905) reports that a Democratic leader said to

sphere of our civilization, one can but answer that in this virtue of honesty, at least, there has been no gain.

Honesty in workmanship is being rapidly destroyed. It was William Morris who used to exclaim:

"The worst tyrants of the days of violence were but feeble tormentors compared with our captains of industry who are taking away from our workers all possibility of joy in their work."

But the revenge of the workers has been swift and accurate. Out of their imbruted lives they are cursing society with masses of hideous, fraudulent, and dishonest products, which none but the unhappy could conceive, none but the depraved execute, and none but the abandoned enjoy. They fill our markets and our homes with objects which the Athenians would have destroyed as vermin.¹

Are we more temperate? Alas, excess is our universal failing. Over-eating, over-drinking, over-work, over-dress, over-strain, over-ornamentation, over-wealth,

him: "I can always hold my town. If the Republican agents come in with money enough to pay ten dollars a vote and I can give only three, I say to my men, 'Go over and get their ten and then come to me and get my three' — that makes thirteen. But I tell them to vote my way. *And they do.*"

Professor McCook has estimated that nearly sixteen per cent. of the entire vote in Connecticut can be bought.

¹ Plato declared: If vicious workmen be allowed freely to express their ugliness of nature in objects of their handicraft . . . they will provide an influence by which our young "will insensibly accumulate a large mass of evil in their inmost souls." Instead of which the young should be surrounded with fair and lovely images so that "dwelling, as it were, in a healthful region, they may drink in good from every quarter. Since emanations from noble works are like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands and winning the young to the love of reason."

characterize our time. We carry everything to extremes. The Greek motto "Nothing too much," we have replaced with the maxim, "Everything as much as we can get."

The consumption of whisky, gin, rum, etc., is practically all excess (except the small quantities useful as medicine — and then doubtfully). We are intemperate even in language, which runs constantly into superlatives. Our immoderation in the pursuit of wealth has become proverbial, and none but a people who were inveterately addicted to excess would tolerate the appropriation by single individuals of fortunes swollen beyond the possibility of rational use.

Unchastity has been prevalent in all ages, and we have no sufficient data upon which to base a comparison between the volumes of ancient and modern vice, but in general it is safe to say that sexual depravity is indubitably fostered by certain conditions and discouraged by others. It is, for instance, undoubtedly stimulated by the drinking of gin, rum, and whisky — which the Greeks did not have — and it is fostered by heated, indoor lives and over-contact between men and women. By the same count a people living largely in the open air, where each sex was occupied with its own affairs, who were by nature keen, cool, lovers of moderation, unsentimental, and extremely intellectual (romantic literature was almost as unknown as rum and gin), are likely to have been comparatively free from degeneration.¹ The physical beauty of the Greeks, their

¹ But neither did the Greeks undervalue normal love. Plato's Socrates says that "love is the desire for the everlasting possession of the

worship of spiritualized athletics, their incessant inculcation of temperance in all things, their prehistoric adoption of monogamy, all point (in spite of the commonly accepted view to the contrary) to a probably relatively high degree of sex morality. Man's attention was at that time but sparingly bestowed upon women, and a feminism, such as dominates the mind of Frenchmen to-day, for instance, would have doubtless appeared contemptible to them. The Greek citizen was chiefly concerned with affairs of State. To this he bent his energies, while his private family concerns were deemed secondary. It is perhaps too much to assume that he was keen enough to see that his method of indirection contributed far more to the true welfare of women and children, but, whether conscious or unconscious, this was his method of satisfying the demands of family welfare.

Concerning modern chastity I cannot bring myself to write in detail. Such facts as are known reveal a horrible gulf of disease and degradation into which it makes one shudder to look. Vice is so prevalent in France, illegitimacy so appalling in Germany and Austria, prostitution so scandalous in England and America, the traffic in women all over the world so abominable, the hereditary diseases of children so cruel, the infection of innocent wives so wide and so wicked, that this good." Again, Plato says: "He whom love toucheth not, walketh in darkness." Socrates said that the wise woman, Diotima, had taught him that "love is birth in beauty whether of body or of soul." "From the love of the beautiful," says Plato, "has sprung every good in heaven and earth."

chapter in human depravity can safely be studied only by minds hardened to the task.¹

Are we more just?

¹ The chief physician of a large hospital for women in one of our principal cities once told the writer that the sufferings of wives (in a considerable number of cases wives of clergymen) infected by their husbands were more wide-spread and more tragic than was generally known or would be easily believed. Innocent women are destroyed by loathsome affections, concerning the origin of which they must remain silent. This same physician mentioned the case of a girl of fifteen brought to bed of a child in the hospital who was unable to state which one of five different boys was the father of it. It is said that sixty per cent. of the children in public institutions are suffering from vicious taint.

The Committee of Fifteen in 1902 reported that in New York City the trade in vice was rapidly increasing. It says: "The volume of this trade may be guessed at when we learn that a "fifty-cent house" of ten inmates can afford out of its revenues to pay to the police five hundred dollars initiation fee and fifty dollars a month thereafter for the privilege of continuing its traffic unmolested. And this in spite of competition, for in one precinct there were forty such houses, besides no fewer than sixty tenements of a similar character. In 1893 Elbridge T. Gerry and Superintendent Byrnes estimated the number of prostitutes in New York City at forty thousand. Berlin is estimated to contain fifty thousand, while in London are said to be the largest number, "trained for prostitution from earliest childhood." The Paris Prefect of Police is quoted as estimating in 1893 that there were one hundred thousand prostitutes in that city. It is further estimated that for every "fallen" woman there are five "fallen" men. The Superintendent of the Florence Crittenton Rescue League estimates that sixty thousand girls in the United States annually enter lives of shame, while their "patrons" number ten times as many.

Dr. L. Duncan Bulkley has remarked: "It is a mistake to suppose that prostitution is confined to the rich; it pervades all classes. Far below the gilded haunts of vice of the Tenderloin district lies the "red light" area of the East Side, and far below this are the unspeakably low resorts of the water edge, where sailors are enticed and degraded, and criminals of both sexes are made."

This question is more difficult to determine since the absolute nature of justice is not yet clear, and the question has not been closed since Plato opened it in his "Republic." Men in all ages have been feebly striving to attain justice as they saw it, and their view on justice, Plato declared, is, in the last analysis, a complete test of their general intelligence. The wide opportunity thrown open to the individual in our time and country conveys the impression that our sense of justice has greatly expanded. This opportunity, however, is being day by day curtailed by the growth of monopolies, a form of economic treason which had not yet appeared in Greece. Professor Gulick tells us that severe penalties were inflicted on any one who tried to corner the grain market. Whoever bought more than seventy-five bushels of grain at a single time was liable to *capital punishment*. The scientist Thales, acting upon his knowledge that a good olive season was approaching, bought up all the olive presses, and then extorted what he liked for the use of them. This action was regarded with great indignation by the people, and Aristotle pours contempt upon him for debasing his intelligence to such a purpose. "Of course," he says, "philosophers can always, if they choose to lower themselves to do it, outwit the ignorant masses — but they should not stoop to such conduct." Crassus also anticipated the methods of our day and amassed a fortune (it is said to have been not more than two hundred thousand dollars in amount, however) by speculating in real estate, exploiting mines, etc. But to the Greek mind, instead of showing

himself thereby to be a superior person, he seemed only to have demonstrated that he possessed an unnatural thirst for gold, and therefore the Pythian general who finally captured him in battle seemed to every one to have made the punishment fit the crime when he put Crassus to death by pouring molten gold down his throat. It is impossible to read the literature of the Greeks, to read Plato's "Republic" or the "Dialogues," or Aristotle's "Ethics," or the plays of Æschylus or of Euripides, or the dramas of Sophocles, without having the suspicion forced upon one that no other people have ever been so passionately in love with justice and so eager to attain it. No subject engrossed their attention more constantly. In Athens six thousand men devoted themselves to the profession of sitting upon juries, sometimes a thousand men sat upon one case, sometimes fifteen hundred (while with us it is often difficult to secure twelve men for this service, nearly every one seeking, by any excuse, to evade this duty.¹) The difference between the two peoples being that the individual now considers his private business of too great importance to be interrupted by public matters, whereas the Greek considered public business, especially the attainment of justice, of too great importance to be interrupted by private concerns. The result of our indifference is seen in the deterioration

¹ Fellow citizens of my own, who have served on juries, tell me that it is a common practise for impatient jurors, tired of being shut up in uncongenial company, to toss up a coin in order to arrive at a decision. Whereupon they march into court and solemnly deliver their "verdict."

of courts and legislatures, and a consequent wide-spread distrust of the courts.¹

Progress in the administration of justice is sometimes asserted to have taken place for the reason that since the sixteenth century, for instance, we have passed numerous laws designed to protect citizens from one another's depredations. The sort of moral progress which consists in passing laws is easily made.² Given an economic system in which there is every inducement furnished for men to prey upon one another, the naturally-to-be-expected result is the passage of thousands of laws, ordinances, and regulations which are intended to mitigate their mutual ferocity. Laws are made in the United States in prodigious numbers and at a rate which rivals the wonders of labor-saving machinery.³ Legislatures are coming to be great law factories,

¹ Trade-unions, for instance, persistently oppose compulsory arbitration laws (which in New Zealand have brought improvements to their conditions), so persuaded are they that justice would not be done them.

² Thousands of petty laws are annually enacted, as, for instance:

For jumping off of a train (Alabama), 30 days.

Riding horse on sidewalk (Virginia), 60 days.

Flirting in street (Tennessee), 30 days.

Swearing by Jesus Christ (New Jersey), 2 years (!)

Tampering with automatic ballot machine (New York), 5 years (!)

Advertising divorces (Washington), 6 months.

Advertising on American flag (Pennsylvania), 6 months.

Organizing a trust (North Dakota), 10 years (!).

³ Statistics of crime, even if we had them, would not be an accurate test of morality. Complex civilization means more laws, and the more laws there are the more breaking there is done. Thus the fact of a larger number of offenses does not prove that men are worse, and neither does the passing of a large number of laws prove that they are better.

and the output of laws may be compared with the output of stockings, plentiful, cheap, and not made to last.

"Never," says Grote, "has the sentiment of constitutional duty and submission to the vote of the majority been more widely and keenly felt than at Athens."

When Socrates' prison door was opened by a friend and he was begged to take his freedom, he preferred death according to the laws of his country than liberty achieved by bribery.

"It is best," he said, "that the law, whether I think it just or not, should take its course. What I should gain by recovering liberty would be more than lost by the example I should set of defying the execution of the law. The laws have protected and benefited me all my life. How can I now consent to break them?"

The whole of the "Phædo" is to be regarded as a homily upon reverence for law.

Let us address ourselves now to an important and difficult question. "The Greeks were all very well in their way," runs the invariable protest, "but it must not be forgotten that that beautiful civilization rested upon a wrong. Their greatness had a tainted origin: they kept slaves." "And so did George Washington," one might reply.

It is true that slavery existed in Greece as it did throughout the ancient world. It is also true that slavery existed in the United States of America — up to forty-five years ago. We give ourselves great airs over our

forty-five years of virtue! The Greeks, it may be remembered, knew no reason why they should not keep slaves. They were not Christians; they had never professed to believe in universal brotherhood and equality. They had never subscribed to a doctrine of love; nor had they accepted the doctrine which affirmed the "infinite worth of every human soul." Moreover, slavery with them, compared to the chattel slavery of negroes as practised on the plantations of our Southern States, was an innocent institution of domestic service. A stranger from another planet, listening to our current criticism of the Greeks, would certainly be led to believe that Christians are, and always have been, unable to tolerate so cruel and inhuman an institution. It is even suggested that it was the Church of Christ which finally abolished this unholy practise. Christianity abolish slavery! Why, slavery was maintained under Christianity for over eighteen hundred years; while in America after all those centuries a Christian people fought a bitter and bloody war, lasting four long years, and suffered the loss of millions of men and money before they would give it up!

One hears it said that it was, moreover, because the Greeks maintained slaves and therefore enjoyed abundant leisure that they had time to be great.

"Give us an army of slaves to do our work for us," it is said, "and we, too, might achieve wonders. We, too, might produce art, science, philosophy in abundance that would astonish posterity. But we, alas, have to do our own work; we must produce our own

food, make our own clothing, wait upon ourselves! We have no slaves to do these things for us. We have no time to be great."

As a matter of fact the rich and middle classes of to-day enjoy much more waiting on than did the Athenian aristocrats. Not only does our wage-earning class correspond in numbers to their slave class, but we can command, furthermore, a machine power equal, it is estimated, to the labor of from twenty-five to thirty slaves for every man and woman in the country. If three slaves apiece provided the Athenian freemen with leisure to be great, how great should the members of our leisure class be expected to be with thirty slave powers apiece?

But it is urged regarding slavery that our conscience has now become too sensitive to permit us to accept such services even if they were to be had.

"We could not be happy," it is argued, "if we knew that a degraded class of human beings were debasing themselves to serve us! We could not rest easy in our beds if we knew that our brother men were risking their lives at sea to bring us comforts, or suffocating in foul mines to dig our coal, or picking cotton twelve hours a day in the torrid sun, or toiling long hours in infernal factories to manufacture our luxuries! We could not endure the thought of little children being taken from home and school to stunt their lives for our pleasure! No, indeed! to our advanced and enlightened Christian view, though they might have been practised appropriately by pagans

who knew no better — such things we now consider too horrible to be allowed!”

The reader, perceiving my satire, will now reply indignantly, “While the struggle for existence is still, no doubt, accompanied by many evils, yet it is surely an advance upon chattel slavery!”

Before deciding this point, let us consider what slavery really meant in Athens.

“The Greek slaves,” says Prof. John Fiske, “were not ignorant, degraded laborers, but intelligent, skilled workers, not subject to any special ignominy or hardship.”

It is true that slave witnesses were tortured (which fact, says Mahaffy, is the one stupid thing recorded of the Greeks), but the Christian world has practised and still practises this same stupidity. Not only was torture exercised during the Inquisition, it was regularly practised upon the accused in law courts in England less than two centuries ago. The pious witch-hunters of Salem had frequent recourse to this expedient, while only a few months ago, in the Philippine Islands, the soldiers of the United States army practised torture upon their victims by administering the “water cure” to extort testimony from unwilling witnesses!

Gulick tells us that it was customary for many slaves to work for themselves, paying a commission to their masters, and so purchase their freedom. A special vote of the people sometimes (as after the battle of Arginusæ) granted citizenship to slaves for conspicuous services. Slaves were freely admitted to all State

feasts and celebrations, and during the Anthesteria, or early spring carnival, all slaves were set at liberty for the space of three days.

Lowes Dickinson says:

"The Athenian slaves were well treated. They had the protection of the law against ill-use and enjoyed considerable license. In dress and general appearance they were not to be distinguished from citizens; they were permitted freedom of speech."

Plato grew satirical over the Athenians' indulgent treatment of their slaves and remarked that the last extreme of popular liberty is "where the slave is just as free as his master." He exclaims rather testily that in Athens "even horses and asses have a way of marching along the streets with all the dignity of freemen." The attendant of Theseus, probably a slave, was regarded with so much honor because of his good teaching of his young pupil that the Athenians sacrificed every year a ram to his memory.

Dickinson declares that by industry and thrift a slave in Athens could acquire a fortune and live in independent luxury. Professor Grant writes:

"There is nothing in Greek slavery that need shock us, nothing that need make us withdraw our admiration for Greek civilization. The slaves were almost entirely domestic servants. Slavery was a quite different affair from the negro slavery practised on the plantations of the Southern States of America in the nineteenth century. The slave was a member of the household, and mutual respect, sympathy, and devotion were not uncommon. Probably nowhere in the world in that age had hand workers so comfortable a lot as was enjoyed by the slaves of Athens. The slave shared, to some

extent, in the culture of the day, and the *material conditions of the Athenian slaves were better than those of great masses of the wage-earners of to-day*. Greek slavery, by providing the Athenian cultured classes with the leisure indispensable for its development, served to produce for the world much good and did extremely little harm."

Professor Bluemner says:

"In Athens slaves were treated much as our own servants are.¹ Slaves could buy their freedom, and some professions, that of medicine, for instance, were almost entirely in the hands of slaves."

Æsop, the writer of fables, was a slave. The Athenians raised a monument to his memory, inscribed with the declaration, "This is to show that with the Athenians no place of honor is closed to merit: they render homage even to a slave."

In his will Aristotle freed some of his slaves, and ordered that the remainder be manumitted by his heirs as soon as they seemed to be worthy of liberty. He held that slaves of all description should be set at lib-

¹ The position of the average Athenian slave was not very different from that of the faithful woman who has stood at the sink and before the range and the washtubs of my kitchen for the past seventeen years, cooking my food, washing my dishes, and cleaning my clothing. She has not done this of her free will (unless necessity be construed as freedom), nor out of love to me, though our relations are kindly. No tie of blood or of religion unites us, no obligation rests on either side. Yet for seventeen years she has served—not her parents, brothers, and sisters, husband or children, but me, a stranger, until, by thrift and industry, she has succeeded in *purchasing her freedom* and now goes to a home of her own. Both she and I would be much hurt if she were called a slave; yet as I compare her lot with that of the household slave in Athens I am struck with a certain resemblance.

erty whenever they merited freedom and showed that they were qualified for using and enjoying it. He ordered that none of his slaves should be sold.

When the slave Andromachus gave information regarding the miscreants who were supposed to have mutilated the statues of the Hermæ, his master laid claim to the large reward — ten thousand drachmas — which the State had offered. But the Athenian assembly voted to present the sum to the slave himself instead of to his master.

Nicias liberated one of his slaves for having beautifully represented Bacchus in a festival and elicited the applause of the Athenians. Nicias rose in the theater and declared to the people that he could not consent to keep longer as a slave one who could so gloriously personate a god.

When the young slave named Phædon showed a marked desire for knowledge and kept running away from his master in order to listen to Socrates, he was bought by one of Socrates' friends and set free in order that he might be able to pursue his worthy ambition.

According to Demosthenes, a slave at Athens was better off than a free citizen in many other countries.

Aristotle bases his defense of slavery (which he admits that some people think is unjust because founded upon force) upon a natural necessity in the order of things. We moderns know to-day, no less than he did, that the drudgery of the world must be done by somebody, and is done by those who cannot help themselves. We please ourselves, however, by calling those who do this

work because they cannot help themselves, free, while Aristotle used the old-fashioned term, prevalent in his day.

"Without necessities it is impossible to live," said Aristotle, "and the slave who provides these necessities is essential to the existence of society." There follows a remarkable passage. "If ever," he says, "instruments shall, at command or from fore-knowledge of their masters' will, accomplish their work (as was done by the statues of Dædalus, it is said, and as the tripods of Vulcan, Homer tells us, could walk of themselves), *if the shuttle could weave and the lyre play of itself*, then neither would the artist require servants nor the master slaves."

This is a perfectly clear statement that men, in Aristotle's view, should be released from slavery as soon as improved machinery could perform their labor for them.¹

The attitude of the Greek toward the slave of his time was in essence our attitude toward the working classes of ours, namely, this:

"There is a lot of hard work in the world which has *got to be done by somebody*. Those persons will have to do it who are not fitted for anything easier, or, as it is often called "higher," *i.e.*, those who have

¹ "Athenæus has preserved for us a fragment of a comedy in which ten Athenian young men are discussing what they would do if they had no slaves to wait upon them. "I," says one, "would rig up a sort of machine, such as they have down at the seashore at Pæonium. Hot water, brought over arches in pipes, runs straight into the bath and stops when you tell it to. Scent boxes, too, and sponges and sandals can be made to come of their own accord."

Karl Marx ("Capital") quotes a Greek poet, Antiparos, who welcomed the invention of the water-wheel because it would set free the mill girls from hard labor. "Sleep, mill girls," he cries, "for henceforth the gods have bidden that the water shall do your work for you."

not wit enough to get away from it, and make somebody else do it for them. We comfort ourselves by thinking that it is the best we can do at present. The drudgery will have to be done by the stupid and ignorant classes, we say in effect, until we have invented machinery to do it. Then we shall be very glad to emancipate ourselves and put machines in their places."

And these words represent almost precisely the attitude of the ancient Greeks toward slavery.

If it could be shown that the genius of the Athenian freemen was purchased by the misery of many slaves, that would constitute a serious offset to our admiration for their achievements. But this was not the case in Greece, nor has it ever been the case anywhere. The tree of a race does not put forth blossoms and fruitage at the top, if there is decay at its roots. *High creative genius is never produced upon a foundation of human weariness.* Where you find a lower class degraded and ignorant, you will find an upper class arrogant, indolent, vicious; where there exists an upper class, luxurious, extravagant, self-indulgent, proud, it will be found that they draw their sustenance from soil moistened with the blood and tears of ignorant and oppressed toilers.¹

¹ Although I have used a figure of speech in comparing society to a tree, it must be understood that this is meant to be taken only as a figure of speech, and by no means commits the writer to the idea of "a social organism," a phrase the writer believes to be nothing more than a convenient metaphor which taken literally, serves to mislead. It is true that classes, as well as individuals, are mutually

We may recall, for instance, the condition of the citizen on the one hand and the proletariat on the other in ancient Rome, where pomp and circumstance of the one class rested on the poverty and degradation of those sustaining it. The same may be said of the great oriental empires, and we may recall France before the Revolution, with her senseless nobles and her insensible peasantry. Similar features were presented in the Southern States of America before the Civil War — arrogance, indolence, luxury, on the part of the masters; ignorance and degradation on the part of slaves. These States at this time produced many showy orators but few great men. At the same time in the northern New England States, where Puritan simplicity and colonial equality still reigned, and the working-classes were intelligent and self-respecting, there appeared the group of greatest men America has yet brought forth — Emerson, Whittier, Lowell, Longfellow, Daniel Webster, etc. Similar conditions in the West produced Abraham Lincoln. It is true that Washington held slaves, but the conditions were almost Greek in their inno-

dependent upon one another, but that fact by no means demonstrates their organic unity. We are dependent upon the earth to give us food, and we die when we are shut off from it, but this by no means proves that we and the earth are one organism — unless indeed the word organism be stripped of all specific meaning. In that case, since all things that exist may be said to be related to one another, and since all related things may be said to be mutually dependent upon one another, and if all mutually dependent things are to be considered to belong to one organism — then, indeed, there is but one organism and all that exists is but a part of it. Let those who choose, enter into this pantheistic maze; to the writer it seems to lead into a barren wilderness.

cence. Slave exploitation, as it was developed on the plantations, had not yet arrived. Sparta, as is well known, treated her slaves or helots with cruelty. Sparta also produced almost no great men.

Finally, we are to remember that, as far as is known, child labor, a form of slavery in practise with us, was unknown to the Greeks. The spectacle of three hundred children standing ankle deep in blood and refuse, learning to be butchers, in the Chicago stock yards, would, one may imagine, have made upon an Athenian an exceedingly unpleasant impression. Seven thousand children of the United States work in laundries, two thousand in bake-shops, one hundred and thirty-eight thousand in hotels and restaurants, twenty thousand in shops, forty-two thousand as messengers, and three hundred and sixty-seven in liquor saloons. One million seven hundred thousand children are working daily for wages instead of attending school or playing in the open air! Two million women are factory workers.

Our views concerning labor are in utter confusion. We declare in one breath that labor is ennobling and we endeavor to invent machinery to save labor. We say that labor is excellent, and we reward talent with money and so make further exertion unnecessary. We say that labor is honorable, and we make every effort to accumulate wealth to leave to our children, to preserve them from this honor.

In truth, labor is natural to man — as natural as it is for a bird to fly, for a lamb to frisk, or a beaver to build. It is wholesome, it is honest, it is ennobling, it is honor-

able; but it is none of these things unless it be first enjoyable, and to be enjoyable it must not be excessive, it must be performed under suitable conditions and it must be duly rewarded. Greek civilization, to him who grasps its meaning, gives the clue to the solution of the labor problem. It shows that the real wrong toward labor cannot be redressed by raising the money wage of labor under conditions which make it possible to extract the increase again in prices or in taxes almost as soon as it is received. It shows that labor is entitled to have its reward paid in an entirely different coin — the coin of a great public life. The wrong of our system toward labor consists in the fact that labor by its exertions provides leisure for a class who use that leisure in self-indulgence diluted by charity, and thereby the result of labor's toil is to it useless. The labor problem is solved when the exertions of the workers procure for them the activities of great men performing great deeds, into the enjoyment of which the workers may enter. If this were the case, the labor of the workers would be well spent; their wages would be beyond calculating in dollars and cents. So long as labor formulates its demands in a money wage it will continue to be fooled by capital, which is far more clever than labor at arithmetic. Labor is coming very slowly, and as yet feebly, to realize this, and in proportion as it realizes it, it will grudge the idle few the labor they cost at whatever wage they purchase their lives.

The ideal aim of society is the production of men of genius, because it is through the activities of these that

mankind acquires the means of its highest development and the satisfaction of its deepest needs. A society adopting such an end as its goal would find all grades of labor falling each into its just and honorable place, being each contributive, inasmuch as in it lay, to the attainment of the consciously realized common end.

The ideal of democracy is a horizontal society, but every day is demonstrating more and more clearly that this ideal is unattainable because in the nature of things impossible. Society is not horizontal; it is perpendicular. It is not flat like the sea; it grows upward like a tree toward the light. The Greek method of trying to discover justice and apply it to society, on the hypothesis that society was perpendicular (that is, naturally disposed in sections one above the other like a tree), might have led to success. It is becoming increasingly evident that our efforts to achieve justice, based upon the false hypothesis that society is level like the sea, can never solve our problems. Justice is within the bounds of attainment to a society which realizes that it has at the heart of its life a common aim — to produce the fruit of the tree — and where each individual aims at fulfilling the function to which it is best adapted toward that common end.

The need of our day is for a new social philosophy which shall aim to secure justice among *unequal* men. It must no longer ignore the fact, to which all our present theories are in reality blind, that men are born unequal, that they do not as a matter of fact stand side by side, but rather, through the inevitable operation

of their natural inequalities, they stand one on top of the other, and that therefore the hope of their ever joining hands in a level brotherhood of justice and peace may one day have to be supplanted by a new hope — that of seeing them welded into a growing whole like a tree, where each part supports that above it in health and joy for the sake of the fruit at the top — a fruit which every minutest portion of the tree will consciously realize to be *its* fruit, and to be an end in which it most perfectly fulfils its own being.¹

Scarcely less than that of holding slaves, contempt for labor is also a reproach often made against the Greeks, and it is true that that sort of labor which is despicable they despised. Xenophon speaks with aversion of occupations which force people to lead sedentary, indoor, overheated lives. "As their bodies become effeminate," he declares, "so do their souls become weakened." "Drudgery disfigures the body," says Plato, "while it mars and enervates the mind." Aristotle advised that sordid, monotonous labor, since it does not conduce to the free activity of the spirit, should be avoided if possible. We do not find among the Greeks any indications of a contempt for moderate labor so long as it did not degrade men. Tanners, bakers, farmers, all belonged to the assembly, and met on terms of social equality. In his discourse with

¹ In connection with this discussion compare Darwin ("Descent of Man"): "The presence of a body of well-instructed men, who have not to labor for their daily bread, is important to a degree which cannot be overestimated, as all high intellectual work is carried on by them."

Epigenes, Socrates pointed out a shoemaker, a crier, a tent-maker, and said, "The Athenian commonwealth consists of such as these."

Socrates' mother was a midwife, and he himself was a statuary. The mother of Euripides was an herb-seller. The philosopher Cleanthes, who was highly revered by the Athenians, earned his living by carrying water at night for a gardener. Æschines, a favorite disciple of Socrates, was the son of a sausage-maker, and was so desperately poor that Socrates used to advise him to "borrow money of himself by diminishing his wants." It was of him Socrates spoke when he said, "The sausage-seller's son alone knows how to honor me."

Plutarch tells us that the great Philopœmen used to work with the laborers on his farm in the vineyard, or at the plow, all the morning, spending his afternoons in the city, engaged with the magistrates on public business. Among leading citizens we hear of Eucrates the rope-seller, Cleon the leather-seller, Lysicles the sheep-raiser, and Hyperbolus the lamp-maker.

Winkelmann tells us that handiwork of all kinds was so highly honored in Greece that the humblest workman might render his name immortal by doing a good piece of work. Indeed this actually occurred. The name of Architeles, an excellent stone-cutter, has been handed down to us, as also the names of the man who constructed the largest ship ever built at Samos, and of him who designed the aqueduct at the same place. The names of the two weavers who wrought the mantle for

the Pallas Polias at Athens were inscribed for the honoring of posterity, as was likewise that of Parthenius, who made very correct weighing scales. The name of the saddler who made the leathern shield of Ajax has been preserved and even that of a certain maker of especially fragrant ointments. Plato has immortalized one Thearion, a baker, on account of his skill at his trade. Byzes of Naxos is recorded as having first adopted the plan of sawing marble into thin plates for use on the roofs of temples, instead of tiles. We are told of Eucheir and Engrammus, who were bakers of clay. Smilis was a graver, Butades of Sicyon was known as a potter. Glaucus of Chios was famous for having invented the art of soldering iron. He was so clever a workman that all who worked rapidly and with ease at any craft were said to possess "the art of Glaucus." Rhœcus and Theodorus invented the casting of hollow figures.

In the heroic age of Greece even kings and nobles exercised themselves in the manual arts. Ulysses built his own bed and constructed his own raft. He was proud of being an excellent mower and plowman. So great was the admiration for skilful work that in many instances crafts were soon lifted to the level of arts. Crafts were handed down from father to son, and a large proportion of the free citizens were craftsmen.

Mr. Alfred W. Benn (the *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1902) writes:

"Historical errors die hard. There is a prevalent belief that there were no paid working men in Greece; that the free

citizens lived in idleness upon slave labor; that Greek democracy was not democracy at all in our sense. This assertion is untrue. The bulk of the Athenian voters consisted of petty shopkeepers, peasants, and day laborers. The number of slaves has been greatly exaggerated, as has been shown by Professor Beloch in his brilliant work on the population of the ancient world."¹

Agriculture was always held in high esteem by the Athenians. Furthermore, that they cherished no undue contempt for labor is most conclusively shown in the fact that the national mythology represented some of the most popular deities as workers. Hephæstus was an industrious smith at his forge, while Athena, the wise, the idolized deity of Athens, was the goddess of industry, and was frequently represented as engaged in weaving. It would have been contrary to the native good taste of the Athenians to attribute acts which they thought contemptible to the goddess whom they worshiped. Not only gods, but heroes, were represented as toiling. The favorite hero, Hercules, was revered solely on account of the hardships and severe labor he had undergone in cleaning stables, killing monsters, etc. Industry seems to have been praised and honored. When it was discovered that Cleanthes, a student, studying with Zeno, had been supporting himself by secretly

¹ M. Wallon has revised the labors of Hume, Bœckh, and Letronne, and concludes that in all Attica there were probably 40,000 slaves employed in domestic service, 35,000 in agriculture, 10,000 in the mines, 90,000 in manufacture and commerce, 6000 aged, 20,000 children, and 1200 Scythian archers. The free population was about 107,000, of whom 40,000 were non-franchised foreigners. Thus the slave bore to the free population the ratio of a little more than 2 to 1.

working in a garden at night, the Areopagus voted him ten minæ as an expression of their admiration for his pluck and industry.

Aristotle ("Politics") expressed the philosophic view of labor when he said:

"A man's constitution should be inured to labor, but not to excessive labor, nor of one kind only. He should be capable of all the acts of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to women." "Up to five years old no demand should be made upon children for study or labor." "Those arts are vulgar which deform the body and likewise those paid employments which absorb and degrade the mind."

Socrates' "knowledge of the good" included, as Professor Sidgwick points out, the knowledge of practical affairs, and hence arose his interest and esteem for labor. He was always harping on the skill of shoemakers, carpenters, herdsmen. "These people," he often said, "know their business," and these vulgar arts, he maintained, led the way to the knowledge of higher things. Hesiod said, "Labor is no reproach; it is idleness which is dishonor." Pericles insisted on giving to artisans the same political rights as were enjoyed by the landed gentry. Solon, far from despising labor, decreed that every boy should be taught a handicraft. If a boy's parents neglected to have him taught a trade, he was exempt from the duty of supporting them in their old age. Instancing their freedom from class prejudice is the people's respect for Aristides, who came from the working-classes, was poor, and of lowly birth. Yet they dubbed him "the Just," which was an appellation

hitherto applied only to kings, and they reposed a flattering confidence in his integrity.

It is said that we have a higher conception of equity among nations and would not stoop to wring tribute from weaker peoples, as the Athenians did in building up their State. This is not true. In that respect there has been no advance. No nation to-day gives any equity or other advantage to its rivals, or dependents, any more than it is obliged to do. The strong have not ceased to bear hard upon the weak, in spite of the fact that the strong have nominally embraced a religion of compassion.

England has been plundering India for a century and a half. The people are now unbelievably poor and their spirit has been utterly broken. Immediately after Clive, in 1757, had vanquished rival plunderers and subdued the resistance of the natives, the English, "deluded by avarice" into extravagant ideas of the wealth of India, began the policy of laying enormous burdens upon the people. The East India Company demanded ten million rupees, and for other claims twenty million rupees were exacted. Then the triumphant Clive went home for five years, "leaving in India no system of government, but merely the tradition that unlimited sums of money might be extracted from the natives by the mere terror of the English name." (*Encyclopedia Britannica*.) The policy pursued was to allow traders, pretending to be agents of the Company, to set aside native dues and imposts, and then, when

the natives objected and killed somebody, to raise a great outcry, assemble troops, and put down "disorder." This hoary trick of invading other people's territory, goading and irritating them until, if they have a spark of self-respect, they will resist, and then crushing them as "rebels," has been played with every known variation by the British officials in India.

One method of stirring up strife was for the British to interfere in the succession of native governments and set up rulers of their own choosing. Whenever disputes arose between native rulers, it became the practice of the English government to step in as a "peacemaker," and, like the monkey in the fable, promptly appropriate the property of both parties. Thus they regularly subjected the people to a humiliating interference and dictation (which it is probable that the English people themselves would have died, to a man, rather than submit to), while at the same time Christian ministers were engaged in proclaiming to the Hindus the ethical beauties of a religion based upon the rule, "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you." In 1843 the Amirs of Sind, "whose only fault was that they would not surrender their Independence," were crushed by Sir Charles Napier. The territory of the Baluchis was forcibly annexed "without any honest excuse." The awful mutiny of 1858 was the last desperate effort of a throttled nation to cast off the grip of an alien despot. To suppress the mutiny cost forty million pounds sterling and an augmented annual military expenditure of ten million pounds, all

of which was filed for collection from the exhausted nation. In these ways, by one confiscation after another, by one "punishment" after another, a harmless people of much native talent have been brought under complete subjection and the glorious British empire in India has been erected. The poverty of the people is incredible. In 1900 Mr. Digby estimated the income per head of the population carefully at one and a half cents per day; Lord Curzon in 1902 put the average annual income at about six dollars and sixty-six cents! (In America it costs three times this sum per year to feed a dog.) The land tax is cruel, while the tax on salt, which is a government monopoly, selected because through it some revenue can be drained from the very poorest, is inhumanly oppressive. Last century the government suppressed many local supplies of salt in order to protect its monopoly. John M. Robertson, M. P., ("Our Relation to India") says, "I have read an account of an old woman being sent to prison for scraping off some crude salt from the crevices of rocks by the seashore."¹

Modern medicine inclines to attribute leprosy to the consumption of half-cured or decomposing fish. It is a testimony to the terrible poverty of India that her people must go saltless even in such need as that implies.

¹ The writer admits, of course, the many benefits which British rule in India has coincidentally conferred upon that land, even although many of these benefits run counter to the tastes and genius of the people and have had too often to be forcibly imposed. Whether justified or not, the treatment of the prostrate nation has indisputably been too often harsh, and the old conception that might makes right has hardly been bettered.

In the history of Athens there is no record of any treatment of a subject people comparable to this. Moreover — and this point cannot be too often insisted upon — ancient Athens knew of no reason why she should *not* have been, had she chosen, rapacious and heartless in her dealings with the weak and helpless. She never pretended to have accepted a religion of love and tenderness. She never professed to believe in a divine command to love her neighbor as herself, she had never declared that all men are brothers before God, she had never committed herself to any creed concerning the infinite worth of every immortal soul; she was guided by nothing more remarkable than a plain pagan sense of there being some natural limits to human selfishness.

Have we more fortitude?

By fortitude the ancients meant that dignified calm which accepts good fortune with ill, which was a virtue high in favor with the Stoics and to this day is called by their name. In Sparta the cultivation of this quality was a religion and their exhibitions of fortitude proverbial. It is a virtue less emphasized in our age and seems to be generally quite uncoveted by our contemporaries, depending as it does upon a rigid self-discipline and self-mastery which are at present out of fashion.

Are we more public-spirited?

This question is easily answered since it is evident

on every hand that devotion to private ends rules present society. "The American continent," said Emerson, "is dedicated to individualism." Except in Japan, that most Hellenic of modern nations, and to a lesser degree in Switzerland, there is nowhere even a conception of the ever-present, passionate, unwavering interest which the Greek, from early youth to old age, cherished for the honor and glory of his city-state.

Virtue, to the Greek, meant always serviceableness. The excellent man was one possessing the degree of strength and beauty of body, combined with wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice, best adapted to serve the State. Excellence was in the Greek view never separated from public usefulness.

The high-water mark of political democracy was reached about the year 480 B.C., when Aristides threw open the highest magistracies to all citizens, rich and poor alike. The Athenians conceived that their private interest and the welfare of the State were one and the same. The citizen never spoke of sacrificing himself for the good of the State, but conceived rather that *he realized himself* in the good of the State.

Each citizen was not only a voter but, in turn, officeholder, legislator, and judge. The chief offices were distributed by lot, and each citizen was likely to be, some time in his life, the supreme ruler, if only for a few days.

"The State" (one reads in the "Encyclopedia of Social Reform") "was a public trust, operated for benefit of the citizens. The free citizen was freer to

develop his individuality than any citizen has ever been."

Although there be signs of the coming of a new social awakening, it is beyond question that in our century and in our country the living of each man for himself has been carried to the utmost limit compatible with non-lapse into complete savagery. In matters industrial the rule holds, "Every man for himself." Each day sees the marching out of a huge industrial mob to fight single-handed with their common enemy; each night sees thousands of poor wretches returning home, crushed, wounded, or slain in the wild, planless battle. With no captains worthy of the name, no organization, no collective intelligence, armed only with their two bare hands, they plunge blindly into the fray and come out of it drained of the life-blood which capital has known how to transmute into wealth and gather to itself. Neither in the money-hungry exploiter, nor in the food-hungry worker, nor anywhere in a business-ridden community is visible that devotion to the public good, putting private interests entirely in abeyance, which is among the first conditions of human progress.

John Stuart Mill ("Representative Government") has written:

"In the exercise of public functions the citizen is called upon to weigh interests not his own; to apply principles and maxims which aim at the common good. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit is for his benefit.

"Without such a school of public spirit private persons come to consider that their only duties to society are

to obey the laws, while their thoughts and feelings are absorbed in the individual and the family. Men then do not think of acting in cooperation, but only in competition with others. A neighbor, never engaged in any common undertaking for joint benefit, is only a rival. Thus private morality suffers while public morality is actually extinct."

"There is little in most men's lives to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is a routine of self-interest in its most elementary form—the satisfaction of daily wants; neither the thing done or the process of doing it introduces the mind to thoughts or feelings extending beyond individuals. If instructive books are within reach there is no stimulus to read them; in most cases the individual has no access to any person of a cultivation much superior to his own. Giving him something to do for the public supplies in a measure all these deficiencies. If the amount of public duty assigned to him be considerable, it makes him an educated man. . . . The practise of the dicastery and the ecclesia at Athens raised the intellectual standard of the average citizen far beyond anything of which there is yet an example *in any other mass of men, ancient or modern.*"

Are we more hardy? —

This virtue of repressing the natural human tendency toward ease and softness was a favorite with the Greeks, whose beautiful bodies and clear minds were sacredly guarded against the subtle inroads of luxury and indolence. The Greek had learned from his conquest of the Persian to despise soft couches, silken robes, costly furniture, rich food, attendant slaves, and dreamy indolence. Such men, they saw, were easy to beat, no matter how great their numbers.

Needless to say, our ideals do not run in this direction. The practise of frugality and the cultivation of hardi-

hood are not, apparently, of the smallest attractiveness to our generation. No one except athletes is supposed to practise them unless compelled. To limit one's desires for food, dress, servants, horses, jewelry, wine, theaters, is commonly held to be a mark of "queerness"; to aspire to self-mastery is scorned as "strong-mindedness." To be satisfied with simple things a mark of eccentricity.¹

To be able to walk with impunity barefoot over the snow, as Socrates did, does not appeal to us; we seek rather the plentiful acquisition of woolen stockings, thick boots, and rubber shoes. Rubber, indeed, is one of the distinct marks of differentiation between our age and that of the ancients. Rubber has become as it were the chief support of our civilization, as whisky and tobacco seem to be its dearest comforts. Rubber tires, rubber heels, rubber springs, rubber everywhere, to take the jolt and jar out of life. In every way possible we seek to render ourselves comfortable — not hardy. Personal comfort, which is slow but sure race suicide, is the precious possession for which men strain every nerve and for which no sacrifice is too great.

Have we greater ideality? Not even the fondest believers in our greatness can urge this claim. The love of beauty was a passion with the Greek. Visions of

¹ There was once a business man, who, upon remarking to a friend that he was about to retire from business, as he felt he already had acquired more than his share of worldly goods, received the following reply: "I recognize no limits. My 'share' of this world's goods, as I see the matter, is — *all I can get.*"

beauty, beautiful statues, beautiful behavior, beautiful cities, haunted his thoughts by day and his dreams by night. Never were a people so obsessed by ideals of perfection and so fervently and unceasingly bent on attaining the highest achievements within human reach.

There are certain virtues in which it is difficult to distinguish any marked gain or loss: such is, for example, *patriotism*, which, like courage, is an elemental, preservative instinct; or *good humor*, a virtue which arises and falls chiefly with the state of the health; *modesty* was praised more by the Greeks than by us, but is valued by all ages. Nevertheless, national boastfulness no people seem to have escaped. From the confident assurance of the Greeks and the blistering self-conceit of the Hebrews, down to Uncle Sam's strident spread-eagleism, Anglo-Saxon jingoism, anti-Semitism, and other forms of race and national vanity, no people are free. *Liberality* was as common with the Greeks as with us, but it had not always the merit of being voluntary, since all rich men were required by law to be generous and from every man of wealth the production of a great dramatic festival for the enjoyment and education of the people was exacted.

Lavish generosity was not uncommon. Atticus Herodes gave the people a theater equal to many modern libraries, and at his death escaped "the disgrace of dying rich" by bequeathing his entire fortune (which consisted originally in a vast treasure found accidentally in his garden, and which he seems

was then
monument?

to have regarded as unearned increment) to his fellow citizens, share and share alike.

Are we more tolerant?

In the ancient Greek States every one was quite free to worship his own gods and to hold any opinions that pleased him so long as he showed a decent respect to the manners and customs of others. Freedom of speech was allowed and practised fully as much as it is to-day.

Grote says:

"The national temper was indulgent to a high degree to all varieties of thought. Liberty of thought and action reigned. There was no tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters. This point in the national character, by rendering many causes of human hatred inoperative, furthered the intellectual development of the people. The germs of productive genius found in this atmosphere of general tolerance the maximum of encouragement." . . .

"None of the governments of modern times, democratic, aristocratic, or monarchic, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance toward social dissent which is to be found in the speeches of Pericles."

Aristophanes in his comedies sometimes ridiculed popular idols so mercilessly that, says one writer, "one sometimes wonders that the people did not stone him on the spot."

When Timoleon was bitterly criticized for his military policy, he replied by thanking Heaven that he had succeeded in securing for his fellow citizens full liberty of speech.

Turning to our own time, consider the *lèse-majesté*

laws in force in Germany. These constitute a complicated code of restrictions, the character of the offense being described in no fewer than 125 paragraphs of the German statute-book, while nine hundred volumes of legal reference concerning it have been published. According to this law any remark suggestive of disrespect to any one of the twenty monarchs and princes of the empire constitutes a criminal offense. The prohibitions of the law do not, moreover, confine themselves to remarks; failure to remove your hat when the sovereign passes, or if you should point to his photograph in a shop-window, with a mocking or cynical expression on your face, these are also crimes. Nor is it necessary that these and similar dastardly deeds be performed in public. If a person conversing in a secluded room in a private house utters a disrespectful remark about the emperor, his companion may denounce him to the police, nay, it is his patriotic duty to do so, and conviction and imprisonment will almost certainly follow, since the evidence of one witness is in these cases accepted as sufficient. As would be expected from such an arrangement, the law is frequently utilized by vindictive persons to gratify personal spite against others. In the year 1904 there were 3956 convictions for *lèse-majesté* in Germany, and the sentences passed aggregated a period of 4098 years. The offenders belonged to all classes, including roughly 2400 workmen, 600 agricultural laborers, 500 commercial men, 200 women, 100 professional men, and 100 children under sixteen years of age! Since the establishment

of the present German empire, in 1871, more than 250,000 persons have been convicted of *lèse majesté* and sentenced to terms of imprisonment aggregating more than three hundred thousand years!

Have we progressed in democracy?

It has been shown that the Greeks not only discovered democracy, but carried it to amazing completeness. Under Pericles the entire free population of Athens were admitted to the franchise. The slave population took no part in the government, it is true, and this excluded three-fourths of the male population, but neither do women exercise the franchise even yet, and this excludes one-half of the entire population. No democracy is conceivable which does not reserve the right of defining the limits of its suffrage.

The city was a corporation in which all the citizens were shareholders by right of citizenship. The State built and cared for temples, baths, gymnasia, stoa, theaters, market-places, etc. It owned and operated mines and conducted rites and festivals. The revenues of the city were derived mainly, *not from taxes*, but from lands, houses, forests, mines, owned and operated by the State. The State built wharves and waterhouses at the Piræus, controlled weights and measures. It entered into distribution, providing food at cheap prices in times of want. *It regulated the price of wheat.* It saw to it that none of its citizens came to distress. It supported the theater. In the army the common soldiers were paid and the officers were expected to be

satisfied with the honor of serving the State. When the city was in funds division was made among all the citizens, *not in charity*, but as a *dividend of the municipal corporation to which they all belonged*.¹

There seems to be a common impression that only the aristocracy took part in the municipal life of Athens, and that the city was ruled by a handful of stately, white-robed philosophers. Nothing could be further from the truth. Freemen of all classes enjoyed the franchise. Wealth or poverty made no difference.

"Citizenship," says Lowes Dickinson, "extended to every rank and calling. In the assembly the poor man jostled the rich, the shopman the aristocrat. Cobblers, carpenters, smiths, farmers, merchants, and traders met together with the landed gentry to debate national affairs. Indeed, the middle and lower classes tended to monopolize power. Cleon, a popular leader, was a tanner, another was a baker, another a cattle dealer."

Mahaffy says:

"The Athenian assembly was composed of the artisans, tradesmen, and seamen of the city, with the farmers of the suburbs and such rich citizens as had houses in town. Seats in the theater were reserved only for persons of official rank. To reserve them for the rich or for a *higher entrance price*

¹ Athens had no police force, relying upon its democratic citizens to keep order and detect crime — a method which fostered vigorous personal responsibility and interest in the welfare of the State. The citizens could be trusted to be each his own policeman.

Grainier ("Histoire des classes ouvrières," p. 283) asserts that a fragment from Solon shows that in his time — 600 B.C. — trade-unions were common in Greece. There were certainly *thiasotia* (disciples of mutual love), *sussitoi* (those who eat at a common table), *omotaphoi* (burial societies), *thiasoi* and *eranoi* (guilds).

would not have been tolerated for an instant by the Athenian democracy."

The price of seats was two obols, six cents (worth about twenty-four or thirty cents to-day), throughout the house, for rich and poor, aristocrat and workman alike.

Democracy is to be measured not by the form of government adopted, nor by the number of persons who have the opportunity to participate in it. Democracy exists where laws are made (no matter by whom) and administered (no matter by whom) in such a way that the whole people (not a privileged class) derive the greatest possible benefit from them. Where this occurs the will of the people is in operation, for *this is the will of the people*.

"Democracy," says Hobhouse ("Democracy and Reaction"), "implies a direct participation of the mass of ordinary citizens in the public life of the commonwealth, an idea most nearly realized, perhaps, in the great assemblies and large popular juries of Athens."

Measured by the true welfare of an entire population, Athens — where there were no kings, no bishops, no nobles, no millionaires, no trusts, no paupers, no tramps, no slums, no great wealth, and no degraded poverty, where genius was in full bloom, health abounding, and temperance the rule, moderate comfort a common heritage, and general intelligence a popular religion — was nearer by far to being a democracy than is our society where the substance of popular rule is daily fading.

Are we more cleanly?

This quality, if it be next to godliness, may be reckoned as a minor morality. As for internal cleanliness — with abundant fresh air, no coffee, no whisky, no lard, no pie, why should not the Greeks have had clear heads and bright eyes? For outward cleanliness, we know that in Athens there were fine public baths and the river close at hand, and both seem to have been regularly enjoyed.¹ There was also no coal smoke in Athens.

Nevertheless, it may cordially be admitted that the triumph of the modern man is plumbing, and perhaps the availability of soap is to be regarded as a compensation for having to live in a particularly crowded and smoky epoch. Athens, it is true, was on one occasion visited by the plague; but this was brought about by the assembling of all the people into the city in a time of national danger. Conditions of over-crowding, which they endured reluctantly for a short time, we permit *all the time*, when there is no enemy devastating the surrounding country and no reason whatever why people should be allowed to pig together in city sties, and not be compelled to cease their horrible pressure upon one another by spreading out into the open. There were no

¹In contrast to this we may recall the words of Huxley, who, in a well-known passage, thus describes modern conditions: "Misery is a condition in which sufficient food, warmth, and clothing cannot be obtained; where human beings are crowded into dens where decency and health are impossible; where the only pleasures are bestiality and drunkenness; where starvation, disease, stunted development, and other degradation accumulate, where unremitting toil holds out no other prospect than a life of unsuccessful battling with hunger, rounded by a pauper's grave." Charles Booth estimated in 1891 that 1,400,000 persons were living in this condition in London.

slums in Athens. Instead of a war plague once in a hundred years we have the great white plague with us all the time, finding no abatement year in and year out, in war or in peace. This plague has slain more victims than all the wars and scourges known in the world. Three thousand persons die of it each day. It is said to cause a million deaths every year. In New York City there are reported to be always thirty thousand persons ill of this disease, each one of whom is emitting seven million infectious bacilli per day. Yet it is believed that cleanliness, fresh air, and good food would prevent the inroads of this plague. We suffer, in addition, from other diseases known to be directly or indirectly the product of unclean habits. Small-pox was unknown to the Greeks, they had no word for it. More cleanly? We are devastated annually by zymotic diseases traceable to bad air, bad food, bad water.

This is not all.

The Greeks did not know what caused their plagues, but we do know perfectly well the cause of ours, and yet we allow them to go on. They did not know that uncleanliness was fatal. *We do.*¹

There is a common impression that among the Greeks woman was denied freedom. It seems to be thought

¹Probably in this, as in several other respects, the Japanese, with their rice diet, their gallon of water drunk by each person per day, and their twice daily baths, approach nearer than other nations to the ideal standard of cleanliness.

that she was forced to lead, against her will, a life of semi-seclusion; was excluded from participation in public affairs, and not admitted into men's business occupations or social pursuits. How far is this true, and what does it mean? How does this life as pictured bear upon the development of Greek genius, and finally, how does it compare with the life of woman to-day?

The majority of Greek women led, it is true, domestic lives. They filled no public offices, they did not vote, and they did not to any extent enter into business. Greek history is filled almost exclusively with the names and exploits of men (as is the case in the history of all other countries). Men do the fighting, the building, the destroying, the conquering — all the big, active deeds were then, as they are now, performed by men. Occasionally women lent a hand, as they did in rebuilding the wall of Athens, and in a number of sieges, when they tore up tiles from the roofs, and threw them down upon the heads of the enemy. When Sparta was besieged by Pyrrhus and its condition looked desperate, it was decided to send all the women away to Crete for safety; but the women refused unanimously to be sent, and Archidamia came into the Senate with a sword in her hand, asking, in the name of the Spartan women, whether the men expected them to survive the ruins of Sparta. Then the women joined the old men and helped to dig a trench, while the young men, who were to fight, slept.¹

¹ The women of Athens showed themselves, on one occasion, to be no less strong-minded. Lycidas, the senator, had rashly proposed in

But in all these *tours de force* women appear as assistants and seconds (unless the stories of the Amazons be believed), and for the most part woman remained then, as she does now, in the background. Her field of activity was the home, where she cooked and cleaned and spun and wove, and gave orders to her servants, and cared for her husband, parents, brethren, and children. Her education was brief, but she must have had much native wit, since that was characteristic of her race, and she enjoyed free companionship and conversation with brilliant men. She also had the free run of the most beautiful city of all time, was admitted freely to the theater, and to all the religious festivals.² She was not admitted, we are told, to the Olympic games, presumably because accidents sometimes occurred which it were best for her not to see (women are at present, I suppose, excluded from prize-fights). We have record of one woman who braved public censure by disguising herself as a man in order to witness the games. She was discovered, but her misdemeanor was pardoned when it was learned that both her father and her son had been winners of prizes, and her natural

the senate that Athens should accept the dishonorable bribe offered her by the Persians, and he had been promptly slain by the population by way of reply to his proposition. Whereupon some leading Athenian women went to the house of Lycidas and stoned to death his wife and children.

²While "neither women, nor boys, nor slaves were excluded from the dramatic spectacles at Athens" (Encyclopedia Britannica), in England, even in Shakespeare's time, women were not admitted to the theater — unless they were *masked*."

woman's curiosity might be presumed to have been increased beyond human endurance.

There is no reason to suppose that home life, soft and sheltered, with its atmosphere of service, its functions of nourishing, cleansing, and setting in order, and its sense of ministering to beloved persons, naturally gratifying to woman's nature, was not the sphere preferred by them then, as it is by the vast majority of women now. Occasionally then, as now, exceptional women endowed with unusual intellectual power, as Aspasia and Diotima, both women from whom Socrates was glad to learn; or remarkable for beauty, as Phryne and many other lovely and famous courtesans, emerged from the general level of obscurity. We learn, too, of numerous women of imposing moral stature who impressed their age with awe of their heroic character.

From what we know of the Athenians (no less than from what we know of human nature) it is impossible to believe that their women were forcibly excluded from culture. Admiration for genius was the ruling passion with Athenian men, and they would not only have been likely to welcome symptoms of it wherever found, but if discovered in their own womankind would have no doubt boasted of it as jubilantly as men do now. It is evident that woman's inferiority in genius to man did not proceed from discouragement of her on his part, or forcible repression of her, since even in America, where he dotes upon her and denies her nothing, she still remains behind him in the race.

That these Greek women considered themselves to

be or were enslaved is not conceivable. Athenian men were, let us not forget, animated by a passion for freedom which has never been exceeded, and men of that type are not born of women who are enslaved. Domestic life was voluntarily chosen by Greek women, who had never thought of anything else, as it is by millions of women to-day to whom every avenue is open. Preference for the sheltered life is, perhaps, more marked to-day than it was in ancient Greece, since many more attractions and vocations are calling to women to come out of the home to-day than there were then, while the amount of drudgery to be borne by those who remain in the home is greater now than it was in the plainer homes of early times. The Greek woman had almost no bric-à-brac, her house was small, bare, and simple; the daily fare of the family extremely frugal, dress-making a matter of a few garments, fashions never changed, shoes lasted a lifetime, and there was no servant problem! She knew not the thousand trifles and trivial actions which are considered to conduce to present-day existence. Women spun wool at home, but linen spinning was done elsewhere and many garments were made out of the house by tailors.¹ Bread was

¹It seems generally to be assumed that Greek women were constantly kept at work at their looms, but linen was not spun at home, and the amount of wool which a single family can consume is limited. Homespun, even to-day, wears nearly forever, and a few yards a year would have then quite sufficed. Women, no doubt, "potted around" the house a good bit with their babies and their pets, as they do now, but there was no question of the hard, incessant toil, such, for instance, as the American farmer's wife performs to-day.

baked in public bakeries and several other articles of food were sold ready to eat. Breakfast consisted of bread and wine. (No kitchen fire to make, no heavy food to cook, no greasy dishes to wash.) After breakfast husband and children were packed off for the day, he to the agora, they to school and gymnasium. With these simple home appurtenances the Greek woman, far from being a slave, must have led a free and easy life, with abundant leisure to care for her health and beauty and to contribute her full quota to the general joyousness which was the birthright of her wonderful race. We have but to look attentively into the face of the Venus of Milo to feel firmly convinced that whatsoever measure of freedom the Greek woman chose to take, that, in all feminine probability, she took.¹

Butler ("The Story of Athens") says:

"In the time of Sappho woman often seems to have been counted the equal of man just as far as she chose to be, particularly in the rôle of poet or teacher."

Sappho contended many times with men for the poets' prize and many times was victorious over them. One of the leading poets was said to have been beaten by her

¹Curtius ("History of Greece") says of the Lysians: "In the quiet home they developed a great refinement of manners, to which the special honor in which they held the female sex bears marked testimony. This was one of the blessings bestowed by the religion of Apollo, which always recognized women as the instruments chosen to give voice to the divine will."

It was Themistocles who declared that his baby ruled Athens. "For," said he, "the infant rules its mother, its mother rules me, and I rule Athens." What Anglo-Saxon could express more consummate domestic devotion!

no fewer than thirteen times. No fewer than twelve of her women pupils became famous. All contemporary critics speak of her poetry with boundless enthusiasm. Atcarus wrote of her as "violet-wearing, pure, sweet-smiling Sappho."

When it was said to the wife of Leonidas, "It is only Spartan women who are strong enough to rule men," she replied, "It is only Spartan women who bring forth men." A nickname for Spartan women was "bull-stranglers."

We should be obliged to abandon all belief in heredity before we could be persuaded that the mothers of Pericles and Socrates and Aristotle and Plato were not women of strong intelligence, or that Alcibiades, Miltiades, Themistocles sprang from other than high-spirited, brilliant, free, proud women; even as we must believe that Aristides, Epaminondas, Phocion were born of dignified, massive women, women of towering morality, to whom freedom was as their native air.

Greek women were not only essentially free, but they enjoyed what even to our liberty-loving time may well appear to be excess of freedom. In Sparta women were trained in masculine fashion, had their hair cut, were dressed like men, and at last became so coarse-fibered that even the highly valued Spartan vigor was suspected (in other parts of Greece) to have been carried too far, and the women of Athens shrugged disapproving shoulders at their manners, even although they still continued to engage Spartan nurses to train their children. Athens herself carried freedom for women to

great lengths in another direction. Restless, vain, pleasure-loving girls were allowed to join the ranks of hetæraë, or women comrades, apparently without rebuke and with small loss of social standing. The most reputable men of Athens brought their wives to Aspasia's house (although that lady was more than suspected of having had "a past"), in order that they might profit by her elevated conversation. The Greek so adored beauty and intellect that there was serious risk lest popular admiration for these qualities might overpower all other considerations. A recognition of this danger may be seen in the passing of a law which forbade the erecting of a statue in Athens to any woman of the hetæra class.¹

Romantic love, it is true, was not known to the Greeks, being a product of later, less vigorous times. The world in those days had not yet been feminized — had not yet had its heart broken. Therefore the especial functions of woman, to soothe, to comfort, to console, and to encourage, had not yet been so generally called for, and therefore were not so highly esteemed. In later times, when men, crushed and wearied out, came sorely to need her in these offices, they began in return to cast upon her that dreamy, sensuous idolatry of the sick man for his nurse. Thus the romantic

¹The popular determination to honor heroism was, however, so invincible that this law was on one occasion evaded. A certain hetæra, having been captured by the enemy, was put to death by torture for refusing to reveal the whereabouts of her lover. The Athenians, being forbidden by the law to raise a statue to her, erected instead in her honor the figure of a lioness.

movement originated, which later issued in the fantastic vanity of chivalry, the sentimentalism of Maryolatry, the madness of the crusades, and has hardly yet, even in these prosaic, commercial days, worked itself out of the human male.

Innocent of romantic love, the Greek yet manifested toward his womankind a loyal tenderness. For her benefit he established monogamy, while yet the polygamous Hebrew was rioting with troops of wives. Plato was so advanced an advocate of woman's rights that society has not yet caught up step with him. Even the conservative Aristotle urges a training for girls which should develop their free activities equally with their brothers. The Greek husband was the legal guardian of his wife and took over her fortune; but he was responsible to the State for her well-being, and if he divorced her he was obliged to return her dowry and to furnish her with alimony. Gulick says that any wife could obtain a divorce by submitting in person a written complaint to the archons.

The most popular of all the great religious festivals — the Eleusinian mysteries — dealt with the touching and beautiful story of the love of two women for each other, mother and daughter, Demeter and Persephone. A droll instance of Greek respect for womanhood is the fact that there was a shrine and counsel-house dedicated to an aged goddess, "the mother of the gods," wherein, as a delicate mark of respect to what might be presumed to be the tastes of an aged lady of her rank, no man was permitted to enter into the sanctuary who had

been eating onions. Could politeness toward the fair sex go further?

If we need further evidence of the esteem in which the Greek held women, we have but to recall the poetic creations in which he has embodied his delight in her. In *Andromache*, *Penelope*, the lovely *Nausicaa*, Homer paints for us exquisite types of women. The Greek dramatists have created characters like *Antigone*, *Iphigenia*, *Ismene*, which the world refuses to forget. Lastly, let us note that the Greek mythology lifted up into the heaven of the gods almost every conceivable variation of the eternally feminine. *Juno*, the majestic wife and mother, dignified, correct, and austere; *Diana*, the chaste, self-sufficient and virginal; *Venus*, the voluptuous and seductive; *Hebe*, the ministering angel; and, greatest of all, *Athena*, the wise woman, fully rounded, balanced, judicious, capable, strong-minded.¹ She it was who typified what the Athenian

¹ *Athena* was originally the personification of the clear, bright sky; hence she became identified with clear, bright intelligence. As they elaborated their conception of their patroness, the Athenians bestowed upon her different pet names corresponding to her various functions. As "*Pallas*" she was thought of as the goddess of war, victorious over Mars himself. As "*Engane*" she was the instructor in industry and skill in handicraft. She was said to have invented spinning and weaving, the flute, and the art of taming horses. Typifying the sudden appearance of intelligence in ripe brains, she was said to have been born full-grown and full-armed from the head of her father *Zeus*. As "*Polias*" she was the eagle-like goddess, fond of soaring among high places and the defender of citadels. As "*Nike*" she was the goddess of victory; as "*Hippia*" the tamer of horses; as "*Athena Hygeia*" she was the promoter of health. There were eight different ceremonies and festivals held annually in her honor in Athens.

believed to be the highest and best development of human nature.

Do we hold human life more precious?

We are told that in the ancient pagan world the individual was lightly regarded, since Christ had not as yet died for him, but now all men, high and low, are recognized to be equals in the sight of God and the individual has come to possess "infinite value."

"Human life more precious!" I am always at a loss to understand how this phrase can be so often reiterated. Let us examine two incidents, one from ancient and one from modern history.

In the darkest hour of national disaster Athens put to death six of her most able and valuable generals because they had neglected their duty and had allowed a dozen disabled vessels to sink (after the battle of Arginusæ) without making proper efforts to save the sailors on board of them. These generals had counted upon Athens being so rejoiced at their victory that no questions would be asked about the methods of securing it. Not so. Athens could not forgive — even in this time of need — the sufferings caused by selfish carelessness.

Let us turn now to an account of an occurrence which took place in the bay of New York on June 15, 1904. On that day thirteen hundred persons boarded the steamer *General Slocum* for a pleasure excursion around the bay. It was lovely weather; the children romped on deck; with the shores close at hand all thought of

fear was absent. The band struck up Luther's hymn, "Our God is a Mighty Fortress." Suddenly the steamer was discovered to be on fire, and before the officers had succeeded in running her ashore over one thousand persons, mostly women and children, had perished. The trial of those concerned in this occurrence established the following facts: The mate was an unlicensed iron-worker; the crew consisted of truck drivers, laborers, and dock men who were hired cheaply and who knew nothing about handling a ship. Most of them jumped overboard when the first alarm bell rang. The storeroom contained, against the law, hay and oil. The fire hose was made of two-thread linen without rubber lining; bought to deceive passengers. The life preservers were thirteen years old, were rotten, and filled with cork dust. Women and children who put them on sank to the bottom at once.

This disaster was caused by the parsimony of the steamer owners, by the neglect of inspectors, and by the carelessness of the population. Laws designed to prevent such occurrences had been on the statute-books for thirty-four years without being obeyed. Thirty-six hundred lives had been previously lost during twenty years within the jurisdiction of a government inspection service which cost the people three hundred and sixty-nine thousand dollars annually. No one was punished at all for this occurrence, except the captain, who, of all concerned, was perhaps least to blame.

Let me, however, be quite candid. Did the Greeks never show a disregard for human life? Alas! when we

read of the manner in which slaves were tortured in the Greek fishing industries, we are driven to confess that our horror at such cruelties almost overcomes our admiration for that people. Here, we must admit, was a form of cruelty which the world to-day has outgrown; at least we may reassure ourselves in the conviction that the softening of heart and manners which Christianity has conferred will no longer permit such outrages. Strangers, we read, the homeless and friendless, the poor, shipwrecked mariners, and others who were unable to offer resistance, were lured on board fishing-boats upon the promise of high wages and there treated with inhuman cruelty, until, when their strength was exhausted, they were set ashore to starve, or else thrown overboard. When, by reason of these practises becoming known, it became difficult any longer to lure men with fair promises, the captains boldly had recourse to force, seizing any poor wretches they could find, drugging them and throwing them into the boats, where, upon awakening, they were whipped into submission. These practises, it is deplorable to have to confess, were continued for many years, and constituted, no doubt, a foul blot upon the fame of even an early and unchristianized civilization like that of Greece. Greece, did I say? Stop a moment. My notes have become jumbled. I have made a mistake. It was not Greece I should have said, but Maryland; not 500 B.C., but 1905 A.D. Let me look further. Yes, here is the report!

"The death of three longshoremen on an oyster dredge near Deal Island, Maryland, has led to the startling discovery that

a veritable system of white slavery prevails in the oyster business in the upper waters of the Chesapeake Bay."

The Philadelphia *Press* has collected volumes of evidence to show that methods of "shanghaiing" unfortunates who haunt the river fronts of Philadelphia and New York — and even raw immigrants landing at those ports — are in practise on the Chesapeake. The Philadelphia *Telegraph* declares that these tales of brutality and murder have been told for years. The governor of Maryland, Mr. Warfield, has declared that these barbarities are of long standing and have cost the State "*more than three thousand lives.*" The Philadelphia *Enquirer* remarks:

"This sort of thing has been going on for many years. Outrages, cruelties, murders, constitute the normal life aboard a Chesapeake oyster dredge. Marshal Langhammer reports that numbers of impressed, half-starved, battered, maltreated seamen who have escaped have come to him asking him for assistance, justice, and revenge. 'The stories I have heard from those poor wretches,' says the marshal, 'have been heart-rending.' The men have been starved, overworked, threatened, beaten, whipped, and finally cast ashore without being paid the wages agreed upon."

It is further alleged that the State is powerless to suppress this iniquity because of the political influence wielded by the capitalists in the oyster business. This is Christian America, not pagan Athens, of which we speak.

Greater regard for human life! It is estimated that one hundred thousand operatives are killed or injured annually in our factories.¹

¹In 1899 the New York Bureau of Labor reported, from incomplete returns, 1822 accidents to factory workers for three months in indus-

All our improved modern machinery is attended by enormous loss of life. We pay in human blood for our conveniences, and seemingly think them worth the cost. Ten thousand persons are killed on the railways each year. In the ten years ending in 1903, seventy-eight thousand persons lost their lives on American railroads. One out of every eleven employees is injured; one in every 137 is killed. Every day's newspaper contains accounts of the needless loss of human life. We remember the six hundred women and children destroyed in a Chicago theater; the poor tenants burning in fire-trap tenements, the deaths in tinder-box hotels, and in collapsible buildings. It has been demonstrated that a slow destruction of life is going on all the time through adulterated foods (as "embalmed" beef) and poisonous preservatives. In the dangerous trades we sacrifice life without mercy, in match factories, white lead manufacture, mining, furnace stoking, fur trimming, underground work at high pressure, glass blowing, tunneling, etc.

Human life sacred!

Nine thousand murders and homicides are committed in the United States every year and the rate is steadily tries employing about one-half of the workers of the State. This ratio, obviously far below the actual facts, showed 14,576 accidents in the year. Even cutting this figure in two, in order to allow for possible error, we have the total for the United States of more than 116,000 factory employees killed or injured annually. Was chattel slavery more fatal?

The Interstate Commerce Commission gives for 1903 the number of persons killed on railways of the United States, 9840; injured, 76,553. The daily average was 27 killed and 210 injured. In the preceding years since 1897 there were 55,167 persons killed and 367,107 injured. Was feudalism much more deadly?

increasing. An article on "American Lawlessness," by S. S. McClure (*McClure's Magazine*, 1904), gives the following figures compiled by the *Chicago Tribune*. In 1881 there was one murder or homicide to every 40,000 inhabitants; in 1902 it was one in every 19,000. In 1881, 24 persons out of every million were murdered; now 112 out of every million meet this fate. Crimes against life are more common in the United States than in any nation of Europe—*except Russia!* There are eight times as many murders in Chicago as in Paris, a city much larger and supposedly wicked, and six times as many as in London!

But what of infanticide? it will be asked. Did not the Greeks deliberately destroy weakly and deformed infants? One of the triumphs with which Christianity is surely to be credited is that it has cured the world of this dreadful vice of infanticide!

Alas, no! Infanticide is in constant practise among us. From 1894 to 1900 in the United States there were 1891 infanticides *known to the records*; how many more tiny lives were secretly snuffed out in darkness and shame, only an all-seeing eye could count.¹

We can enumerate four motives for this act.

¹It is one of our commonest delusions to believe that when we have passed a law against a thing that we have thereby abolished it. An offense which has been made illegal may lessen in frequency, but its immorality when it *is* committed is thereafter greater than before, for the sin offends then not only natural but also human law. It gains in quality what it loses in quantity. Laws against crime are society's "good resolutions,"—the sort of things with which it is said—by those presumably who know—that hell is paved.

I. Infanticide may be induced by the pressure of over-population, as in some parts of China and India, where parents who are barely able to keep body and soul together, and have no means by which they can escape the constant menace of famine, choose death rather than slow starvation for their offspring.

II. Infanticide is induced by fear of disgrace in countries where marriage laws are strict and where, therefore, offspring begotten out of wedlock endanger the worldly prospects of the parents.

III. Infanticide may be practised by morbid, degenerate persons who have come to regard life with distaste, and who are unwilling to add to their burdens the horror of more responsibility.

IV. Certain infants may be destroyed deliberately by intelligent persons who sincerely believe that the weeding out of the sickly, feeble, and deformed is a mercy to them and a contribution to the improvement of the human stock, and who conscientiously hold that their private affections should and must be sacrificed for the good of the State and the future of their race. Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of this policy, of its morality, as compared with the other motives, there can be no doubt.

Infanticide through nervous dread of inconvenience is pure selfishness; infanticide from fear of the discovery of sin is the act of cowardice; infanticide induced by fear of starvation is pitiful; infanticide for the purpose of improving the health and vigor of the human race is, at least, rational.

As far as we know, the last was the chief and perhaps the only motive followed by the Greeks. Intelligent selection alone actuated them. They were not driven by the pressure of population. The fear of disgrace was not present since offspring born out of wedlock were not visited with the ignominy which is bestowed on them in modern times. Finally, the morbid motive was not operative since the Greek was full of the joy of life and duty was not a nightmare.

Since, then, the Greeks practised infanticide almost exclusively in the case of weakly and deformed children, and since, as they were a particularly vigorous race, the number of weakly and deformed children born was probably not large, is it not fair to suppose that under all these conditions the practise of infanticide was rare?

There are many ways besides direct ones of taking life.

England, as we know, regards the Greek form of infanticide with horror, yet in England there die every year one hundred and fifty thousand infants from the effects of bad milk. Wholesale infanticide of this sort takes place under an economic system upheld by Church and State.

"To save hundreds upon thousands of infant lives down here," said a doctor at the London Hospital, "what we want is not drugs, but pure milk. In the hot months the babies die like flies from the contamination of the milk supply, and we are powerless."

Dr. H. Kenwood, medical health officer for Stoke Newington, in his annual report for 1905, remarked,

"If the death-rate among calves were only one-half that which prevails among infants, the British farmer would soon have to give up entirely the business of rearing cattle."

There are three hundred thousand married women working in factories in Germany who average seventeen hours of labor a day, eleven in the factory and six at home at domestic work. In addition to this they are expected to rear children. They age soon; anemic, apathetic, they fade away and end their lives mostly as invalids, a burden to the community.

The infant mortality in Germany averages 20.7 per cent., but in the manufacturing centers of Saxony it rises to 49.3 per cent., — "a figure," remarks the New York *Evening Post*, "which, to put it plainly, accuses of wholesale murder."¹

Child labor is a form of infanticide. It is reported that child labor in the United States is increasing (1905) steadily and rapidly in spite of the protests of philanthropists and trade-unions. Nor is it confined to the South. In Pennsylvania little girls of thirteen work all night in mills, spending the midnight lunch hour in the society of men and boys.

A greater regard for human life, supposed to be the

¹ No atrocities in history were more revolting than the massacres of the Jews in Russia to-day. No monsters of cruelty ever cursed the world who were more depraved than the officials of that Christian country. If we turn to more civilized western Europe we find in the person of Leopold of Belgium a monarch probably never surpassed in any age for cold-blooded infamy.

chief mark of our moral advance, would be demonstrated could we point to the abolition, or at the least decrease, of war; but, in fact, two thousand years of Christian teaching have passed without war having been thereby either abolished or even diminished. A list of the wars fought by England during the reign of Victoria shows the game of war to have been almost continuous. The United States, the youngest and supposedly the most advanced of nations, has fought five wars in the single century of its existence. The implements of war are daily becoming more deadly, while the hope once entertained that their absolute deadliness would one day put an end to war has been abandoned. President Emeritus Eliot of Harvard University, in a speech before the Quill Club, is reported as saying:

"We thought that the advent of long-range guns would prevent hand-to-hand conflicts; but only this horrible difference has been found that while the troops using them cannot, it is true, get together in the daytime, they do *attack at night*. We may think that we have advanced beyond past centuries, but if we look back we shall find that the nineteenth century, was the bloodiest of all modern cycles."

It is true that we no longer carry off into slavery the women and children of the men whom we have conquered in battle, nor do we countenance the slaying of prisoners, or the despoilment of the enemy's property. Nevertheless it is not for a moment to be supposed that we have abandoned the main purpose of war (which is the accumulation of spoils for ourselves at the expense of others), or have renounced the practise of making war, if we can, a paying enterprise. We have merely

altered our methods, and we now accomplish the enslavement of the conquered through a war indemnity in preference to using chain and whip. We utilize banking-houses rather than shambles, and cut off men's living rather than their ears or heads. We avoid executions and massacres and deal in long-term, interest-bearing bonds. But though our manners and methods have by so much become (with occasional lapses) more civilized, the fact remains that our spirit and intention have not changed. We still do not settle our disputes by reason; we still continue to make war for the same old purposes, namely: to injure, to kill, to despoil, and to enrich ourselves at the expense of those weaker than we.

In the pursuits of peace the same facts are to be noted. Compared with former splenetic, blood-spilling periods of history, men are to-day relatively cool, calculating, quiet. They are not so much given to knifing their enemies in street brawls as to undermining their competitors in quiet offices. Then they stole one another's blood, now they steal one another's livelihood. Then they slew, now they ruin. Fashions change, even in crime, and the preference in our day is for commercial rather than physical strife. Nevertheless, whether men use as weapons the bludgeon or the check-book, the end is the same: they still destroy one another. Still runs on the stream of wrong, still flows the tide of man's inhumanity to man, still do the countless thousands mourn.

Nor is this all. Not only have we failed to cure our-

selves of the old faults, we have discovered and invented some entirely new and subtle vices. Professor Ross, writing in the *Atlantic* for May, 1905, on "New Varieties of Sin," points out that our complex civilization is developing certain forms of wrong-doing quite unknown in simpler ages; wrongs not gross, direct, bloody, personal, but indirect, impersonal, clean-handed, and committed "in the name of business." The injury which is latent in the adulterated loaf, the rotten tenement, the crazy hulk, "passes into that vague mass, the 'public,' and is lost to view," and hence it eludes our blame. The New Unrighteousness enjoys a great advantage over the old. Since it is entirely without malice, hateth no man, and pursues its ends in the service of the great god, Business, how is it possible to visit upon it the same reproach which we have been accustomed to bestow upon the old crimes that were inspired by personal malignity? How can society be expected to take the pains or use the patience necessary to pursue the evil through the many indirect and devious ways which it now follows? Accustomed only to the coarser diagnosis of tangible crime, society is too preoccupied to perceive as yet the truth that boodling is on a par with piracy, that blackmail is highway robbery, that the sale of a vote is treason, that railroad discrimination is conspiracy, that adulteration is homicide, that (for instance) the drugging of soothing sirups, the making of offal into sausages, and the crowding of tenements are, in a new form, the ancient offense of child murder.

A physician who should urge the claim for his science that it had conferred great benefit upon mankind might fairly be asked to name the diseases which, through it, had been stamped out or practically abolished. Is it less fair to ask of a great moral system that it enumerate what vices and evil conduct it has succeeded in overcoming?¹ Answering this test, what could we report after two thousand years? Though the Greeks had mastered the very gist and pith of the moral life — the *will to be good* — they had not succeeded in ridding themselves altogether of many forms of human frailty. Surely we, who have become “more moral” by the aid of a great new law of conduct, will have conquered many of these evil tendencies, and will be able to point to some vices which we have utterly stamped out! Which are these? Has mankind cured itself yet of lying, swindling, adultery, fornication; has it ceased to indulge in slander, arson, murder, lechery; does it no longer practise drunkenness, gluttony, gambling, abuse, betrayal,

¹ American optimism is incorrigible. Optimism often springs from kindly good nature and personal contentment; sometimes it arises from ignorance of present facts; most often it springs from a lack of historical knowledge and the absence of a standard of measurement. We like to believe what is pleasant and it is possible to extract exceedingly sunny views of our own progress from judiciously chosen comparisons of ourselves with Zulus and wild men of Borneo, etc. Our manners may be also advantageously compared with those of Tamerlane or Nero. Optimism likes to overlook Salem witchcraft and dwell with horror upon the Spanish inquisition. It plumes itself upon its freedom of thought contrasted with the ages of religious persecution, quite forgetting that there was once an age and a people to whom religious persecution would have been unthinkable.

meanness, cruelty? Alas, no! There is not a single vice, crime, fault known to the perverse heart of man which we do not still practise, not a single defect of character, not a trait of ignobility, which has been erased finally and forever from the catalogue of human frailty.

We are not making moral progress because we are on the wrong track.

Again, it is urged that out of evil shall come good.¹

Our society is said to be "working its way up" toward something; it is in a "process of becoming"; it is in "the birth throes of a new order"; it is developing "a new social consciousness"; it is becoming a "social organism"; its chaos is the prelude to the creating of "a new synthesis"; its anarchy is but the opening preparations for a new "Brotherhood of man." All these phrases are resorted to; — instead of the simple statement that we are not making moral progress, we are not on the right track. We have lost our way.

But it will be urged that surely we have made some moral progress. What of the growth of human kindness, of generosity, philanthropy, charity; what of the vast sums poured out to relieve distress, what of the asylums, almshouses, homes, houses of refuge, idiot

¹ Concerning this notion Prof. William James ("Varieties of Religious Experience") has this to say: "The Greeks had not any such desire to save the credit of the universe as to make them insist, as so many of us insist, that what appears immediately as evil must be 'good in the making,' — or something equally ingenious. Good was good, and bad just bad for the Greeks."

institutions, insane wards, epileptic colonies, hospitals?¹ I shall be asked:

"Could your boasted Greek civilization point to such a showing as this?"

"It could not."

"Well, then, have we not made progress since that heathen age?"

"The Greeks had no almshouses because they had no paupers; they built no asylums for the insane because they had almost no insane to put in them. I see your great hospitals, asylums, institutions, so substantial, so comfortable, so humane; but where did you get the army of miserables to put in them? Whence came these hordes of sick, deformed, inebriate, diseased, epileptic, idiot, insane? You have first

¹ America seems to believe herself to possess the virtue of generosity, by right of discovery. What a chorus of self-praise did she set up after her donations to the San Francisco sufferers! Any one would have supposed that extending a helping hand to fellow creatures in misfortune was an American invention, like the telephone. Elemental humanity is, however, not the discovery of the citizens of the United States. When the earthquake at ancient Rhodes occurred, Hiero and Gelon of Syracuse sent \$95,000 in money and exempted the vessels of the Rhodians from import duties. Ptolemy of Egypt gave 250,000 bushels of grain, 10,000 pounds of bronze coin and large quantities of timber and hemp. Antigonus of Meceles contributed \$100,000 in money and great supplies of iron, timber, tar, and pitch.

The greatest physician of his day was employed by the city of Athens to give his services free to the people; and for this he was paid a salary larger than was paid to the chief military commander,—and this in a military civilization. One may perhaps mention another little act of civic kindness. A poor person in need of shelter could always sleep in any of the club buildings, of which there were three hundred in Athens.

driven them mad in your competitive maelstrom, you have poisoned them with bad air, bad water, bad food. You have permitted them to trample upon one another in their struggle for bread. You have allowed monsters of wealth to fatten upon the fruits of their industry. You have not used intelligence. You have not planned your society well. You have never organized it. You have not looked after the health of your people; you are not growing a fine and hardy race. You allow them to kill themselves with work and worry; you do not see to it that the wealth which they produce is justly and fairly distributed. You are not bringing order into your generation; you have no plan of progress, no moral or religious code which is demonstrating its power to bring bodily health to your people, genius and art and joy to their minds, or peace to their hearts."

But I shall not be let off so easily in an examination of moral progress. This age is very sure of its moral superiority and has had some very subtle flatterers at its ear. Among the ablest as well as the sincerest of these was the late Thomas Hill Green. In his "Prolegomena to Ethics," Green compares Greek and Christian ideals of morality. The comparison briefly condensed is as follows:

To the Greeks the ideal man was one who feels in his heart the will-to-be-good, and who in the application of that will makes himself useful to society. The basis of goodness, according to Aristotle, is "the desire for what is beautiful or noble." Green's statement is:

"The essential forms of the will-to-be-good are the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to be brave and temperate, to take for one's self and to give to others not what one is inclined, but what is due."¹

Acknowledging that the Greeks mapped out the chief features of the moral life, it is contended that Christian doctrine *added* to these a new content, having its roots in a personal relation and accompanied by a wider functioning of the conscience. Christianity has developed a new morality in mankind, and this in two respects:

I. Through Christ, man has developed a new, personal, intimate relation to God.

II. In the expansion of society, the new complexity of relationship is making a more varied demand upon his will-to-be-good, and is thus unfolding new possibilities in his moral nature.

Although the Greek experienced warmly the will-to-be-good, yet he knew of no loving Father or atoning Saviour for whose sake his will-to-be-good was to be exercised; nor, on the other hand, were there half as many directions, half as many poor people, sick people, stupid people within his ken, on whom his determination to be good could be wreaked. He had no Saviour to be good *for*, and he had no slums to be good *to*. This was his misfortune.

It is this, according to many, which constitutes the new and precious element in the moral life of the Chris-

¹ Greek morality, Green reminds us again, was free from debasement by any notion of a compensation to be furnished in the pleasure of another world.

tian world. Man's heart, it is said, has been touched; the love-motive now controls him. He no longer pursues beauty or truth for their own sakes, but for their relation to the infinite Being with whom his soul is in communion. He is no longer bent upon knowing "things as they are," but upon knowing them in their relation to God and so through God to himself. God is the medium through whom he relates himself to the universe. He no longer looks nature straight in the face, but sees her as Perseus did the Medusa head, reflected in a divine shield.

This "God-consciousness" which is held so to have enriched human experience, and enlarged the human soul, is a concept which, though it has undoubtedly brought man much comfort in his perplexed career, has yet been fraught with danger, and has again and again led his steps astray. This is because it had no objective validity, but has always been the reflection of man's own mind thrown upon a magnified screen. Each age has created afresh its creator in its own image. Each generation, with touching ingenuousness, announces the existence of a Supreme Being who possesses the particular qualities which at the moment seem to it to be the most desirable. The fashion in Supreme Beings changes almost from year to year. The God of my father was, for example, a much more strict and even cruel tyrant than was the genial and kindly Being I was told of. The fashion for ogres was just passing when I was born; and people were turning to a more easy-going and tolerant Supreme Ruler with

all that sense of relief with which one discards tight shoes for comfortable slippers, or doffs high, starched collars when the warm spring days come.

Some of the bygone fashions seem very strange to our eyes. Thus the monk of the Middle Ages prayed and starved in a cell to please a God who had a predilection for pale, lean, hungry mortals of pure and meager habit. A few years later the pale ascetic donned helmet and armor and, mounting his prancing steed, rode gallantly away to the sound of martial music, into the din of battle, to please a God who loved warriors and delighted in them that kill. It is thus evident that God is as various as the men who conceive him, since one continuous and permanent God could not possibly regard with equal benignity the opposite types who invoke him in succeeding ages. He is even called upon to change his character by persons on opposing sides of the same quarrel, as when the British army, for example, confident that the God of the Christian world was with them, came up with the Boer farmers on the field of battle and found them singing hymns, Bible in hand, to the same God, equally confident that he would not desert them, since, as they piteously reminded him again and again, he was "a righteous God." The Puritan worshiped a stern God who practised harsh virtues; the God of the Roman emperors was an emperor, a resplendent potentate in crown and scepter; the Jehovah of the Hebrews was a war-god, fierce, grim, aquiline, with vengeance in his heart and a mind gloomy and vindictive. The God of the persecuted and desperate

early Christians was a timid, gentle being, who forgave his enemies and turned a meek other cheek to persecutors. A monogamic God rules in most states, but in Utah there is a God who favors polygamy.

Then the modern world must have a God in agony. "Men who suffer," says Renan, "wish their gods to suffer with them."¹

The God of each age and people is a being who personifies their secret belief in their own inmost desires, and thus man manages somehow, in spite of all, to follow the devices of his own heart. His eyes have been turned inward for centuries until he has given up even the wish to see "things as they are." The Greeks were the only people who looked the universe *straight in the face*. Like eagles they could gaze into the sun. We have looked inward so long that we can no more see the Light which shines in the distance, beckoning us to come on. The Greeks saw it. *They saw something which we have lost sight of*. They were fairly running

¹The attainment of monotheism is often adduced as a proof of progress, but it may be questioned whether men have really adopted monotheism. Since they continue to worship at heart all the old gods of wealth, power, war, love, pleasure, it seems that they are still polytheists, having merely added one more god to the long list—a god of pity, who, since pity is what the modern world sorely needs, has become the favorite nominal deity.

It is true that circumstances led the ancient Hebrew to favor a system of monotheism. Outwardly he saw one thing—the desert; inwardly he saw one—himself. The Semitic mind is insensitive to nature. "To the Semites," writes Renan, "nature is not alive. Nature plays no part in the Semitic religions, which are metaphysical. The Semitic mind lacks diversity, lacks the plastic arts, lacks mythology, lacks political life. In monotheism there is no variety."

toward it. There is no other way to account for the tremendous speed of their progress.¹ They looked outward and they saw something.

The second ground for believing in man's moral progress, according to Green, is "a practical conviction of the brotherhood of all men, of equality of men before God, such as was impossible to the Greek, which brings with it for us a new standard of justice."

How can any one seriously believe this? Never were race antagonisms more apparent than now. The Greek scorn for the barbarian of his time was no whit stronger than John Bull's contempt for Zulu savages to-day. Never did the Greek overpower inferior races with less compunction than Great Britain showed when she mowed down ten thousand natives with her machine guns at Omdurman, while never was treachery toward the weak more lightly condoned than when Funston in the Philippines captured Aguinaldo through a contemptible trick. The negro has been held in slavery until recently, on purely race grounds, in the United States, and negroes are almost daily lynched there still; while all over the world the idea of brotherhood is as yet still but a dream. Economic equality, which must be the basis of all other equality worth the name, so far from approaching, is receding from us every day. The gulf between rich and poor, widening every year, is

¹ Mr. Lowes Dickinson ("The Greek View of Life") says: "At whatever cost it was done, the fact remains that the Greeks actually did achieve a higher and more complete individual than has been even approached by any other age."

swallowing up the hope of a fraternal order, whose foundation wall must be laid level before the structure of a great State can be built.

Is it true, again, that complexity of social relations constitutes in itself a proof of progress? The argument is plausible. It is conceivable that the more little brothers and sisters are born into a boy's family, the more individuals there are with whom he has got to get along somehow, the more there are whom he may be good to, and practise generosity and other juvenile virtues upon, and hence the more his character is likely to develop. This is the theory. We know that the solitary hermit cut off from human intercourse is morally atrophied. We argue that since human intercourse is necessary to develop men's moral nature, that therefore it follows that the more intercourse they have the more moral they become; and it is just at this point that the argument comes a cropper. It is true that the society of two or three brothers and sisters is better for a child than to live alone, it is also true that if he is given several hundred brothers and sisters, as is the case in large public institutions, the child most generally dies. It is with human relationships as with everything else; the rule is, "Nothing too much." Therefore it is not true that the greater the complexity of social relationships, the more man's soul necessarily develops. The more persons a man is related to, the more there are, it is true, to call out his charity, patience, pity, honesty, etc.; on the other hand, also the more there are to call out his impatience, dishonesty, vindictive-

ness. Living in crowds may develop moral heroes; it may also develop moral maniacs. Hurlled together in a whirlpool, men may learn to love one another; but they also learn to hate one another with the fury of exhausted sympathies and the fever of irritated nerves. Lavish charities show that human intercourse calls out our pity; the growing number of murders and homicides proves that human intercourse calls out exasperation and aversion. Social intercourse calls out kindness; it also calls out antipathy. By living together men learn to esteem one another; they also learn to loathe one another. Complex relations with our fellows may awaken dormant virtues; it may also rouse evil impulses which, if they were let alone, might fade altogether from the troubled human consciousness.

A "larger range of persons" on whom to exercise the will-to-be-good may or may not contribute to human progress. Like the more things upon which the world prides itself, its benefit depends upon how much of it can be assimilated. The mere bringing of more and more classes into a theoretic pale of equality has no value whatever in itself. Moral growth depends upon the nature of the relationship, upon whether or not the newcomers are made really brothers or not, whether they are, with us, organized into a useful, noble, and sane society! It is not the tumbling together of vast masses of humanity into loosely formed bodies, where they operate mainly to get in one another's way, to irritate, confuse, and prey upon one another, that conduces to moral growth.

Let us turn now to a still more desperate apologist. Mackenzie ("Manual of Ethics") says:

"... It is sometimes difficult to determine whether we have morally advanced or receded. If in some respects our actions seem more trustworthy . . . in other respects we seem to have grown more selfish and dishonest than men ever were before. It is only when we pass from the actions of individuals to the consideration of the principles on which men are expected to act, the codes of virtue and ideals of duty which have grown up among us, that we gain *any firm assurance of progress.*" (!)

Then it is not, after all, behavior that determines morality, but "codes"! No matter that conduct may be no better if only our "principles" have advanced! Never mind if our behavior is questionable, so long as our "ideals" are irreproachable! Surely this is extraordinary reasoning! But let us be quite fair to the theory. We may indeed admit that the preliminary step toward the attainment of higher conduct may be the conviction that present practise is wrong. We must, it is true, first see and confess our sin and set up a new code before moral improvement can be expected of us, just as, if we are standing still and wish to walk, we must first lift one foot into the air before we can take a step forward. This is all very true, but while the preliminary movement no doubt is necessarily the lifting of the foot into the air, it is equally true that until the foot is brought down again and the body brought up to it *the forward step has not been taken.* Thus a people who have adopted a religion of love and equality, or other ideal code, which they do not live up to, can be said, it

is true, to have lifted their foot into the air preliminary to making moral advance, but so long as their conduct contradicts their professions, and their lives give the lie direct to their creeds, they have not taken the step. Indeed, standing as they do with one foot poised in mid-air, not only have they not made moral progress, but their attitude has become more ridiculous and more unstable than that of their less sophisticated forbears who did not attempt to create an impression of progress by waving a pedal extremity in space, but who stood where they were squarely on both feet.

We forget that the essence of morality lies not in the codes men profess, but in the act of making their conduct tally with their ideals and professions, whatever these may be, and that immorality, on the other hand, consists in maintaining a discrepancy between our behavior and what we know to be, and openly profess to be, right. A people, for instance, which should practise slavery, attended by the utmost cruelty, two thousand long years after it had learned that slavery was in direct violation of its most sacred doctrine of human brotherhood; that the institution was an insult to the loving Saviour who it professed to believe had died to save it from sin; that the institution denied the spirit and the letter of his teaching, and was, by every article of his code, a base and wicked practise, — such a people is ten times more immoral than one acknowledging no such religion, since it outrages and poisons its own conscience thereby, and to the old sin of inhumanity it superadds hypocrisy, that sin which is

the particular discovery and invention of the modern world.¹


Why do we continue to deceive ourselves? Why are we misled by names? Why are we so determined — against evidence — to believe in our superiority? Why do we cling so desperately to that poetic phrase about the “increasing purpose through the ages”?

There is no purpose, either benevolent or evil, running through the ages; nor is there any force making for human advance other than the intelligence and day-by-day determination of human beings. Neither is there any fixed law decreeing the rise of species. Man may have risen from the ape; also the ape may be a degenerate man. Men are headed ape-ward quite as frequently as angel-ward. Time runs an elevator which goes both ways, down as well as up.

Whether or not man shall ever advance another step onward depends entirely upon himself. It depends upon his seeing himself as he is, and upon his making the conscious effort to improve his own species.

Why are we so afraid of the truth? Why not face it squarely? This might not prove so painful as many think; and it might lead to new views and the turning into new and more promising paths.

¹Ruskin has written: “I know of no previous instance in history of a nation’s establishing a systematic disobedience to the first principles of its professed religion.”



CHAPTER IV

PROGRESS MEASURED BY MYSTICISM

IF water which has been frozen into ice could describe its changed state it might soliloquize as follows:

"I feel much stronger and more solid than I used to. I do not feel active and fluid. I have no desire to run about wherever there is an opening. I prefer to remain on one spot, to keep myself intact and to freeze everything that comes near me. I am cold and hard."

The block of ice would express in this soliloquy the state of mind consequent upon excessive confinement to narrow and sordid pursuits. We all know that there are such types of mind, and the terms, "hard," "cold," "icy," are freely applied to them.

Even as water may be frozen into ice, so also by the application of sufficient heat it may be made to pass into another and quite different form, that of steam. A mind also, while it may be chilled to zero temperature by self-interest or ill treatment and congeal into ice, may also, on the other hand, if subjected to heat of sufficient intensity, pass up into what one may call thought-steam.

If steam were to become suddenly conscious, it might soliloquize as follows:

"A wonderful lightness has come over me; I yearn to rise, to mount to the skies, to expand over all space, growing finer and finer until I lose myself in the universe. I dislike separation, isolation, solidity, I despise the solid lump which I was when men called me ice, and, scarcely less, the dead level, commonplace water which was my native condition. Now I have wings, I soar, I yearn, I feel that I came from some higher and more ethereal sphere, I long to return to that vast element which is my home. Separation from it is pain. If I am repressed I feel ready to burst. Continually I am animated by a longing to fuse with the elemental, to lose myself in the infinite."

By these tropes I wish to convey my notion of what happens when the mind of man becomes emotionally overheated and passes into thought-steam. Thought-steam is commonly known as mysticism.

The song of mysticism is pitched in varying keys and uttered in diverse tongues; but there are a few well-marked features which never fail to signalize it. It is the expression of a certain mental lightness or aspiration, an uplift, an upward impulse, a curious sensation of attenuation and diffused vagueness. Its chief characteristic is invariably the idea of fusion, of melting into something. Thus the mystic will tell you that he yearns to attain "the ultimate reality," or "the divine essence of the infinite"; he longs to unite himself to the "first cause," or "to lose himself in the eternal," or to do something else which he indicates by large, vast

phrases, describing indefinite, elemental aspirations. Two features are most prominent in this infinite something: its vastness and its oneness.

"The leading idea of the mystic," says Prof. Andrew Seth, "is that of a supreme, all-pervading, and indwelling power, in whom all things are one. Mysticism maintains the possibility of direct intercourse with this being by a species of ecstatic transfusion in which the individual becomes partaker of the divine nature. To the mystic, God ceases to be an object and becomes an experience. In the writings of the mystics ingenuity exhausts itself in inventing phrases to express the closeness of this union. Mysticism is penetrated by the thought of an alienation from and yet implicit oneness with the divine. These are the two poles on which all mystic speculation and practise revolve. All relations tend to become unreal for the mystic, except that between himself and God."

Wilfred Monod ("II Vit") gives the following picture of the mystic state:

"Oh, new and blessed life! . . . Always the same presence is filling my heart. . . . The Lord is with me. I feel the pressure of his hand, I feel something else which fills me with serene joy; shall I dare—dare to speak it out? Yes, for it is what I truly experience. The Holy Spirit is not merely making me a visit; it is a permanent habitation. He can depart only if he takes me with him. More than that; he is no other than myself; it is a sort of fusion, he is *one* with me."

Bonaventura, in the same vein, runs riot in his efforts to describe his "union with God."

The popular hymn runs:

"Rivers to the ocean run,
Nor stay in all their course;
Fire, ascending, seeks the sun,
Both speed them to their source;

So a soul that's born of God
 Pants to view his glorious face,
 Upward tends to his abode
 To rest in his embrace."

St. Bernard says:

"As the little water-drop poured into a large measure of wine seems to lose its own nature entirely and take on both the taste and the color of wine — so must all human feelings toward the Holy One be self-dissolved and wholly transfused into the will of God. For how shall God be all in all if anything of man remain in man?"

Thomas à Kempis ("Imitation of Christ") exclaims, "O Thou most pure Lover, Thou Lord of all creations, O that I had the wings of liberty that I might fly away and rest in Thee!"¹

¹"To some observers, one may remark, all mysticism has a sexual origin. Professor James, among others, rejects this theory on the ground that all states of mind are, in the last analysis, neurally conditioned. Nordau describes mysticism as a sudden perception of a hidden meaning in things, and he accounts for it by declaring that it originates in the abundant, uncompleted associations which arise in a degenerate brain. These give to the person a vague and vast sense of something leading further, but awaken no definite or useful consequent in his thought. Wernicke explains the mystic state as arising from a laming of the association organ.

The trances of Socrates were mystical, Plato is sometimes called the fountainhead of mysticism. Mystic also was the "vision" of Plotinus, the vision of Porphyry, the conversion of Paul, the aurora of Behmen, the illumination of Swedenborg.

Emerson, our Yankee mystic, writes ("The Over-Soul"): "Within man is the soul of the whole — the eternal One. And this deep power in which we exist and whose beatitude is all accessible to us is not only self-sufficing and perfect, but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object, are one. . . . There is a shudder of awe and delight when the individual soul mingles with

Tauler's words are: "I have a power in my soul which enables me to perceive God. I am as certain as that I live that nothing is so near to me as God. He is nearer to me than I am to myself. It is part of His very essence that He should be near and present in me." St. Augustine declares, "God made us for Himself and our hearts are restless until they repose in Him." Fichte also asserts, "An insight into the absolute unity of human existence with the divine is the profoundest knowledge that man can attain."

Notice the peculiarities of the mystic vision. In general it looks over beyond things into a sea of pure being in which they float. "The subject and the object are one." It declares that black is and white is, hence they both are and therefore there is no difference between them. It tries not to distinguish them; it sees them preferably blurred and vague and running together as eyes do that look through tears. It suffuses the world with feeling and sees it through a liquid, flowing medium as though it were peering through water [or gas. All things are equally good, all are the same. In short, in mystic states reason abdicates and pure indeterminate feeling floods the consciousness.¹

the universal soul." Emerson speaks further of "the tide of being which floats us into the secret of nature," and of "the fire, vital, consecrating, celestial, which burns until it shall dissolve all things into the waves and surges of an ocean of light."

¹The most astonishing mystic of our day is undoubtedly our own Walt Whitman, who passed his entire life in an unbroken mystic rapture, who never got anything in focus and never saw any object or person, nor did ever attempt to see any object or person as it is, but viewed

Mysticism is pure religious feeling with the ethics left out. All religious thought tends to soar into mysticism, as heated water tends to pass into steam, and the offices and services of the Church are designed by various forms of emotional incitement to provide the necessary heat. Litanies, liturgies, sacred music are so many flames lighted beneath the expectant soul; the solemn atmosphere of a church, the pictured windows, the twinkling lights, the roll of organ tones, the swell of song, the strange intoning of the priest, the peal of belfry bells, the hushed demeanor of devotees, the bowed heads and kneeling forms, the yearning prayers, the fervid exhortations, the wrestling of the sinful spirit, the struggle of doctrinal argument, the appeal to love, the dread of misfortune, the fear of death, the cry for mercy, the horror of damnation, the veiled threats of the preacher alternating with his proffered hope of eternal bliss — one and all of these are calculated to stir the emotions of the hearers and thus by friction may be communicated the heat that literally “converts” the mind into thought-steam which ascends forthwith and melts into the vague indefinite.

Now, whether Wernicke is right or not in saying that mysticism arises from a laming of the associative organ, there is no doubt that it bears sometimes a pathological

all creation as whirling in a vast streaming maelstrom, a phantasmagoria of pure feeling, benevolent, expansive, capacious, impressional, — the sublimated genius of good-will and inaccuracy, the blind eye combined with the warm heart. An elemental creature as near a tree as man, a loafer-saint, a patriarchal vagabond filled with cheerful acceptance (as genial as a bullfrog’s) and of antediluvian indolence.

aspect. In the first place it requires that the eye of the mind be dimmed, that a blur (if not a cataract) be set up between the outlook of reason and the external world. Man must cease all effort to see things as they are, and must behold them as if in a dream. He must shun the light of the sun, and haunt the shadowy caves and moon-lighted caverns of his inner dwelling-place. The mystic is less capable of progress than is the egotist. The egotist knows nothing except the things he wants: the mystic does not know even these. He knows nothing; he merely feels; he severs all connection between himself and things as they are. He can love without loving anything, see without seeing anything, fear without having anything to fear. "My heart is full of love," he says. "Love of what?" you ask. "Love of anything," he replies, — or "everything."

The confirmed mystic is incorrigible. He can never be restored to reason; can never be tamed or cured. He is a sleep-walker who never wakes up. Nevertheless, without being mystics there are few persons of sensibility who escape moments and even hours of mystic feeling, and, unless the mind is entirely cold, unless the fires of the heart are entirely dead, there are sure to come times when the kettle begins to boil, the lid begins to dance, and from the spout thought-steam mounts heavenward. Young love warms the life currents and sets thought-wreaths curling; the flow of sap in spring, the carol of birds, the strokes of death, the grinding of pain, the blows of adversity, the friction of struggle may supply to the overheated brain at unex-

pected moments the delicious pain of mystic outpour.

To some minds mysticism seems to be as refreshing — and as necessary — as sleep.

By no means would I seem to belittle the offices of feeling — it is inevitable that in moments of gratitude and extreme joy, in hours of need, distress, and weakness, man shall find strength in the mere thought of those vast, though unknown, sources of universal power, and shall turn to them as flowers to the sun. "There are times," says Homer, "when all folk yearn for the gods."

But in regard to feeling, as concerning everything else, our efforts should be to see it as it is. Feeling is purely subjective; is rooted in the ego. On the side of feeling man has long since ceased to grow. There are no such things as advanced feelings, there are only feelings. The bushman knows them all, just as we do. He hates, loves, hopes, fears, exults, reverences, despairs, mourns, laughs, weeps, scorns, covets, adores. There are a fixed number of feelings as there are a fixed number of colors in the spectrum. The colors may be deeper or paler and they may succeed one another slowly or they may whirl through the mind. But there are no new, no "higher" feelings. On the side of his intellect man's development can be indefinitely extended, but on the side of feeling there is no more to be done. No new or higher feeling can be produced; future progress is to be marked not by the effort to excite new feelings, but by the progressive harmonization of those we already have.

Some believers in man's progress take often their last argumentative stand upon the development in him of a new "spiritual" nature. What do they mean by this? I confess that the word spiritual has first and last provided me with considerable bewilderment, but after long consideration I have begun to hope that I at last understand what it means. It means thought-steam. It is a term which attempts to describe in one word a state of mind which is that of the rising of consciousness into vapor and its passing into the vasty vague.

Many causes may operate to bring about this state of mind. Sometimes it comes as a reaction after what is known as "sin," while the reaction from excessive grief as that from sin may produce a similar spiritual state of mind. It is very sweet, very soft and refreshing, like a warm bath or a healthy perspiration, and unfortunate are the hidebound souls who never experience it. (It may become an indulgence, however, and thus enervating. Have we not all known souls so weak that they break into spiritual perspiration and melt into the infinite at the slightest exertion?)

But what is the influence of mysticism upon conduct, for this after all must be our chief concern? Does the indulgence in mind-steaming and the spiritual warm bath make men better or worse? It may do either. On the one hand it may clear the vision and induce to right reason, or on the other it may simply relieve the sinner of some of the results of his sin and so merely facilitate his speedy return to sinfulness. The pugilist

employs a trainer to sponge off the blood from his face, between rounds, not by any means for the purpose of subduing the tiger within him, but solely to enable him to stand up and continue the fight. In the same manner does many a man (for instance) employ a preacher to talk to him about heaven and love and peace and brotherhood and God's infinite mercy merely by way of sponging the blood from his face and allowing him to catch his breath so that he can stand up again next day for another round more hard, more bitter, more relentless than before.

Mysticism bears precisely the same relation to conduct that sleep does. Gazing upon a human being asleep, who can say what his conduct is probably to be like when he wakes? We may surmise that if his life is set toward good, his sleep will probably strengthen him in the pursuit of good, but if his mind is bent upon evil, sleep will refresh and aid him toward the attainment of evil ends. Thus the mysticism of the Church has no doubt soothed men to some degree into the practise of good, but also no doubt it has furnished strength and refreshment to tyrants, plunderers, and oppressors, has made more easy and more effectual many deeds of wrong by renewing the vigor, again and again, of the doers of evil.

There is no certain cure for wrong conduct in mysticism. We know that it can provide the soul of man with temporary refreshment, but as with sleep, whether the refreshment it gives will be used to turn the mind to better ways, or whether it will serve merely as a means

of gathering strength for further evil, no man can say. Religion can be and is every day utilized in both of these ways.

The "new spiritual consciousness," which it is continually asserted has come to man with this new birth under Christianity, is not new. It is mind-steam, something which has been known ever since emotion has been applied to man's mind. When it is said that man now has a sense of "the infinite value of his soul," of the boundless love of God, of an endless realm of bliss, of intimate communion with the eternal — these are the phrases of mind-steam. Nor are these phenomena the discovery of the modern spiritual consciousness, since many ancient peoples were quite familiar with them. They, too, indulged in mystic raptures as a refreshment to the bruised or tortured, or wearied, or repentant soul. The Greeks, it is true, were more continent than the medieval or even the modern man, but this is because they were healthier, bodily and mentally, because they were more seldom "sorry and sad" and had not yet conceived the notion that evil is good. But they were not incapable of mysticism, using it nobly and with splendor, demonstrating their capacity through the exquisite rhapsody of the Eleusinian mysteries. In those ceremonies there was established, Sopater tells us, "a kinship of the soul with the divine" (a typical mystic statement). Cicero also says that from the mysteries men learned "not only to live happily, but to die with a fairer hope," and enthusiastic references to these sacred rites we find in the Homeric hymn, in Pindar, Sophocles,

Aristophanes, Plato (Phædo), Isocrates, Chrysippus, and others. Spirituality, as the mystic state is sometimes called, would thus seem to be far from being a strictly modern achievement (as many would have us believe), but was a mood familiar to ancient peoples and indulged in by them from time to time.

Man possesses two distinct methods of thought: the subjective and the objective. Some people practise, from habit, or education, or temperament, the one mode, while others find the converse mode more natural. To illustrate these two methods, let us think of two men being made acquainted for the first time with a stranger. The subjective thinker sees the stranger wholly in regard to his own interests, his likes and dislikes, and the impression which the stranger makes upon *him*. The objective thinker, on the contrary, endeavors to see the stranger just as he is in *himself*, and to avoid clouding his judgment by any subjective impressions. The latter tries to eliminate the personal equation while the subjective person lives entirely in the personal equation and never thinks out of it. The subjective mind looks inward, the objective outward. One is spiritual, the other scientific; one is self-conscious, the other is other-conscious. One dwells in feeling, the other in reason. ("The ego which reflects upon itself," says Rosmini, "finds that at bottom it is feeling.")

The growth of the human intellect takes place by means of the cross-fertilization possible between objective minds in contact with one another. It is clear that subjective minds, each self-centered and self-bounding,

cannot copulate. For purposes of progress they are sterile. It was the extraordinary number of objective minds existing in Greece in close contact with each other, with the mutual flowing in and out of streams of thought only possible in the freely opened channels of the objective intelligence — it was to this fact was due the marvelous fructification which resulted in phenomenal mental progress. This development was checked when the Hellenic type went down and the Hebraic took the ascendancy. Feeling then obtained precedence. But progress depends upon reason. Reason alone is stable and continuous. "As man's reasoning power develops," says Frederic Harrison, "all else develops likewise."

The most conspicuous quality of the Greeks was their capacity for objective thinking, in subordinating private interests to the attainment of a great collective ideal. In the time of Pericles, all the undertakings of Athens were of immediate, constant, and vital interest to every individual in the city. At the rebuilding of the wall, men, women, and children united in the work day and night. Each stone of the Parthenon as it swung into place caused a thrill of triumph in the breast of every man and woman, slave or free, in every corner of Athens. Amidst an infinite diversity of opinion, unity of feeling, popular enthusiasm, such as we are accustomed to witness only in time of war or political crisis, or other national excitement, was, so to speak, the usual, every-day condition of the Athenian citizens. One might almost say that the whole populace were builders, the whole people were architects, the entire population were sculptors, the

whole people were dramatists, and went in a body to the theater to pass judgment upon the play with a professional eye. A large proportion of the population seem to have written plays, which were turned out by the hundreds. The entire population was athletic, the whole people were journalists collecting and reporting the news to one another on street-corners. They were all orators and declaimed incessantly. Every one studied philosophy, philosophical symposia took place in every doorway and beside every fountain. Every one was interested in music and the entire body of citizens were incipient poets, as is witnessed by the popular authorship of the national mythology. Every one knew more or less of Homer by heart. Every one was familiar with the national history and recognized every allusion at the theater. Social intercourse was a passion with the people, who were all studying human nature.

They kept their religion fresh and interesting by adding constantly new forms suited to changing needs. All revered the accepted gods; all united in the celebration of the great festivals. There was a sense of union among the inhabitants of the city, never experienced with us except within the narrow confines of the family. The city resembled an enormous family of geniuses. The people were all interested in the concerns of each and all. They were all without exception politicians; a large proportion were statesmen. There were times in the history of Athens of which we may say that never elsewhere in the world's history have so large a proportion of a civilized community been bent upon the com-

mon good. This was made possible through their capacity for objective thinking.

"Through and through," writes Lowes Dickinson ("The Greek View of Life"), "the Greek ideal is unity. To make the individual at one with the state, the real with the ideal, the inner with the outer, art with morals; to bring all life under the empire of a single idea — the good and the beautiful."¹

¹ Bees, which are the Greeks among insects, have also a remarkable capacity for collective action, and they, too, have developed extraordinary intelligence. Among Hymenoptera, the chief order of bees (corresponding to the Athenians among Greeks) have, after man, the highest degree of intellect of all living creatures. The bees are as sociable as were the Greeks. Isolate a worker-bee and she soon dies of loneliness no matter how much food is given her. She absents herself unwillingly from the hive, as unwillingly as Socrates would have spent a day outside the walls of Athens. There is no tyrant permitted in the hive; it is strictly a republic. The queen wields no authority, she is but the embodiment of the hive's mother principle, the ark of future generations. The bees are as devoted to politics as were the Athenians, and at their conclaves eloquent orators wield, by appeals to reason, the same sway by which Pericles ruled Athens. The news of the hive circulates from bee to bee on wings of the wind. A disaster to the queen will be known in a short time to ten thousand bees, and all work will cease.

Bees have a truly Hellenic passion for order, for art, for activity. When engaged upon a wax Parthenon, their architectural labors halt neither day nor night. Bees exhibit also Hellenic *insouciance*. They know not the meaning of fear, and nothing save smoke, it is said, ever disturbs their well-bred assurance and truly Attic poise. The bee, like the Greek, finds boundless joy in her work, while the rapturous period of swarming is not unlike the solemn delight of the Greeks in the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries. Eagerness to work is so strong among bees that care has to be taken lest it be unfairly distributed. "The pride of toil," says Maeterlinck, "is required by a law of the hive to be divided, and every achievement, being anonymous, and common to all, becomes thereby more fraternal. It is in collective action that the bee has advanced." "In this concept," says Maeterlinck finely, "lies the germ of the religion of the future. For as it is the destiny of the bee to make honey, it is the destiny of man to make cerebral substance."

I can never hope to make this point clear to my reader unless he will do me the honor to try to understand that mysticism, in spite of any appearances to the contrary, is purely subjective. The mystic is credited with altruism because he professes to be drawn out of himself into the infinite. This is an illusion. What really takes place is that his self expands until, in the extreme of attenuation, it spreads over the universe. His consciousness dissolves, as in sleep. The characteristic of his vision is invariably drowsiness or vagueness. He does not — and he makes no effort to — see things clearly. He sees through a mist — the mist of himself — spread out very thin. Mystic thought is always indefinite and fluid because it swims in feeling — that is, in the self.

Now objective thinking takes place through exactly the opposite process. The objective mind is truly drawn out of itself and escapes from the ego entirely. Since the world is made up, not of indefinite feelings, but of definite objects, it follows that when the mind acts objectively it acts definitely. It seeks clearness above all else. It is able to cooperate with other objective minds in pursuit of a common ideal and the attainment of definite ends.

The capacity for objective thinking makes it possible for men to form a conception of a common aim and ideal, and only the possession of a common aim and ideal makes it possible for men to understand one another. The race can make no further progress except consciously. To accomplish this the race must know

itself—understand itself. For a race to understand itself, the individuals composing it must be able to understand *one another*, must be able to think objectively and hence be able to work toward a common end. We can scarcely imagine what this means! To-day men are so separated by all the differences which industrial anarchy can devise, or personal interest supply, that mutual understanding is difficult and hence men naturally oppose and seek to injure one another. Rich and poor, employer and employed, glare at each other, face to face, each in blank incomprehension of the other's point of view, or else in hate and anger, resisting the other's right even to have a different point of view. Both are incapable of turning their gaze away from each other and fixing it upon some point of *common interest*.

To do this would work their salvation. Not only would it moralize them — making henceforth unnecessary all the laws by which we now seek to prevent their tearing each other to pieces — but it would, in making them mutually comprehensible, open the sluices so that currents of thought might pass freely from mind to mind, nourishing and enriching one another like the red blood circulating in a healthy brain, or like the sweet waters of the hills flowing over the thirsty plains.

Two persons capable of objective thinking can, in discussion, keep in mind a common ideal and object in view, *i.e.*, the attainment of truth, and by sinking their subjective opinions may create new thought. But the moment that either comes to think subjectively,

then the birth of new thought is prevented, since the fructification of one mind by the other ceases to be possible. Intercourse, in the real meaning of the term, has stopped.

One hears it said that what the world needs is love. This is not true; what it needs is intelligence. The world cannot be administered by love any more than a locomotive can be run by the paint on its smoke-stack. There is no organizing power in love; love cannot direct or dispose or distribute or give justice; these things demand intelligence. Love cannot organize, love cannot know; love can only love. It was hoped that the gospel of love might be made to act as an antidote to the economics of strife, but the hope has proved vain because no emotion of any kind can be in its action other than transitory. Feeling is necessarily evanescent. Only reason stands. Society cannot be founded upon love any more than a house can be held up by the wall-paper on its walls. Love beautifies and enriches existence, but the notion of building society upon it must ever remain a foolish dream. Both the hatred and arrogance of the Old Testament, and the love and forgiveness of the New, are shifting sands. Men do not need to be hated or loved, punished or forgiven — they simply need to have their lives rationally organized. They need to be kept happily busy, working toward some end, *of common interest*, in the benefits of which all will share, which appeals to their honor, to their ambition, their enthusiasm, and which is so big that it can be attained only by collective endeavor.

Disturb men's relations, disorganize them so that they are forced to interfere with and oppose one another, and stimulated to rob, wrong, thwart, baffle, and wound one another — and they will inevitably hate one another. It is absurd to bid men "love one another" without having previously established a social system which permits them to do so.

Love is the last finishing touch, not the foundation-stone of society. Love is the rose, not the roots or soil. A highly organized person, in perfect health, emits love as a rose emits fragrance. In a well-organized society, built upon justice, well-organized people will inevitably love one another. Badly organized people, united into a badly organized society, *cannot love one another*. Men cannot, for instance, "love one another" so long as they are organized to prey upon one another. It is not in our power to love the persons we prey upon, still less to love those who prey upon us. The Church cuts a pitiable figure in urging men to do that which their economic system (which the Church upholds) makes impossible.

When people are in right relations to one another, when they are serviceable and interesting to one another, then only will they love one another.

CHAPTER V

CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS

It has been the aim of this book to show that progress consists in the improvement of the human species, not in the accumulation of more things or more facts; and that progress, under this definition, has not taken place since the downfall of the Greeks some two thousand years ago. In this concluding chapter I wish to indicate what radical changes in social structure are, in my view, the indispensable conditions of progress, without which it is not to be looked for. Let us first briefly review our main thesis.

Before it can be ascertained whether humanity is progressing or not, we have found that we must first come to an agreement as to what human progress is.

We may approach the inquiry from the standpoint of quantity or from that of quality. The first is the usual method and is purely illusory, for progress is a qualitative not a quantitative term. An increase of quantity in anything is in itself of no benefit until that increase has been translated into improved quality. For instance, if an apple grower, famous for the poor quality of his apples, increases the size of his orchard and doubles his income, he himself doubtless regards

this change as progress, and we too may admit that if by his increased income he is enabled, for instance, to restore an overworked wife to health, or to educate a defective child, or do something similar to these, his increased income conduces to progress. But the increase in quantity of his poor apples, whatever he may think of it, is not regarded as progress by the expert horticulturist, to whom progress (as applied to apples) means the production of a finer quality of fruit — that, and that only. Similarly, to increase the quantity of food consumed by a man is of benefit to him only if the increase is transmitted into greater strength; if it be not so converted, then it becomes only an augmented burden. Again, to increase the stores of human knowledge is a gain to mankind if thereby the human brain becomes stronger; if, on the contrary, the mind be thereby overtaxed, confused, and weakened, then increased knowledge becomes a curse instead of a blessing. To sum up, a complex civilization may become a Frankenstein and destroy its creator, if the creator weaken under the task of creation and lose control of his creature. There are many indications that our civilization is indeed a Frankenstein. We have by it called up demons of disease, for instance, which we cannot — or as yet have not proved ourselves able to — exorcise, we have created social conditions which we are powerless to master, we have created vast wealth which we are impotent to distribute with equity, we have called into being explosive engines whose throttle we cannot hold. It sometimes seems that our civilization is running away

with us, that we have lost control of it and are being dragged at its heels.

This disaster is attributable to the illusion under which we labor in habitually mistaking quantity for quality. We insist, for instance, in regarding things as wealth and, believing, truly, that we cannot have too much wealth, we therefore assume that we cannot have too many things. But things may or may not be convertible into wealth. { If a rich woman dies from heart disease for lack of exercise, how can her carriage, which prevented her from walking, be regarded as wealth, even although her heirs are able to convert it into cash? Or what wealth was there in the dose of poison which the suicide purchased, although he paid money for it? There is no wealth but life. Riches, freedom, opportunity, education, democratic government, commerce, civilization, — all these have but one rational end, namely, to produce a higher type of mankind. A “better” society is one which produces better human beings; improved civilization is one that shows improved individuals. Human progress consists in producing a finer and finer breed of men and women, the final test of their quality being their relative degree of pure intelligence.

The proof of this statement, that progress refers only to improved quality without regard to quantity, can be plainly seen if we glance back upon the historic rise of our race, looking at it in the light of the doctrine of our accepted masters, the evolutionists. If the anthropoid ape, of Darwinian association, had been content

to remain an anthropoid ape, satisfying himself with the gratifications contingent upon a continually increasing census report of the population of Apeville, *we* should never have arrived. Or had savage tribes increased and multiplied until they covered all the earth, progress would not thereby have taken place. It is no less true that the indefinite multiplication of human beings, *such as we are*, will not constitute progress. Furthermore, even the increase in the total amount of wealth, owned by beings such as we are, does not in itself constitute progress. If you place a gun in the hands of a child, you do not render him less a child, although you do increase, it is true, his ability to blow some one's head off. The scepter of the czar puts power in his hand, but does not make him into a powerful man. Riches make kings out of ordinary men; they do not make great men even out of kings; possessions in relation to innate power are as the wax apples hung upon a Christmas tree compared to living fruit. Progress is intrinsic, not extrinsic. } *

There is at present rising into view a new science, that of eugenics, the aim of which (that of producing by selective parentage new and improved varieties of human kind) is especially alluring to a scientific age. Auto- evolution, as it might be called (or human selection as against natural selection), seems a logical sequence to the doctrines of evolution. Moreover, it revives the hopes of many schools of social philosophers who are at present sorely discouraged by the comparative failure of religion, of democracy, of education, to effect the ben-

efits to humanity which were so confidently expected of them. In this moment of disheartenment, the eugenicist steps forward to propound a new and a more fundamentally revolutionary scheme than has as yet been considered, since it involves nothing less than the breeding of an entirely new and higher order of men.

“All our tinkering is in vain,” he declares. “Man’s sin, folly, ugliness, ignorance, cannot be prayed away, nor taught away, nor legislated away. We must begin from the beginning. These defects must be bred out, as breeders exterminate bad points in plants and animals, and in place of them, intelligence, strength, and beauty must be bred in. Salvation by selective parentage is to be our new watchword.”

No more alluring prospect could be held up to the sorrowing and impatient lover of his kind. Think of breeding poets to order like Saint Andreasberg canaries, or Abraham Lincolns as required! Think of winning blue ribbons with lovely young girls and athletic boys bred and groomed for the show! Think of securing Rockefellers or Carnegies in one’s family at will, and thus successfully replenish the family coffers!

Alas for the vanity of these hopes! Eugenics in its present amorphous condition, while it presents no end which seems to be unattainable, presents no beginning which seems to be feasible. Many decades must be passed in the bare effort to accustom men to the idea. Long, long years the deliberate improvement of human breeds must be discussed and dreamed of before it can be done. For this, which is the most stupendous task

man has ever attempted, will need his all of intelligence, will, endurance, and foresight.

Moreover, before such an undertaking can be fairly tried, the possibilities of man as he is should be fully unfolded. Burbank, before attempting to breed new attributes into his plants, first made sure, by trying them out in the golden sunshine of a California garden, that the qualities they already possessed should be evolved in full. Otherwise he might have mistaken for new qualities those which were merely dormant. Our human species similarly needs full and free development in the glorious sunshine of an equitable social order. It will be in order then to prepare the breeding ground for the coming of the Superman.

Among the conditions indispensable, in the present writer's view, for the best development of the species as it is, is to be counted a check in the present movement of woman into outside industry, and her reentrance into the home. I am aware that her present exodus is being generally heralded by persons who do not rightly understand woman nature as a mark of progress, but I regard it as a calamity to the human race. By thus tearing her up by the roots, the vessel which for ages has conserved the seeds of memory, ideality, piety, art, and the affections is being rudely handled. Woman in the crowd, woman in competitive industry, in office, factory, and shop, woman in herds, deprived of the nesting instinct, deprived of solitude, has no time for memory, for the affections, for the quiet brooding of the mind in which ideals are born and cherished. Inac-

curately estimated as an indication of social progress, this movement is in reality a symptom of economic disease. It means that wealth is being so irrationally distributed that men cannot by ordinary exertion support their families. Women and children must go out to work to help them out. The craftsman has been put into the factory and made a "hand." Next his wife and children are made "hands." All become "hands" instead of persons. Personality fades. The old order is breaking up. The family is disintegrating, and the process will work irreparable injury to human life. Work mechanized, the family scattered, woman denaturalized, how can any one be so fatuous as to see progress in these things! It is not important that more wealth should be produced, but that what we have already shall be properly distributed. It is not important that some men should be rich, but that all men should have enough.

This is an old complaint that I am making, and one that has been more ably stated by others. All students of society know it to be well founded. Where the present process of turning men into machines is to end nobody knows. We are hurling along like a runaway locomotive on a track which grows more desolate as we go on. Uncontrolled economic forces working themselves out seemingly disconnected from man's will and reason are driving us on. Yet I, for one, believe that man who has mastered other mechanism will one day take control of this. When he fully realizes what lies ahead on the track which he is pursuing, he will lay

a firm hand himself upon the wheel and will reverse the engine. What will happen then?

Our present trend will slow down. Many influences at present flowing in one direction will turn back and flow in another direction. Wealth, for example, now driven to concentration, will then tend to diffusion. The concentration of population in monstrous cities will be checked and the people will return to the land. The diffusion of wealth will reintegrate the family; women and children will return to the home.

The normal habitat for the normal family is undoubtedly in the country, with space and quiet and fresh air. The rearing of children in cities should be prohibited by law. If cities are necessary, suburbanism may be resorted to, but it should exempt children. The State must recognize the inalienable human right of every child to be brought up on a farm. Both parents in the normal family should be workers; the man at coarser, more aggressive, or more gregarious occupations outside of the home; the woman at finer sorts within the home. Both should labor but a few hours a day, and should enjoy abundant leisure to devote to their own culture and to the education of their children. The children too should perform some slight but useful labor, and should attend school for two or three hours a day only, mainly for purposes of discipline and to acquire the rudiments of education in a few routine studies. Their individual development should be early specialized, and some of their special studies should be conducted by their parents (in whom prepa-

ration for this task should be part of their own cultural development), others by special masters provided by the State. All of the family should train itself to live frugally and simply, with a hearty devotion to the development of fine health, to the worship of beauty, and to the unwearied strengthening and expansion of their own intellectual faculties. This is the ideal family.

Government should exist for the sole purpose of securing these conditions and of *producing people of this sort*. It should forbid and prevent the accumulation of disproportionate wealth in private hands. It should secure to all men the right to labor, and the enjoyment of full and generous compensation for a few hours' labor outside of the home. It should secure to women equally generous remuneration for lighter tasks performed within the home. The development of water-power electricity may provide every cottage and farmhouse with the means of effective and economical wealth-production. A motherhood pension might secure woman's economic independence, and the disappearance of the servant class provide her with ample occupation in the home. The State should provide adequate elementary schools with a greatly shortened curriculum, and abundant masters for individual instruction in special lines of development. In other words, that individual tutoring and expert training, now the privilege of the aristocrat only, should be within the reach of all. The State should exercise absolute power in the securing of public health, and it should provide abundant oppor-

tunity for athletic sports and outdoor recreation of all kinds for all classes.

The family is the garden in which ideal human beings are produced. The function of the State is to protect and foster the family; to prevent its debilitation either by luxury or by want, to cast about it the sheltering mantle of collective power and to supplement its ordinary functions by the services of experts.

The disintegration of the family is the chief of the ill consequences arising out of a bad economic system which permits the undue concentration of wealth. All the strange reasoning current in the "woman's movement" is symptomatic of the same disease. For example, it is said that woman has been dwarfed by confinement in the home. (This is said in the very face of what many of us know our Puritan home-keeping grandmothers to have been!) And man's struggle for wealth in the outside competitive world is said to have "broadened" and developed him so that he has "outstripped" her. An exponent of this theory has remarked that woman is "thousands of years behind man" in development. This lady might as well say that a pedestrian's right leg at a given moment was a mile ahead of his left leg. Man and woman are limbs of the same torso; one of them can never outstrip the other, so so long as men are born of women, and women are begotten by men. Woman is always, under all circumstances, the female of her species, of her contemporary species — not of the species of some other time and place. She is always the "equal" of man,

always has been, always will be, as the left foot is the "equal" of the right. Nevertheless she differs from him in temperament, and therefore flourishes better under a somewhat different environment.

It has been proven that babies cannot live in herds. The baby is the prince of individualists; he is the source of the individualism of the family. Scarcely less than to children is gregariousness injurious to women. They do not enjoy the society of other women as men enjoy the companionship of their sex. Women are not associative; they cooperate unwillingly. Women's clubs resolve themselves into lecture courses whose audiences disperse at the close of the performance, while men meet night after night, not to hear "papers" but for the solid enjoyment of being together. Women cannot endure much of each others' society. They tire one another. Under the excitement of prolonged social intercourse they become cross and critical. The "society" woman, addicted to this unnatural excitement, almost invariably becomes nervously diseased. An army composed of women, an arctic excursion or fishing expedition of women doomed to spend years exclusively in each others' society, would become quite mad. Their delicate susceptibilities could not stand the prolonged strain of contact with other minds equally erratic in their orbits as their own. Women, like children, cannot organize without unnatural strain; they resist socialization. They have been ordained from the beginning of the world to be the conservators of individualism, and of the subjective, personal elements of thought.

They are the priestesses of the private, inner life. They are always present at the birth of new religions and these are fostered chiefly by them throughout their existence. It would be well for the world if it left religion exclusively in the hands of women. Man's touch is too rough; he brushes the bloom from the fresh spiritual content of young religions. By his coarse talent for organization, and his passion for gregariousness, he presently stiffens it into ecclesiasticism and by his artificial dogmatism encompasses the beginning of the end. In the delicate hands of women, a religion would live longer and wither less rapidly. By temperament women are intimate, intense, concentrated. At their worst, very narrow; at their best, very sweet and very deep, for depth and sweetness are the attributes of the secluded, silent life of the spirit—the life of feeling rather than action. If women are to be withdrawn from this life, if they are no longer to be set apart to conserve this vital half of the psychic function of humanity, who, pray, is there left to perform this task? Or is it to be allowed to fade out of our common heritage, leaving us by so much the poorer?

If we examine society we find that it consists, roughly speaking, of three portions—the main trunk or column, which is made up of “the common people,” of whom it may be said that their attributes are chiefly negative. They are not very intellectual, not excessively energetic, own little or no property, are not extravagantly virtuous, are not ferociously courageous. Whenever individuals among them develop these qualities in

larger measure they quickly separate themselves from the mass and become scholars, rulers, capitalists, saints, generals, as the case may be. The "common people" are none of these. They remain where they are. Their lives are occupied mainly with the fundamental human functions, work and offspring.

The other two portions of society consist in a body of talented persons who have succeeded in escaping from the "common people," and, at the other extremity, another body of very poor and faulty persons who have dropped out at the bottom of it. For brevity I am in the habit of describing these three divisions of the human army into "the main column," "the runaways," and "the dropped-outs." There are also stragglers, but these belong mainly with the "dropped-outs" and need not specially concern us.

Now it is in the main column or trunk of society consisting of "the common people" that the whole question of human progress centers. This is the true human race; the other portions are excrescences or putrescences. The possibilities of a nation's progress are to be measured solely in this spot, by the vigor and happiness of the "common people."

All persons who separate themselves from this class do so at their peril, and sooner or later racial starvation confronts them, because it is in the common people — within the confines of this most intensely human domain — that issue the great food supplies of human growth. The intellect which has become separated from this nutritive center withers and dies. Ambition

and talent, cutting themselves off from this dynamo, lose the life currents there generated, and run down. Here in this inexhaustible soil of "common humanity" lie the chemical elements of progress, and it is the seed here implanted which fructifies.

The epochs of highest vitality among the common people were the days of the largest output of genius, and, by our hypothesis, the epochs of progress. In its heyday, the superabundant vigor of this class was made manifest in the fact that its labor was easily performed and left it with a fund of surplus energy which it instinctively employed in creative activity. At the end of the day's work, in those happy epochs, men and women were not tired. This is the chief item of interest in their history. This is the import of all their great art. "At the end of our day's work we were *not tired*." Keen and lively *after* their day's work was done, they turned joyously to the making of things of beauty, since such is the natural outlet for the fresh, unwearied sensibilities of strong persons. It is in their play that men reveal their true condition. The ancient philosopher said, "Tell me how a man employs his leisure and I will tell you his true character." When men's work has been coarse or excessive, their coarsened minds turn to coarse pleasures. The amusements and relaxations of the common people in the happiest epochs of human history, in Greece under Pericles, in Rome under the Antonines, in Italy of the Renaissance, in England under Elizabeth, were creative, not absorptive; active, not passive. These men bubbled with the joy of living and at such moments

any achievement to which they turned was bound to reflect their abounding vitality.

At the close of the day's work the "common people" were not tired. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this statement. They danced upon the green — whence come the folk-dances. They sang songs — whence come the folk-songs. They told stories to one another — whence come folk-lore, the sagas, epics, and wondrous myths of the early peoples. The mythology of Greece — man's greatest poem — what was it but stories told one another by men and women who, though they had worked by day, in the evening were *not tired*?

Our common people also invent myths and tell tales at the close of the day — the tales and myths of yellow journalism, which proves, not how depraved, but how tired they are. Watch them — sitting in rows, homeward bound in street-cars. Their day's work is over, now comes freedom and leisure, the time of joy and creativeness. What are they doing? Buried behind their newspapers, they are reading of murders, suicides, scandals, corruption. Later they will seek the saloon, the dance hall, the theater, to be passively and coarsely amused, to stupefy themselves with narcotics, mental and physical. Or they will sit at home smoking to deaden the dull ache of bruised senses. This tells the tale of minds bereft of joy, bereft of elasticity and freshness and of creative power. It tells of minds beaten flat, bleached, desiccated, benumbed, and rendered sterile by the shriveling influence of their daily tasks. Progress does not grow in this kind of soil.

It is the common cant of the day — especially in political circles — to address this class as though they were full-grown, mature, sovereign citizens, but nothing could be further from the truth. They are but children of a larger growth; their distinguishing characteristic is their immaturity. But if they are children, then the human race is childish and the persons who appear to be mature are but prodigies, abnormal variations. The race advances only as fast as the common people advance; the rest is but seeming. It is characteristic of these “sports” or prodigies that they tend to become “runaways,” hastening as fast as possible to get away from the “common people,” whose society they do not enjoy. This their superior maturity enables them to do without much difficulty, for they can always outwit the people as grown persons can outwit children. In the hands of a powerful magnate, for example, the common people are as helpless as a bird in the grasp of a giant. They flutter and squirm but they cannot escape, for he can think faster than they can.

It is to be noted that at the bottom of their hearts the “common people” know very well that they are children. This is why they are always seeking for a father, why they long for some one who is wiser and stronger than they are, who will guide and cherish them. This is why when they have found such a father (as Washington or Lincoln) they worship his memory. The common people love and revere wise, fatherly, good men. They would gladly give up all their weary attempts at self-government and the flim-flam humbug of democracy

if they knew some wise, kind, strong, fatherly leader to whom they could safely entrust their fate. It is "the inhuman dearth of noble minds" which has driven them into democracy — their best instincts teach them better. For to them the fact is not hidden that what matters is not the form of government under which they live, but what sum of actual happiness comes to be their portion. One form is as good as another so *that* is accomplished. When the people are healthy and happy, and when they are permitted to love their work and love their play, when they are guided and cherished like well-born children, then — no matter under what form of government it is accomplished or who does it — the will of the people rules — for *this is the will of the people*.

In the march of humanity it is the "common people" who form the main column. What must be their fate when all the wisest and strongest hurry on ahead of the column and take most of the wealth along with them? The column of children left behind are poor, simple-minded, helpless, errant, bewildered. They strive hard; they work and struggle. They long to break away and escape from their misery, as they see the strong grown-ups doing. But they don't know how.

Why is it that the energetic, the shrewd, the capable are so anxious to leave them behind? Why do these classes strain every nerve to shake off the society of the "common people"? Why do the intellectuals despise and avoid them? Why is every one trying his utmost to separate himself from this class?

Because life among them is not what it should be. Though they are children, the joyous, care-free life of children is denied them (and nothing is more pathetic than children on whom has been imposed tasks beyond their capacity). They are not merry and well cared for; they do not appeal to the imagination and the affections as their class have done in happier epochs. They are careworn and dull, often vicious, coarse, vulgar, cross. Life is hard in the world of the "common people." There is overwork there, and wrong, and worry, ignorance, monotony, fear.

While this is their condition it is no wonder that all who can do so, break loose from them and struggle upward toward light and air and freedom, typifying education, wealth, power.

And yet it is all wrong. There can be no real light and air and freedom, no real education, real wealth, real power in the region where the common people are not. There is no escape while they are left behind. The elders who have forsaken them have no future except in them! There is no advance without their advance; no rise except their rise. The deepest, richest human life is among them. There run the currents of human destiny, there march the cohorts of the human species, there are the sources of human growth. That is the soil in which each seed of progress must be planted and there that it must germinate.

Some day all men shall remain in this class. None shall escape, no, not one! There shall be no more "runaways." The intellect, the energy, the power, the

talent, which now are ever seeking to break the human compact, shall then cleave to it. All shall abide by the covenant. In this, the central, vital part of the human organism, the strength, the capacity, the energy must be integrated. The race must pull itself together. The common people shall not be deserted, left behind. The column must form a solid compact body. It must stay together.

Since the migrations of men follow the migrations of wealth, when the wealth of the nation is anchored in this class, all activities will center there; comfort and security will accompany the normal functions of labor and will glorify that estate.

Therefore social wealth must be anchored within the confines of the common people's domain. With it will return the "runaways," bringing with them the judgment, courage, resource, intelligence of mature minds and, in turn, receiving from the child-like masses the priceless gifts of creativeness and the future!

The way will then have been made open for the most stupendous task which man can attempt. He can then take his destiny into his own hands. Through selective parentage and the deliberate breeding of higher types — under the laws of what I have ventured to call auto-evolution — he may move toward vistas of indescribable expansion.

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